[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
94 Ohio St.3d 489.]
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MURRELL, APPELLANT.
[Cite as State v. Murrell, 2002-Ohio-1483.]
Criminal law—Search and seizure—When police officer has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile.
(No. 00-1757—Submitted October 17, 2001 at the Greene County Session—
Decided April 3, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-000103.
__________________
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile. (New York v. Belton
[1981], 453 U.S. 454, 460,
101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864,
69 L.Ed.2d 768, 775,
followed; State v. Brown [1992], 63 Ohio St.3d 349,
588 N.E.2d 113,
syllabus, overruled; Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, harmonized.)
__________________
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 1} This case requires us to consider the allowable scope of an automobile
search incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle. For the reasons that
follow, we overrule this court’s decision in State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d
349,
588 N.E.2d 113, and therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
I
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On September 15, 1999, a Cincinnati police officer stopped an
automobile driven by defendant-appellant, Marvin Murrell, on a street with a posted
speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour after the officer’s laser device registered
appellant’s speed at forty-nine miles per hour. The officer ran a check on
appellant’s license, which showed that there was an outstanding warrant for
appellant’s arrest for failure to pay child support. The officer arrested appellant,
handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the police car.
{¶ 3} The officer then proceeded to search appellant’s vehicle. On the
floorboard in front of the driver’s seat, the officer found a small cloth bag. He
opened it and found crack cocaine and powdered cocaine. The officer then also
arrested appellant for drug possession.
{¶ 4} Appellant was indicted on two counts of possession of cocaine. He
filed a motion to suppress the results of the search, and the trial court held a hearing
on the motion on November 19, 1999. The arresting officer provided the only
testimony at the hearing, giving his account of the stop and arrest. The officer
testified that the traffic stop was a routine one, that he never felt that he was in any
danger during the course of the stop, that he never sought appellant’s permission to
search the vehicle, and that he would not have impounded the car (and therefore no
inventory search of the vehicle would have occurred) if he had not found the
cocaine.
{¶ 5} On February 10, 2000, the trial court granted the motion to suppress
in a handwritten entry that gave no reasons for the ruling. The trial court apparently
relied on this court’s decision in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349,
588 N.E.2d 113, in
which this court held at the syllabus that “[a] police officer may not open a small,
closed container found inside an automobile’s glove compartment solely as a search
incident to the driver’s arrest for a traffic violation, after the officer has the
2
January Term, 2002
suspect—and sole occupant of the vehicle—under control in the police cruiser.
(New York v. Belton [1981], 453 U.S. 454,
101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768,
distinguished; the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, applied.)”
{¶ 6} The state appealed pursuant to R.C. 2945.67, certifying that the appeal
was not taken for the purpose of delay and that the trial court’s ruling rendered the
state’s proof so weak that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution was
destroyed. See Crim.R. 12(K) (formerly Crim.R. 12[J]).
{¶ 7} The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
distinguishing the situation before it from that in Brown. The court of appeals
focused on the fact that Brown’s syllabus specifically mentioned arrest for a “traffic
violation,” and found that Brown did not apply because appellant was not arrested
for a traffic violation but for nonpayment of child support. While acknowledging
that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that there was contraband in
the vehicle, the court of appeals upheld the search pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court’s Belton decision.
{¶ 8} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
II
Search of Automobile Incident to Arrest of Occupant
{¶ 9} In Belton, 453 U.S. at 460,
101 S.Ct. at 2864,
69 L.Ed.2d at 775, the
United States Supreme Court articulated a specific rule for automobile searches
within the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The Belton court held that
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
“when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile.” (Footnotes omitted.) Earlier, the
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 762-763,
89 S.Ct.
2034, 2040,
23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694, a case not involving a motor vehicle, had held
that when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest, a warrantless search of
the person arrested and of the immediate surrounding area is justified to discover
any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use and to prevent the concealment or
destruction of evidence.
{¶ 10} The Supreme Court viewed its holding in Belton as the establishment
of a bright-line rule that extended the principles of Chimel to arrest situations
involving motor vehicles. The Supreme Court in Belton, in explaining why
searching a closed container found in the passenger area of the vehicle is also
permissible, further illuminated its reasoning, stating that “[i]t follows [from
Chimel] that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach
of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. … Such a
container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the
justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have.” 453 U.S. at 460-461,
101 S.Ct. at 2864,
69
L.Ed.2d at 775.
