¶1Concurring:
¶2¶ 1 I join -with the majority that the sentences for statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors merge for sentencing purposes in these two cases. I write separately to express my views as to why. The standard for determining if a single crimi*85nal act may support multiple sentences remains whether the two crimes are greater and lesser included offenses. Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 Pa. 527, 538, 716 A.2d 593, 599 (1998) and Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 582, 650 A.2d 20, 24 (1994).
¶3¶2 When comparing elements of two distinct offenses, it is likely that there will be some parts of the statute which are inapplicable to the case at hand. Our Supreme Court has recognized this and stated that “any merger analysis must proceed on the basis of its facts, some aspects of the statute are relevant while others are not.” Comer, 552 Pa. at 539 n. 15, 716 A.2d at 599 n. 15 (1998) and Anderson, 538 Pa. at 582 n. 3, 650 A.2d at 24 n. 3 (1994). Therefore, two offenses cannot be greater and lesser included offenses based upon an element of a crime which is not applicable or relevant to the particular facts of a case.
¶4¶ 3 In each case at bar, the act that corrupted was an act of sexual intercourse. We are not concerned with those parts of the corruption of minor statute that address aiding, abetting, enticing or encouraging a minor in the commission of a crime. Accordingly, the Commonwealth may not argue that because statutory sexual assault does not require a defendant to aid, entice, or encourage a minor in the commission of a crime, that an element of corruption of a minor is not included in the elements of statutory sexual assault.
¶5¶ 4 Accordingly, when applying the facts of this case to the elements, we see that statutory sexual assault requires that Appellant engage in sexual intercourse with a minor less than sixteen. Corruption of a minor requires that Appellant engage in sexual intercourse that corrupted or tended to corrupt a minor under the age of eighteen.
¶6¶ 5 The Commonwealth argues that the elements of statutory sexual assault are not included in the corruption of minor charge because, while there may be sexual intercourse to satisfy the sexual assault statute, the sexual intercourse does not necessarily have to be an act that corrupts minors. I find such reasoning clearly erroneous. The data supports that minor victims of sexual assault are themselves likely to become perpetrators of sexual assault either as juveniles or as adults. The consequences of these actions may haunt these victims the rest of their lives. Thus, I believe the act of sexual intercourse with a minor necessarily corrupts or tends to corrupt. Therefore, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 Pa. 527, 538, 716 A.2d 593, 599 (1998) and Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 582, 650 A.2d 20, 24 (1994), the facts of these two cases establish that statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors merge for sentencing purposes.
¶7Concurring and Dissenting:
¶8¶ 1 I join that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the sentences for statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors merge for sentencing purposes as to the crimes committed by Appellant Walter Smith.
¶9¶ 2 However because I conclude that facts of the Gatling case involve more than one criminal act, I believe it is unnecessary to engage in a merger analysis in the Gatling case. As stated in the Majority opinion, Gatling told the child “to lie face down on the couch, climbed on top of her and rubbed his penis against her buttocks.” Majority Opinion at-. He then proceeded to have the child turn over “whereupon he pulled down her pants, then his own, and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her.” Id. The Majority concludes from these facts that Gatling committed “a single criminal act,” and with *86this conclusion I cannot agree. Gatling’s initial actions could support a conviction for corrupting the morals of a minor while his later actions, in which he turned the child over and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her, support a conviction of statutory sexual assault. Although the two events occurred only moments apart they were two separate criminal actions committed on this child. Because the same facts are not the basis to support the convictions, the merger question is inapplicable. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20 (1994).
¶10¶ 3 HUDOCK, J., STEVENS, J., and ORIE MELVIN, J. join this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.