[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
96 Ohio St.3d 90.]
RIDENOUR, APPELLANT, v. RANDLE, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Cite as Ridenour v. Randle, 2002-Ohio-3606.]
Habeas corpus sought to compel relator’s release from prison on parole—Court
of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed, when—Testing constitutionality of
parole eligibility requirements not cognizable in state habeas corpus—
Alleged breach of plea agreement not timely raised.
(No. 2002-0154—Submitted June 26, 2002—Decided July 31, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ross County, No. 01CA2589.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶1} In April 1972, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, upon
the guilty plea of appellant, William L. Ridenour, convicted him of two counts of
murder in the second degree, one count of shooting to kill, and two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon. The common pleas court sentenced Ridenour to two life
terms and a term of 1 to 20 years and two terms of 1 to 5 years, all to be served
consecutively. Ridenour subsequently escaped from prison, and following his
recapture, he was convicted in May 1978 of two counts of kidnapping, one count
of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of escape.
The common pleas court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 4 to 25 years,
to be served consecutively to his 1972 sentence.
{¶2} In 1995, the Ohio Parole Board denied parole for Ridenour. In January
1999, a hearing officer recommended to the Parole Board that the board again deny
parole. After Ridenour objected to the hearing officer’s findings and
recommendation, a hearing officer responded that the objections were meritless:
{¶3} “In reviewing the Review Screening Recommendation Sheet and the
facts presented to the Parole Board, I must point out that the facts presented to the
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Parole Board indicate that you forced individuals at gunpoint who were outside the
victim’s residence and forced them to allow you into the residence where you
eventually murdered two individuals which constitutes part of the offense behavior
for which you are currently in prison. In the hearing officer’s perspective, the
movement of those individuals from point one to point two at gunpoint constitutes
kidnapping. As the Parole Board’s guidelines indicate, the hearing officer is to
review offense behavior, not necessarily the criminal charges for which you were
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶4} In March 2001, Ridenour filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Court of Appeals for Ross County. In his memorandum in support of the
petition, which he incorporated into his petition, he raised the following claims: (1)
under former R.C. 2967.13 and 5145.01, he was entitled to parole eligibility at the
expiration of ten years of imprisonment, (2) the sentence for his escape conviction
expired because of his accumulated good-time credits earned under former R.C.
2967.19, (3) the Parole Board, in the 1999 review screening recommendation sheet
of one of its hearing officers, breached his 1972 plea agreement by treating his
convictions for assault with a deadly weapon as conduct indicative of kidnapping,
and (4) the Parole Board could not constitutionally deny parole based upon the
nature and circumstances of his offenses. Ridenour claimed that based on these
claims, the judgments of his sentencing courts had already been satisfied and the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction no longer had authority to
incarcerate him.
{¶5} After the court of appeals denied the first motion of appellee,
Chillicothe Correctional Institution Warden Michael Randle, to dismiss the
petition, it sua sponte converted Randle’s second dismissal motion into a motion
for summary judgment and gave the parties the opportunity to submit additional
documentation pursuant to Civ.R. 56. In December 2001, the court of appeals
granted Randle’s motion for summary judgment and denied the writ.
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January Term, 2002
{¶6} In his appeal as of right, Ridenour asserts that the court of appeals
erred in denying the writ. For the following reasons, Ridenour’s assertion is
meritless, and the court of appeals correctly denied the writ.
{¶7} Ridenour’s claims challenging the Parole Board’s determinations
denying him parole do not entitle him to release from prison. Habeas corpus is
generally appropriate in the criminal context only if the prisoner is entitled to
immediate release from prison. Douglas v. Money (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 348, 349,
708 N.E.2d 697. Testing the constitutionality of parole eligibility requirements as
applied to Ridenour is not cognizable in state habeas corpus. Rodgers v. Capots
(1993),
67 Ohio St.3d 435, 436,
619 N.E.2d 685; cf. Moore v. Leonard (1999),
85
Ohio St.3d 189, 190,
707 N.E.2d 867 (“Parole may be revoked even though
criminal charges based on the same facts are dismissed, the defendant is acquitted,
or the conviction is overturned, unless all factual support for the revocation is
removed”).
{¶8} Furthermore, because Ridenour has no constitutional or statutory right
to parole, he has no similar right to earlier consideration of parole. State ex rel.
Vaughn v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 378, 379,
708 N.E.2d
720. In fact, earlier consideration of parole is not tantamount to a legal right to
release from prison, which Ridenour was required to establish to be entitled to
extraordinary relief in habeas corpus. Heddleston v. Mack (1998),
84 Ohio St.3d
213, 214,
702 N.E.2d 1198.
{¶9} Moreover, former R.C. 2967.19 and former 5145.02 merely reduce the
minimum term of Ridenour’s indeterminate sentences; they do not entitle him to
release from prison before he serves the maximum term, i.e., life in prison, provided
in his sentence. State ex rel. Johnson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (2002), 95
Ohio St.3d 70, 72,
765 N.E.2d 356; State ex rel. Bealler v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.
(2001),
91 Ohio St.3d 36,
740 N.E.2d 1100. Similarly, R.C. 5145.01 also does not
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
entitle Ridenour to release. State ex rel. Lanham v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1997),
80 Ohio St.3d 425, 427,
687 N.E.2d 283.
{¶10} In addition, Ridenour has or had adequate legal remedies in the
ordinary course of law to raise his claim of a breached plea agreement. See State
ex rel. Tran v. McGrath (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 45, 47,
676 N.E.2d 108; State ex rel.
Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994),
69 Ohio St.3d 489, 491,
633 N.E.2d 1128. “
‘[H]abeas corpus, like other extraordinary writ actions, is not available where there
is an adequate remedy at law.’ ” Agee v. Russell (2001),
92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544,
751 N.E.2d 1043, quoting Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1996),
76 Ohio St.3d 380, 383,
667
N.E.2d 1194.
{¶11} Finally, Ridenour waived those additional claims that he raises on
appeal but did not raise in the court of appeals. Brown v. Leonard (1999), 86 Ohio
St.3d 593,
716 N.E.2d 183.
{¶12} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of
appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
William L. Ridenour, pro se.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane Mallory, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
__________________
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