¶1(concurring specially).
¶2[¶ 36.] I write specially to point out that the trial court clearly erred in denying Frawley the right to intervene under SDCL 15-6-24(a)(2). Our intervention statute provides in relevant part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
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the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest ... unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties,
¶3(emphasis added). Frawley’s application to intervene was timely, it related to the property and the transaction, which interest was not adequately represented by the County, and the disposition would impair or impede his ability to protect his interest. On every count or factor, we are faced with the same rationale for allowing Frawley to intervene. Neither the parties nor the trial court really dispute this. Therefore, the trial court was not “technically correct” but incorrect.
¶4[¶ 37.] Nevertheless, the trial court acted contrary to its own ruling and allowed Frawley to argue on the merits as if intervention was permitted. In fact, so did we. Therefore, the incorrect ruling was ignored by the trial court and Frawley can complain of no prejudice. “No harm, no foul.” I concur specially to keep the law on this point correct, not incorrect.