{¶ 11} In support of its decision to apply a bright-line rule, the Belton court
stated that “as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of
rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law
4
January Term, 2002
enforcement.’ LaFave, ‘Case-By-Case Adjudication’ versus ‘Standardized
Procedures’: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 127, 142.
“…
“In short, ‘[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers,
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’
Dunaway v. New York [1979], 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 [
99 S.Ct. 2248, 2257,
60
L.Ed.2d 824, 836].”
453 U.S. at 458,
101 S.Ct. at 2863,
69 L.Ed.2d at 773-774.
{¶ 12} The Belton court then reviewed cases from other courts that had
encountered the issue before it, and observed that “[w]hile the Chimel case
established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within
the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of
‘the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably
includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our
reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach
in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item].’ Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 [
89 S.Ct.
at 2040,
23 L.Ed.2d at 694]. In order to establish the workable rule this category
of cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that may be
searched in light of that generalization.”
453 U.S. at 460,
101 S.Ct. at 2864,
69
L.Ed.2d at 774-775.
{¶ 13} With this court’s decision in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349,
588 N.E.2d
113, Ohio follows a different rule on automobile searches incident to an arrest than
was established in Belton. The Brown opinion actually set forth two separate
rationales for not following Belton. Although the syllabus in Brown and the text of
the opinion (see
id. at 351-352,
588 N.E.2d at 115) assert that the court
“distinguishe[s]” the situation in that case from the situation in Belton, this court in
5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Brown also stated, “If Belton does stand for the proposition that a police officer
may conduct a detailed search of an automobile solely because he has arrested one
of its occupants, on any charge, we decline to adopt its rule.” (Emphasis sic.) Id.
at 352,
588 N.E.2d at 115. The Brown opinion then included a footnote to the effect
that if the two cases were not distinguishable, the decision to decline to adopt
Belton’s rule was based on Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution2: “
‘Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution.’ ” Id. at
fn. 3, quoting California v. Greenwood (1988),
486 U.S. 35, 43,
108 S.Ct. 1625,
1630,
100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39. See, also,
Brown at 352,
588 N.E.2d at 115 (stating that
the warrantless search of the automobile violated the Ohio Constitution).
{¶ 14} A close reading of both Belton and Brown reveals that, although the
Brown opinion attempted to distinguish that case from Belton based on the differing
facts of the two cases, the attempt was unfounded. While it appears clear that there
was probable cause for the search in Belton, while there was not in Brown (the point
upon which the opinion in Brown relied to distinguish the two, id. at 351-352,
588
N.E.2d at 115), the United States Supreme Court in Belton deliberately chose not
to analyze the situation before it under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, which is based on probable cause.
Id.,453 U.S. at 462-463,
101 S.Ct.
at 2865,
69 L.Ed.2d at 776, fn. 6 (“Because of this disposition of the case, there is
no need here to consider whether the search and seizure were permissible under the
so-called ‘automobile exception.’ ”). Instead, the Belton court purposely
determined to craft a bright-line rule of sufficient scope to encompass the facts of
Brown, as well as those of the case sub judice.
2. Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person and things to be seized.”
6
January Term, 2002
{¶ 15} Given these considerations, it becomes apparent that this court’s
statement in Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 352,
588 N.E.2d at 115, that “the warrantless
search of Brown’s automobile was unreasonable and violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution” was, at most, only partially supportable. Since Belton should not
have been distinguished, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Belton as
to the Fourth Amendment was binding on this court, and this court should have held
that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the search in Brown. Therefore,
the only possibly justifiable rationale behind this court’s decision in Brown is the
alternative reasoning set forth in that case—that the search was inconsistent with
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
III
State v. Brown Reassessed
{¶ 16} The resolution of the case before us thus turns on a consideration of
this court’s decision in Brown, which can accurately be said to have relied on
Section 14, Article I to decline to give full effect to Belton. Within that
consideration, and depending on its outcome, a further issue potentially could arise
in the circumstances here, based on the court of appeals’ decision to distinguish
Brown—if Brown should be reaffirmed, what should its scope be?
