[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
96 Ohio St.3d 404.]
THE STATE EX REL. KLINE, APPELLEE, v. CARROLL, JUDGE, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS.
[Cite as State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll, 2002-Ohio-4849.]
Prohibition—Disqualification of judges—Writ sought to declare relator’s
conviction and sentence void and to prevent judge and municipal court
from proceeding in the transferred criminal case—Court of appeals’ grant
of writ affirmed, when.
(No. 2002-0305—Submitted July 24, 2002—Decided October 2, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 79737.
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Per Curiam.
{¶1} In November 1994, appellee, Cynthia Kline, was charged with failure
to comply with an order of a police officer by driving past a police roadblock,
criminal trespass for refusing to leave the police station despite several requests to
do so, and obstruction of official business for failing to comply with a police
officer’s request to relinquish a bottle of prescription medication. In May 1995, the
Parma Municipal Court found Kline guilty of these charges and sentenced her.
{¶2} On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed
Kline’s conviction and sentence based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
Parma v. Kline (Mar. 7, 1996), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 68998 and 68999, 1996 WL
100957.
{¶3} On remand, the Parma Municipal Court scheduled the case for a new
trial on April 30, 1996. On April 16, 1996, attorney Mark A. Stanton entered his
appearance on behalf of Kline in the municipal court proceeding.
{¶4} By letter dated April 16, 1996, Stanton advised Judge Timothy P.
Gilligan of the municipal court that due to Kline’s pending civil suit against Parma,
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all of the judges on the Parma Municipal Court had conflicts of interest in presiding
over any case involving Kline, including the criminal case on remand from the court
of appeals. Stanton requested recusal of all of the municipal court judges as “the
only proper and adequate remedy to purge this disqualification.” Stanton then
noted that although former R.C. 2937.20, now R.C. 2701.031, required him to file
an affidavit of disqualification, he expressed reluctance to do so:
{¶5} “Pursuant to [former R.C.] 2937.20, I am required to file an Affidavit
of Prejudice in the Office of the Clerk, Parma Municipal Court, ‘. . . setting forth
the fact of such interest, relationship, bias, prejudice or disqualification . . .’
Thereafter, the presiding judge of the Court of Common Plea[s] examine[s] the
affidavit and enters a ruling on the matter.
{¶6} “I would greatly prefer not to file the Affidavit. I take no pleasure in
presenting the relevant recitation of facts in the affidavit and I absolutely do not
wish to disclose your comments at the time of the verdict. If you and your
colleagues on the Parma Municipal Court are willing to assent to recusal, I will
request that he assign the case to a different jurisdiction.
{¶7} “I am hopeful that you concur with my proposal and that you will
respond on or before April 25, 1996. If my hope is misplaced, I will be forced to
file the affidavit.”
{¶8} On October 23, 1996, Judge Gilligan, pursuant to the letter from
Kline’s attorney and in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, referred the
case to Judge James J. Sweeney, the Presiding Judge of the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, to be reassigned to another municipal court. On November 6,
1996, Judge Sweeney, purporting to act under former R.C. 2937.20, transferred the
criminal case to appellant Lakewood Municipal Court by specifying:
{¶9} “Presiding Judge Timothy P. Gilligan of the Parma Municipal Court
having recused himself from hearing the above-captioned matter, pursuant to
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January Term, 2002
[former] Ohio Revised Code Section 2937.20, this Court transfers this matter to the
Lakewood Municipal Court, to hear and determine the same according to law.”
{¶10} Following a trial in the Lakewood Municipal Court, Kline was
convicted of failure to comply with a police order and obstruction of official
business, and she was sentenced on those charges. On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence on the charge of obstruction of
official business and reversed the conviction and sentence on the charge of failure
to comply with a police order. Parma v. Kline (Oct. 14, 1999), Cuyahoga App.
Nos. 74617 and 74618, 1999 WL 820467.
{¶11} On remand, Kline was resentenced on the obstruction conviction and
was ordered to appear for the community-service portion of her sentence on June
4, 2001. In April 2001, Kline filed a motion to vacate her conviction and sentence
based on her claim that appellants, the Lakewood Municipal Court and Judge
Patrick Carroll of that municipal court, lacked jurisdiction over her criminal case.
