¶1(concurring).
¶2[¶ 30.] The genesis of this case grows out of the providing of funeral services by Quinn. Unlike many other trades and services, this is now considered a profession subject to substantial licensing and regulation by the State of South Dakota. See generally SDCL chapter 36-19. Born of *41necessity in our frontier days, the profession has clearly evolved over the years to its current position in our society. In so doing, it has shed any claim of a right to caveat erwptor or doing what the market will bear.
¶3[¶ 31.] SDCL 36-19-38 prohibits the following conduct by a person licensed to practice funeral service:
(4) [N]ot a person of good moral character;
(5) Shall be guilty of gross or willful malpractice in the business of funeral service or funeral directing;
(6) Shall be guilty of willful violation of any section of this chapter, or any rule or regulation of the board, or any rule or regulation of the state or any municipal board ... governing the disposition ... of dead human bodies....
¶4SDCL 36-19-41 declares a violation of any provision of SDCL chapter 36-19 to be a class 2 misdemeanor.
¶5[¶ 32.] Nevertheless, for reasons including the failure to legally enact “guidelines,” acts of prosecutorial discretion, stipulated facts precluding consideration of the most egregious acts, trial tactics and admissions by counsel, we do not sit in direct judgment on the actions of Quinn against an elderly widow and the taxpayers of Pennington County. Instead, we are limited to the very narrow issue addressed today by the Court. The opinion of the Court within these legal limits correctly decides that narrow issue.
¶6[¶ 33.] However, this is hardly a vindication of the actions of Quinn. As noted by the Court today, in the future he may well be called to answer for his acts in civil, criminal or administrative tribunals. Today I can only look at the entire factual record, shake my head and sympathize with the writing of the Chief Justice.