{¶ 17} The Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I contain virtually
identical language, with both prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and
both imposing a warrant requirement. See State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d
234, 238,
685 N.E.2d 762, 766-767. For that reason, this court observed in
Robinette that, for some time, it “has interpreted Section 14, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution as affording the same protection as the Fourth Amendment.”
Id. at
238,
685 N.E.2d at 767. See, also, State v. Orr (2001),
91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391,
745
N.E.2d 1036, 1038-1039. In making that point, this court in Robinette cited a
number of cases, including State v. Geraldo (1981),
68 Ohio St.2d 120, 125-126,
7
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
22 O.O.3d 366, 369-370,
429 N.E.2d 141, 145-146 (reach of Section 14, Article I
is coextensive with that of Fourth Amendment); and State v. Andrews (1991),
57
Ohio St.3d 86, 87,
565 N.E.2d 1271, 1273, fn. 1 (this court has interpreted Section
14, Article I to protect the same interests and in a manner consistent with the Fourth
Amendment).
{¶ 18} After reviewing the cases, this court in Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d at
239,
685 N.E.2d at 767, determined that “we should harmonize our interpretation
of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment, unless
there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise.” This court in Robinette obviously
left open the possibility that, depending on the circumstances, this court may decide
to give independent effect to Section 14, Article I in the appropriate case.
{¶ 19} In actually relying on Section 14, Article I to find that the evidence
was inadmissible on the facts before it, the Brown court did not cite any authorities,
including those cited in Robinette that appear inconsistent, for its decision to
interpret Section 14, Article I more stringently than the Fourth Amendment. Also,
Robinette, decided more than five years after Brown, did not cite Brown in its
consideration of when Section 14, Article I might be interpreted differently from
the Fourth Amendment.
{¶ 20} As several of the briefs in this case indicate, most jurisdictions,
unlike Ohio in Brown, follow the Belton rule regarding automobile searches
incident to a lawful arrest, even where the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed
in a police vehicle at the time of the search. See, e.g., State v. Fernon (2000), 133
Md.App. 41, 57-58,
754 A.2d 463, 472; United States v. Doward (C.A.1, 1994),
41
F.3d 789, 791-792, fn. 1; United States v. White (C.A.6, 1989),
871 F.2d 41, 44.
Included within the group of states that follow Belton are states with specific
constitutional provisions that, like Ohio’s Section 14, Article I, essentially mirror
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Charpentier (1998),
131 Idaho 649,
962
P.2d 1033; State v. Fry (1986),
131 Wis.2d 153, 171-172,
388 N.W.2d 565, 573.
8
January Term, 2002
While a few states, such as Ohio in Brown, have rejected Belton in part, most states
have chosen to fully embrace Belton’s bright-line rule.
{¶ 21} In light of the standard set forth in Robinette, we take this
opportunity to review the propriety of this court’s decision in Brown. To the extent
that Brown apparently found persuasive reasons not to harmonize Section 14,
Article I with the Fourth Amendment in the situation before it, we believe that the
time has come to reassess Brown and the assumptions upon which that decision was
based.
{¶ 22} As a starting point, it is critical to recognize that Belton’s rule applies
only when there is already a lawful custodial arrest. Concerns about a possible lack
of probable cause to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that
probable cause must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the
first place. In addition, as the Belton holding explicitly states, a Belton search must
be “contemporaneous” with the arrest, occurring at or very near the time of the
arrest. Id.,453 U.S. at 460,
101 S.Ct. at 2864,
69 L.Ed.2d at 775. Furthermore, on
its face, Belton’s rule applies only if an arrest is “custodial.”
Id. The United States
Supreme Court, in Knowles v. Iowa (1998),
525 U.S. 113, 118-119,
119 S.Ct. 484,
488,
142 L.Ed.2d 492, 497-498, found that a “search incident to citation,” in which
a police officer searched a vehicle incident to the issuance of a citation in lieu of an
arrest in a routine traffic stop, violated the Fourth Amendment when there was no
prior arrest to justify the search.3 Belton does not authorize indiscriminate fishing
3. The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated its commitment to Belton’s bright-line rule
in Florida v. Thomas (2001),
532 U.S. 774,
121 S.Ct. 1905,
150 L.Ed.2d 1. In that case, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari “to consider whether [the Belton] rule is limited to situations in which the
officer initiates contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person remains inside the vehicle.”
