State v. Dillon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 72 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Absent exceptional circumstances, we will not address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. We depart from this principle only when trial counsel was “so ineffective and counsel’s representation ‘so casual’ as to represent a ‘manifest usurpation’ of [the defendant’s] constitutional rights.” The preferred arena for an ineffective assistance claim is a habeas corpus proceeding. While there are many reasons for this rule, [appellant’s] claims illustrate its main purpose: in habeas proceedings, attorneys charged with ineffectiveness can explain or defend their actions and strategies, and thus a more complete picture of what occurred is available for review, (citations omitted).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Cottrill · State v. Hauge

2. “Rape is an act of sexual penetration accomplished with any person under any of the following circumstances: (1) If the victim is less than ten years of age ...”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Perovich · State v. Lafferty

3. “In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Supreme Court held that ‘where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.’ See also Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 , 113 S.Ct. at 2856 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). Still, the Blockburger test is ‘a rule of statutory construction to help determine legislative intent’ and ⅛ not controlling when the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.’ Garrett [v. United States ], 471 U.S. [773,] 778-79, 105 S.Ct. [2407,] 2411, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 [ (1985) ] (citations omitted). Thus, multiple charges and punishments in a single prosecution will not violate double jeopardy if the Legislature plainly intended to impose cumulative punishments. [Missouri v.] Hunter, 459 U.S. [359,] 368-69, 103 S.Ct. [673,] 679, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 [ (1983) ]. [[Image here]] ‘[S]imply because two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test does not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes.’ Id. at 359 , 103 S.Ct. 673 . Courts cannot impose multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same conduct but the Legislature can. See”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Weaver