{¶12} On June 1, 2001, when Judge Carroll and the Lakewood Municipal
Court did not rule on Kline’s motion to vacate, Kline filed a complaint in the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition to declare her conviction
and sentence void and to prevent Judge Carroll and the municipal court from
proceeding further in the transferred criminal case. On June 4, 2001, the court of
appeals granted an alternative writ, stayed appellants from enforcing the sentence,
and ordered them to respond to the complaint. By letter dated June 4, 2001, Kline
notified Parma that he had filed the prohibition action and that the court of appeals
had granted an alternative writ. After the court of appeals denied appellants’
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to join Parma as a party under Civ.R. 19(A),
Parma filed a motion to intervene as a respondent on August 3, 2001.
{¶13} On January 4, 2002, the court of appeals granted the writ of
prohibition and denied Parma’s motion to intervene.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶14} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right by Judge
Carroll and the Lakewood Municipal Court.
{¶15} Judge Carroll and the Lakewood Municipal Court assert that the court
of appeals erred in granting the writ of prohibition. For the reasons that follow, we
reject these assertions and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
{¶16} In order to be entitled to the writ of prohibition, Kline had to establish
that (1) Judge Carroll and the Lakewood Municipal Court were about to exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by
law, and (3) denial of the writ would cause injury for which no other adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law exists. State ex rel. Potts v. Comm. on
Continuing Legal Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 452, 455,
755 N.E.2d 886.
{¶17} Here, it is uncontroverted that Judge Carroll and the municipal court
had exercised and were about to exercise judicial power in the underlying criminal
case involving Kline.
{¶18} Regarding the remaining requirements, “[w]here an inferior court
patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie
both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the
results of prior actions taken without jurisdiction.” Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio
St.3d 334,
2002-Ohio-2217,
767 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 15.
{¶19} The court of appeals correctly held that Judge Carroll and the
Lakewood Municipal Court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over
the underlying criminal case involving Kline.
{¶20} The presiding judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
transferred Kline’s criminal case to the Lakewood Municipal Court based on former
R.C. 2937.20.1 That statute provided that upon the filing of an affidavit of prejudice
concerning a judge of a court inferior to the common pleas court and the notification
1. Effective November 20, 1996, R.C. 2937.20 was amended and recodified as R.C. 2701.031. 146
Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10624, 10628.
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January Term, 2002
of the presiding judge of the common pleas court of the filing of the affidavit, the
presiding judge would examine the affidavit, and if the judge found evidence that
the alleged grounds for disqualification existed, the judge would designate another
judge of the inferior court or the common pleas court to hear the matter:
{¶21} “When … a judge of a court inferior to the court of common pleas
… has a bias or prejudice either for or against a party to a cause pending before
the … judge … or is otherwise disqualified to sit in a cause pending before
the … judge, on the filing of an affidavit of such party or counsel, setting forth
the fact of that interest, relationship, bias, prejudice, or disqualification, the clerk
or deputy clerk of the court, or the magistrate, shall enter the filing of the affidavit
on the docket in that cause, and, forthwith notify the presiding judge of the court of
common pleas …, who shall proceed without delay to examine into the affidavit,
and, if the judge finds from all the evidence that the alleged interest, relationship,
bias, prejudice, or disqualification exists, the judge shall designate … another
judge of the inferior court, or the court of common pleas to hear and determine that
cause.” 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2177, 2203.
{¶22} The attempted transfer to the Lakewood Municipal Court under
former R.C. 2937.20 was unauthorized for several reasons. First, no affidavit of
prejudice was filed against Judge Gilligan or the other judges of the Parma
Municipal Court. See Williams v. Banner Buick, Inc. (1989), 60 Ohio App.3d 128,
133,
574 N.E.2d 579 (“it is evident that an affidavit must be filed by a party in order
for the procedure outlined in R.C. 2937.20 to be applicable”). (Emphasis sic.)
Second, no entry of any filing of an affidavit of prejudice was made in Kline’s
criminal case. Third, no notification of the filing of any affidavit of prejudice was
made to the presiding judge of the common pleas court. Fourth, the presiding judge
did not, as required by former R.C. 2937.20, designate another Parma Municipal
Court judge or a Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judge to hear the case.