Id. at ___,
121 S.Ct. at 1908,
150 L.Ed.2d at 5. However, the court never reached that issue on the
merits, holding that the case did not involve a final judgment or decree from the court below and
that the case did not fit any category that would nevertheless allow it to be treated as final for
jurisdictional purposes, and so dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction.
Id. at ___,
121 S.Ct. at
1909-1910,
150 L.Ed.2d at 6. The specific issue in Thomas is not relevant to the case sub judice.
9
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
expeditions; only motor vehicles very recently occupied by those who have already
been lawfully arrested are subject to a Belton search.
{¶ 23} The Belton court reached a calculated conclusion that a search of the
motor vehicle incident to arrest in this situation is a reasonable one, justified
principally by concerns for officer safety and preserving evidence, and the
advantages of having a bright-line rule in such situations. We find it significant
that Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in Belton, also wrote the
majority opinion in Chimel, which established strict limitations on the “search
incident to arrest” exception, and which reversed the conviction at issue in that case
as based on a search the Chimel court determined to be unreasonable. See 395 U.S.
at 768,
89 S.Ct. at 2043,
23 L.Ed.2d at 697. Obviously, Justice Stewart and the
other justices in the majority in Belton believed that the specific concerns at issue
in that case justified extension of the Chimel rule to cases involving an arrest of the
occupant of a motor vehicle. Both Chimel and Belton are seminal Fourth
Amendment decisions that contribute to a comprehensive jurisprudence regulating
what is acceptable police conduct and what is not in warrantless searches incident
to an arrest.
{¶ 24} We believe that the same considerations that led the Belton court to
establish its bright-line rule justify the adoption today of that rule by this court. We
now conclude that Brown was erroneously decided, and that this court in Brown
failed to appreciate the practical advantages underlying Belton’s bright-line rule.
The case before us and Brown do not present persuasive reasons to depart from the
principle that Section 14, Article I and the Fourth Amendment should be
harmonized whenever possible.
{¶ 25} For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that in the circumstances
before us we should harmonize the Fourth Amendment and Section 14, Article I of
the Ohio Constitution. We thus overrule Brown and its syllabus paragraph.
Consistent with Belton, we hold that when a police officer has made a lawful
10
January Term, 2002
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile. Under our holding, the warrantless search of appellant’s vehicle did
not violate the Fourth Amendment or Section 14, Article I.
{¶ 26} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent.
__________________
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 27} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this court
must overrule State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349,
588 N.E.2d 113, for the
sole purpose of aligning our jurisprudence with that of the United States Supreme
Court. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the trial court was correct in
granting the motion to suppress based upon this court’s decision in Brown.
{¶ 28} The overarching question, which the majority fails to satisfactorily
answer, is why this court needs to reverse itself by overruling Brown, and in doing
so, adopt the United States Supreme Court’s bright-line rule announced in Belton.
“ ‘[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence
to the latest decision.’ ” Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio
St.3d 244, 257,
617 N.E.2d 1052 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting, quoting Helvering v.
Hallock [1940],
309 U.S. 106, 119,
60 S.Ct. 444,
84 L.Ed. 604). However, this
court has also observed that “ ‘any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis
demands special justification.’ ” Wampler v. Higgins (2001),
93 Ohio St.3d 111,
120,
752 N.E.2d 962, quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (1989),
491 U.S.
164, 172,
109 S.Ct. 2363,
105 L.Ed.2d 132. The majority offers no special
justification for overruling the unanimous decision in Brown.
11
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 29} The majority relies on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
New York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454,
101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768, as
justification to overrule Brown. In Belton, the court discerned a need for a bright-line rule and held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at
460,
101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768. The court thereby concluded that such a
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
{¶ 30} The Belton court derived its bright-line rule from its decision in
Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752,
89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685.
