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2002 Ohio 1240

Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided March 6, 2002

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 2002-03-06

Attorneys at law–Complaint charging attorney with practicing law while under suspension dismissed, when.

Relies on Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace · Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace

Decided 2002-03-06

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 
94 Ohio St.3d 414
.]




                 OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. WALLACE.
             [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace, 
2002-Ohio-1240
.]
Attorneys at law–Complaint charging attorney with practicing law while under
        suspension dismissed, when.
      (No. 01-1136—Submitted August 28, 2001—Decided March 6, 2002.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
                     Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-96.
                                  __________________
        LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.
        {¶ 1} On May 31, 2000, we suspended respondent, Paul Wallace of
Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0010369,
 from the practice of law for
six months. Disciplinary Counsel v. Wallace (2000), 
89 Ohio St.3d 113
, 
729 N.E.2d 343
. On December 4, 2000, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint
charging that in June 2000, while he was under the order of suspension, respondent
not only engaged in certain actions that constituted the practice of law but also
failed to inform opposing counsel of his suspension. Respondent answered and
admitted that he had taken the actions as alleged. However, respondent claimed
that they were ministerial, did not involve the practice of law, and that the counsel
who were not informed of his suspension were not opposing counsel. The matter
was submitted to a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline (“board”).
        {¶ 2} The stipulations and the board’s findings reveal the following facts.
In 1999, respondent began representing Gerald Ioannides by negotiating
Ioannides’s purchase of Crossridge, Inc., a company that had operated a landfill.
As part of the deal, Crossridge was to assign its permit to operate the landfill to
Ioannides.     However, before the permit could be assigned to Ioannides, the
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Environmental Protection Agency required Ioannides to pass a background check
with the Environmental Background Investigative Unit of the Ohio Attorney
General’s Office (“EBIU”). Accordingly, respondent prepared the background
investigation documents and submitted them to the EBIU on March 8, 2000.
       {¶ 3} Pursuant to a May 31, 2000 order from this court, respondent began
notifying clients (including Ioannides), courts, and opposing counsel of his
suspension from the practice of law. Consequently, Ioannides made arrangements
with Peter Precario to represent him in the acquisition of Crossridge and the transfer
of the permit. However, Precario did not take over representation until July 17,
2000. On June 7, 2000, Assistant Attorney General Ann Wood notified respondent
by phone that the EBIU had not received all the documents needed to complete its
investigation of Ioannides. In response, on June 9, 2000, respondent faxed a copy
of the assignment of purchase agreement to the EBIU. In July 2000, respondent
received a message from Wood that again sought certain documentation for the
Ioannides investigation. Respondent attempted to contact Wood to determine what
documentation was still missing. However, Wood was not in the office, so
respondent left a voice mail inquiring as to the status of Ioannides’s file. During
these contacts, respondent never informed Wood or the EBIU that he was
suspended from practicing law.
       {¶ 4} The panel found that respondent’s communication to Wood in June
2000 that he would again supply the documents that he had previously furnished to
the EBIU and his voice mail message to Wood asking her whether she had the
“complete package,” together with the use of his letterhead as a cover for
transmitting documents to the EBIU by ordinary mail, were not the practice of law.
       {¶ 5} The panel then concluded that by not informing Wood and the EBIU
of his suspension in his various communications with them, respondent technically
violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct adversely reflecting




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                                January Term, 2002




on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). The panel recommended that respondent
receive a public reprimand.
       {¶ 6} The board adopted the findings, conclusion, and recommendation of
the panel.
       {¶ 7} We adopt the board’s findings and conclusion that Wallace was not
practicing law when he provided documentation to the EBIU. However, we do not
adopt the board’s conclusion and recommendation that Wallace violated DR 1-
102(A)(6) by not informing Wood or the EBIU of his suspension.
       {¶ 8} This court’s order suspending respondent required that he do the
following:
       “1. Notify all clients being represented in pending matters … of his
suspension … and … notify clients to seek legal service elsewhere …;
       “…
       “4. Notify opposing counsel in pending litigation or, in the absence of
counsel, the adverse parties, of his disqualification to act as an attorney after the
effective date of this order ….” (Emphasis added.)
       {¶ 9} Upon notification of his suspension, respondent began complying
with the order by notifying his clients, including Ioannides, of his suspension.
However, this order did not require Wallace to notify either Wood or the EBIU of
his suspension because respondent was not involved in litigation on behalf of his
client with either Wood or the EBIU. The process of providing documents to the
EBIU so that it could complete its background check was not litigation and merely
involved resubmitting background investigation documents on behalf of Ioannides
to the EBIU, which was a ministerial act. As the board found, respondent’s
submission of additional documents to the EBIU was not even the practice of law.
       {¶ 10} Therefore, because the respondent’s actions herein were not
litigation, Wood was not an opposing counsel, the EBIU was not an opposing party,
and merely providing missing documentation to the EBIU was not practicing law,




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




we find that the respondent was under no obligation to notify either Wood or the
EBIU of his suspension pursuant to this court’s order. As a result, we find that
respondent did not violate DR 1-102(A)(6). Accordingly, we dismiss the charges
against respondent.
                                                               Cause dismissed.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
       COOK, J., concurs in judgment.
                              __________________
       Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kenneth R. Donchatz,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
       Nelson E. Genshaft and Benson A. Wolman, for respondent.
                              __________________




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