Lee v. SSA CV-00-477-M 01/03/02
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Alan D. Lee,
Claimant
v. Civil No. 0 0-477-M
Opinion No. 2002 DNH 002
Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Respondent
O R D E R
Claimant, Alan D. Lee,1 brings this action seeking an order
reversing the Commissioner's dismissal of his most recent
application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act (the "Act"). In response, the
Commissioner says the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this dispute and, therefore, moves to dismiss.
1 Claimant's counsel refers to him as both "Alan D. Lee"
and "Alan Lee D." Compare Claimant's objection to motion to
dismiss (document no. 9) and objection to motion to reopen
(document no 6) with Claimant's complaint (document no. 1).
Because the Social Security Administration has consistently
referred to claimant as "Alan D. Lee," the court has done so as
well.
Background
The facts underlying this action are undisputed. See
Claimant's objection (document no. 9) at para. 1. In February of
1996, proceeding pro se, claimant filed an application for
disability insurance benefits. On June 13, 1996, claimant's
application was denied at the initial level of administrative
review, based upon a finding that he was not disabled at any time
prior to the expiration of his insured status (March 31, 1996) .
Claimant did not request further administrative (or judicial)
review of that denial.
In December of 1997 (i.e., after his insured status had
expired), claimant filed a second application for disability
insurance benefits, saying "new and material" evidence had come
to light that supported his initial claim for benefits by showing
that, contrary to the Commissioner's original decision, he was
disabled prior to March 31, 1996. That application was denied
both initially and on reconsideration. Claimant then requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
2
On May 21, 1999, accompanied by his wife and attorney,
claimant appeared and testified at a hearing before an ALJ. The
ALJ treated claimant's application as both an effort to reopen
the earlier (1996) adverse disability decision and a second
application for disability benefits. After considering
claimant's testimony and reviewing the new evidence he submitted,
the ALJ concluded that:
the evidence regarding [claimant's post traumatic
stress syndrome], while it may be new, is not material.
There is no evidence that claimant's symptoms were
anything more than fleeting before [his insured status
expired in] March, 1996. Although symptoms have
increased to the point where treatment was required in
1998, the record does not show that PTSD significantly
impacted claimant's ability to perform basic workrelated activities prior to March 31, 1996.
Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of John J. Timlin, ALJ Decision of June
21, 1999, at 3.
Having concluded that "there is no new and material evidence
relating to the previously adjudicated period," the ALJ declined
to reopen or revise the decision denying claimant's first
application for disability benefits. I d ., at 3-4. See also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.987 through 404.989 (discussing the circumstances
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under which an otherwise final and binding decision denying
benefits may be reopened). Next, treating claimant's request as
a second application for disability benefits, the ALJ concluded
that it must be dismissed on grounds of administrative res
judicata. ALJ decision at 3-4. See also 20 C.F.R. §
404.957(c)(1) (providing that res judicata applies when the
Commissioner "has made a previous determination or decision under
this subpart about your rights on the same facts and on the same
issue or issues, and this previous determination or decision has
become final by either administrative or judicial action.").
On August 19, 2000, the Appeals Council denied claimant's
request that it review the ALJ's decision. Claimant then filed
this action, seeking an order reversing the ALJ's decision.
Discussion
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
4 0 5 (g), provides the exclusive means by which dissatisfied
claimants may obtain judicial review of adverse disability
rulings issued by the Commissioner. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(h). It
provides, in pertinent part, that, "Any individual, after any
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final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after
a hearing to which he was a party, . . . may obtain [judicial]
review of such decision." (emphasis supplied).
This case presents three related questions. First, whether
the Commissioner's decision to deny claimant's request to reopen
his initial application for benefits constitutes a "final
decision of the Commissioner," subject to judicial review under
section 405(g). Second, whether the Commissioner's decision to
dismiss claimant's second application on grounds of res judicata
constitutes a reviewable final order. And, finally, regardless
of the answer to those questions, whether the ALJ's adverse
decision in this particular case is nonetheless a reviewable
final order, since it was issued only after the ALJ conducted a
hearing at which claimant testified. Unfortunately for claimant,
the answer to each question is "no." Consequently, the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised in his
complaint.
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Administrative Decisions Not to Reopen Earlier Claims.
In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Supreme
Court resolved the first of the three questions presented in this
case, holding that neither the Social Security Act nor the
Administrative Procedure Act vests district courts with subject
matter jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's discretionary
decision not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for Social
Security benefits. I d ., at 107-08. The Court concluded that the
Social Security Act:
clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of
agency action, a "final decision of the [Commissioner]
made after a hearing." But a petition to reopen a
prior final decision may be denied without a hearing as
provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). Indeed, the
opportunity to reopen final decisions and any hearing
convened to determine the propriety of such action are
afforded by the [Commissioner's] regulations and not by
the Social Security Act. Moreover, an interpretation
that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by
filing and being denied a petition to reopen his claim
would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly
evidenced in [42 U.S.C. § 405(g)], to impose a 60-day
limitation upon judicial review of the [Commissioner's]
final decision on the initial claim for benefits.
Congress' determination to so limit judicial review to
the original decision denying benefits is a policy
choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or
belated litigation of stale eligibility claims. Our
duty, of course, is to respect that choice.