However, Chimel involved a search incident to an arrest in a residence, not an
automobile. The Chimel court held that, in a residential setting, once an arrest is
made, police officers may search the arrestee and the area within the arrestee’s
immediate control.
Id. at 762-763,
89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685. The court
concluded that a search of the immediate area after the arrest was justified “ ‘by the
need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or
effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of
the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on
the accused’s person or under his immediate control.’ ”
Id. at 764,
89 S.Ct. 2034,
23 L.Ed.2d 685. Thus, the justification for the search in Chimel was specifically
based on well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, which are designed to protect the safety of the arresting officer
and to prevent the destruction of crime evidence.
{¶ 31} In Belton, the United States Supreme Court sought to create a bright-line rule for the search of a motor vehicle by applying the rule in Chimel, allowing
for a search of the area within the immediate reach of the arrestee, to the facts in
Belton. Unfortunately, in applying Chimel to Belton, the court stretched the
underlying justification supporting Chimel beyond its rationale.
12
January Term, 2002
{¶ 32} The Supreme Court applied the rationale of Chimel to a case where
the occupants of a motor vehicle were ordered out of the car and arrested. When a
police officer arrests a vehicle occupant, the arrestee is generally removed from the
automobile. At that point, there is no longer any danger to the officer from anything
in the passenger compartment of the vehicle and it is not possible for the arrestee
to destroy evidence that may be in the vehicle. In Brown, we observed that the
search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle after the occupant had already
been arrested could not be justified by the same motivations as Chimel because
“[t]he contents of the automobile were no longer within the arrestee’s immediate
control.” Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 353,
588 N.E.2d 113.
{¶ 33} The majority concedes this point by stating that “only motor vehicles
very recently occupied by those who have already been lawfully arrested are subject
to a Belton search.” The majority acknowledges that the occupant must first be
removed from the automobile and placed under arrest before the police officer may
search the automobile. Therefore, since the occupant is already under arrest and
separated from the vehicle, the Chimel justifications for the search, i.e., police
officer safety and the protection of evidence, disappear.
{¶ 34} The absence of the Chimel justifications are apparent in the facts of
Belton. In Belton, a police officer stopped a motor vehicle for speeding. The officer
had probable cause to suspect that there was marijuana in the vehicle and therefore
he ordered all four men out of the vehicle, placed them all under arrest, patted them
down, and “split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway … so they
would not be in physical touching area of each other.” Id. at 456,
101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768. It was not until the police officer completed this procedure of
securing the arrestees that he searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
The facts clearly demonstrate that at the point of the vehicle search, the police
officer was not in danger and any evidence in the vehicle was secure.
13
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 35} The facts of both Brown and the case at bar illustrate the obvious
absence of the Chimel justifications supporting the search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile after the occupants have been arrested. In Brown,
the police officer arrested the vehicle occupant and “placed him in custody in the
patrol car” before searching the arrestee’s automobile. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at
349,
588 N.E.2d 113. Similarly, in the case sub judice the majority acknowledges
that the police officer “arrested appellant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the
back seat of the police car.” Only after Murrell was secured did the police officer
proceed to search the appellant’s vehicle.
{¶ 36} The majority states that the Belton court “reached a calculated
conclusion that a search of the motor vehicle incident to arrest in this situation is a
reasonable one, justified principally by concerns for officer safety and preserving
evidence, and the advantages of having a bright-line rule in such situations.”
{¶ 37} Since the traditional justifications of officer safety and preservation
of evidence found in Chimel do not apply to Belton, and by extension do not apply
to the case at bar, the only valid justification for the Supreme Court’s holding in
Belton is the need for a bright-line test.
{¶ 38} The Belton court stated that, without a bright-line rule, police
officers would be overwhelmed in attempting to decide whether probable cause
exists to search the passenger compartment of an automobile after the occupant is
arrested. Id.,453 U.S. at 458,
101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768. In order to alleviate
this supposed confusion, the court reasoned that “ ‘[a] custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.’ ”
Id. at 461,
101 S.Ct. 2860,
69 L.Ed.2d 768, quoting United States
v. Robinson (1973),
414 U.S. 218, 235,
94 S.Ct. 467,
38 L.Ed.2d 427.
{¶ 39} There is nothing in the record before us to support a conclusion that
since our decision in Brown, law enforcement officers have encountered particular
14
January Term, 2002
difficulty in knowing when to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle
incident to an occupant’s arrest.
