Martindale v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo.1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination because the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess “the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions.” Id. The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de novo. Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo.1995).”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. McAuliffe · Guzman v. State

2. ““The investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime.” Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220 (citing Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683 [ (Wyo. 1982) ]; see also Putnam [v. State], 995 P.2d [632] at 637 [ (Wyo.2000) ]); and McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999). We have a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: (1) whether the officer’s actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance. Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 680 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). An officer’s conduct is judged by an objective standard which takes into account the totality of the circumstances. Putnam, 995 P.2d at 637; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81 ; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir.1996). Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 52, ¶ 11 , 24 P.3d 1138, ¶ 11 (2001). In applying this test, the Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.C”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rice v. State

3. ““The investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime.” Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220 (citing Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683 [ (Wyo.1982) ]); see also Putnam [v. State], 995 P.2d [632] at 637 [ (Wyo.2000) ]; and McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999). We have a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatoiy stop: (1) whether the officer’s actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance. Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. at 1879 ); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 , 105 S.Ct. 675, 680 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). An officer’s conduct is judged by an objective standard which takes into account the totality of the circumstances. Putnam, 995 P.2d at 637; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81 ; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir.1996).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Damato v. State