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I d . at 108.2 See also Colon v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 877 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1989) ("neither the Social
Security Act nor the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes
judicial review of a final decision of the [Commissioner] not to
reopen a claim of benefits.") . Consequently, this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the ALJ's decision not to reopen
claimant's original application for disability benefits.
II. Res Judicata and Dismissal of Subsequent Petitions.
As to decisions by the Commissioner dismissing second or
subsequent applications for disability benefits on grounds of res
judicata, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review
them as well. See Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 845 F.2d 1136, 1138 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Absent a
colorable constitutional claim not present here, a district court
does not have jurisdiction to review the [Commissioner's]
discretionary decision not to reopen an earlier adjudication.
Similarly, a dismissal of a hearing request on res judicata
2 The Court acknowledged the possibility that in certain
"rare instances," district courts might have jurisdiction over
challenges to the Commissioner's refusal to reopen prior
petitions for benefits, when such challenges raise constitutional
issues. Califano. 430 U.S. at 109. Here, however, claimant
advances no constitutional claims in his complaint.
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grounds, where the current claim has the same factual basis as
the earlier decision, is not reviewable.") (citation omitted);
Matos v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 581 F.2d
282, 286 (1st Cir. 1978) ("In light of the rationale in Sanders,
we hold that this court is without jurisdiction to examine
appellant's claim which was denied as res judicata.").
III. Judicial Review After Administrative Hearings.
As noted above, section 4 0 5 (g) provides that a claimant may
seek judicial review of "final orders" of the Commissioner that
have been issued "after a hearing to which he was a party."
Relying on a literal reading of that language, claimant
mistakenly (but, perhaps, understandably) argues that since the
ALJ conducted a "hearing" on his second application for benefits,
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) specifically vests this court with
jurisdiction to entertain his challenge to the ALJ's decision.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has, however,
repeatedly rejected that very argument.
In Rios v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 614
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), the court of appeals addressed precisely
the argument advanced in this case and conceded that, because the
ALJ issued his adverse ruling only after conducting a hearing,
"[t]he present case appears to fit literally within the language
of § 4 0 5 (g) authorizing judicial review of 'any final decision of
the [Commissioner] made after a hearing.'" I d ., at 26.
Nevertheless, relying primarily on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Califano, the court concluded that "the district court was
without jurisdiction" over claimant's appeal. Id. In support of
that holding, the court reasoned:
[T]he Supreme Court has suggested quite strongly that
the type of "hearing" referred to in § 405(g) is
limited to those mandated by the Act. A purely
discretionary hearing such as that held here for
purposes of receiving allegedly new and material
evidence is not a "hearing" within the meaning of
§ 4 0 5 (g).
I d ., at 26-27 (citing Califano, 430 U.S. at 108) .
More recently, the court of appeals reaffirmed its holding
that a discretionary decision not to reopen a prior application,
even if issued after a hearing, is not subject to judicial
review. Torres, 845 F.2d at 1138-39. There, as in this case,
the claimant sought to reopen an earlier application for
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disability benefits. In response to the claimant's application,
the ALJ conducted a hearing, heard testimony, considered the "new
evidence" proffered by the claimant, and issued a written
decision denying claimant's application to reopen. Rejecting
claimant's assertion that section 405(g) vested the district
court with jurisdiction over his challenge to the ALJ's decision
simply because it was issued after a "hearing," the court of
appeals concluded that the "ALJ was entitled to make a threshold
inquiry and review the evidence presented by the claimant in
order to resolve the reopening." I d ., at 1139. And, once again
the court held that the "purely discretionary hearing" conducted
by the ALJ was "not a hearing within the meaning of § 405(g)."
I d . (quoting Rios, 614 F.2d at 26). Consequently, section 405(g)
did not authorize the district court to review the adverse ruling
subsequently issued by the ALJ.
Thus, contrary to claimant's suggestion, his right of appeal
under section 405(g) was not triggered by the ALJ's affording him
the opportunity to testify and present evidence in support of his
petition to reopen his earlier application for benefits.
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Conclusion
Claimant did not appeal (either administratively or
judicially) the denial of his original application for disability
benefits. Accordingly, that denial of benefits became the final
decision of the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.987(a), and,
because the time within which to challenge that decision expired
long ago, it is no longer subject to judicial review. See
42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing claimants 60 days within which to
commence a civil action challenging an adverse, final decision of
the Commissioner).
Nevertheless, the pertinent Social Security regulations
provide that a claimant may, under certain specified conditions,
request the Commissioner to reopen and revise an earlier adverse
decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987 through 404.989. Absent a
situation in which the claimant challenges the Commissioner's
decision on constitutional grounds, however, the law is clear
that even if the claimant received an adverse ruling on his
application after a "hearing," this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to review either: (1) the Commissioner's decision
not to reopen claimant's initial application for benefits; or (2)
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the Commissioner's dismissal of claimant's second application on
grounds of res judicata. Those decisions are committed solely to
the discretion of the Commissioner and are not, except in "rare
circumstances," subject to challenge in this forum.
Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
review the Commissioner's most recent decision denying claimant's
application for benefits, the Commissioner's motion to dismiss
(document no. 8) is granted. The Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
January 3, 2002
cc: Michael C. Shklar, Esq.
David L. Broderick, Esq.
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