{¶ 40} The majority, stating no special justification for adopting the Belton
bright-line rule, contends that “[c]oncerns about a possible lack of probable cause
to conduct a search in a Belton situation are eased by the fact that probable cause
must have been present to arrest the occupant of the vehicle in the first place.”
(Emphasis sic.) In my view, we need a more persuasive reason to justify the
automobile search.
{¶ 41} It is well settled that a state supreme court may interpret its state
constitution to provide greater individual rights than those provided in the federal
Constitution. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins (1980), 447 U.S. 74, 81,
100
S.Ct. 2035,
64 L.Ed.2d 741. We did that in Brown when we unanimously held that
the warrantless search of Brown’s vehicle was unreasonable and violated Section
14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 42} In the time since Brown was decided, nothing has changed to warrant
the majority’s sudden compulsion to overrule Brown. The only reason given by the
majority to demonstrate that the time is now ripe to overrule Brown is this court’s
decision in State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234,
685 N.E.2d 762. In
Robinette we acknowledged the similarity in language between the Fourth
Amendment and Section 14, Article I, and therefore indicated that the two should
be harmonized. Id. at 766-767,
685 N.E.2d 762. However, as the majority correctly
observes, “Robinette obviously left open the possibility that, depending on the
circumstances, this court may decide to give independent effect to Section 14,
Article I in the appropriate case.” The case at bar is an appropriate case for this
court to give independent effect to Section 14, Article I.
{¶ 43} In Brown, this court unanimously rejected Belton in stating that
“[w]e do not believe that the certainty generated by a bright-line test justifies a rule
that automatically allows police officers to search every nook and cranny of an
15
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
automobile just because the driver is arrested for a traffic violation.” Brown, 63
Ohio St.3d at 352,
588 N.E.2d 113. Moreover, the facts in Belton were significantly
different from those in Brown and the case at bar. In Belton the police officer had
probable cause to search the vehicle after the arrest because the arrest was based on
probable cause that there was marijuana in the vehicle. The vehicle search therefore
flowed directly from the arrest.
{¶ 44} However, in Brown, the arrest was for driving under the influence of
alcohol. The probable cause that the officer possessed to make the arrest had no
connection to the contents of the vehicle. In the case at bar, the connection is even
more difficult to make. Murrel was arrested for failure to pay child support. There
was no connection between the reason for the arrest and the contents of the
automobile.
{¶ 45} Because Robinette does not prevent this court from giving
independent effect to Section 14, Article I, Brown should continue to control.
Moreover, since the determinative facts here are closer to Brown than they are to
Belton, we should follow our own jurisprudence as reflected in Brown.
{¶ 46} The unanimous opinion of this court in Brown, that the sole
justification of the need for a bright-line rule is not enough to warrant “an extensive
search based on facts that could never support a warrant because of the lack of
probable cause,” should not be altered. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d at 352,
588 N.E.2d
113.
{¶ 47} I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate
the judgment of the trial court.
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
__________________
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 48} This court’s holding in State v. Brown (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 349,
588 N.E.2d 113, should control this case. The Brown opinion is measured and wise,
16
January Term, 2002
and allows for the search of the interior of an automobile incident to a driver’s arrest
when necessary. Under Brown, police officers can search an automobile if there is
probable cause to suspect that the vehicle contains contraband, if there is a
suspicious item in plain view, or if an officer is searching for weapons within the
immediate control of the suspect. These are all reasonable exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches. The majority’s holding
today seems inclined to skirt the Fourth Amendment rather than work within it. I
dissent and also join the dissent of Chief Justice Moyer.
__________________
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott A.
Rubenstein, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Arenstein & Gallagher and Hal R. Arenstein, for appellant.
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio
Prosecuting Attorneys Association.
H. Fred Hoefle, urging reversal for amicus curiae Greater Cincinnati
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.
Kravitz & Kravitz and Max Kravitz, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
__________________
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