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{¶23} Because former R.C. 2937.20 is inapplicable to a municipal court
judge who disqualifies himself without an affidavit having been filed against the
judge, the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court possesses the exclusive
authority to appoint another judge in these circumstances. Univ. Hts. v. Rothschild
(2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 443, 444,
751 N.E.2d 551; Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Davet (Aug. 10, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76288,
2000 WL 1144782; Williams,
60 Ohio App.3d at 133,
574 N.E.2d 579. In this regard, Section 5(A)(3), Article
IV of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[r]ules may be adopted to provide for
the temporary assignment of judges to sit and hold court in any court established
by law.” See, also, Section 5(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. We have
promulgated rules authorizing the Chief Justice to assign judges to serve on any
municipal court. See former M.C.Sup.R. 13(A),
40 Ohio St.2d xlviii, which was
effective at the time of the transfer in this case; see, also, Sup.R. 17(A), which was
adopted on July 1, 1997. The Chief Justice has also adopted Guidelines for
Assignment of Judges. 69 Ohio St.3d XCIX and 95 Ohio St.3d at LXXIX to
LXXXV.
{¶24} Therefore, the presiding judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas patently and unambiguously lacked authority to transfer the
criminal case to the Lakewood Municipal Court upon the voluntary disqualification
of Judge Gilligan of the Parma Municipal Court. See Rothschild, 141 Ohio App.3d
at 444,
751 N.E.2d 551; Rocky River v. Hughes (Nov. 22, 2000), Cuyahoga App.
No. 76771,
2000 WL 1739220.
{¶25} Judge Carroll and the Lakewood Municipal Court argue that Kline’s
claim and the court of appeals’ judgment are based upon territorial jurisdiction,
which they claim is tantamount to venue and is consequently a waivable, procedural
concept. See Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 88,
61 O.O.2d 335,
290
N.E.2d 841 (subject-matter jurisdiction distinguished from venue); Brooks v. Hurst
Buick-Pontiac-Olds-GMC, Inc. (1985),
23 Ohio App.3d 85, 23 OBR 150, 491
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January Term, 2002
N.E.2d 345; cf. State ex rel. Coyne v. Todia (1989),
45 Ohio St.3d 232, 236,
543
N.E.2d 1271 (“respondents’ [municipal court judges’] proposed unauthorized acts
are jurisdictional because they claim exclusive, territorial jurisdiction”).
{¶26} Appellants’ assertion is incorrect and the cases they cite are
inapposite. This case involves an improper transfer of a case from one municipal
court to another municipal court pursuant to former R.C. 2937.20 upon the
voluntary disqualification of a municipal court judge rather than upon a request for
a change of venue. The cases cited by appellants do not address this issue.
{¶27} Appellants’ reliance on the doctrine of invited error is also misplaced.
Under this doctrine, a party is not entitled to take advantage of an error that he
himself invited or induced the court to make. Lester v. Leuck (1943), 142 Ohio St.
91,
26 O.O. 280,
50 N.E.2d 145, paragraph one of the syllabus. But challenging
improper assignment and transfer of a case is an attack on the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the transferee court; hence, the doctrines of invited error and waiver
do not apply. See Davis v. Wolfe (2001),
92 Ohio St.3d 549, 552,
751 N.E.2d 1051;
cf. State ex rel. Lomaz v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1988),
36 Ohio
St.3d 209, 212,
522 N.E.2d 551 (Writ of prohibition granted: “Proper assignment,
like jurisdiction over the subject matter, is required for the valid exercise of judicial
power”).
{¶28} Finally, any error by the court of appeals in not granting Parma’s
belated motion to intervene in this prohibition action is harmless. Even if Parma
had been permitted to intervene, the court of appeals’ judgment granting the writ
was appropriate. State ex rel. First New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher (1998),
82 Ohio St.3d 501, 504,
696 N.E.2d 1058. Moreover, even without Parma as a
party, the court considered Parma’s preeminent claim of invited error in its
decision. Finally, Parma did not appeal the judgment granting the writ and denying
its motion to intervene.
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{¶29} Based on the foregoing, Judge Carroll and the Lakewood Municipal
Court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over Kline’s criminal case,
and Kline was entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition to vacate
her Lakewood County conviction and sentence and to prevent appellants from
exercising further jurisdiction in her case. See, e.g., Lomaz, 36 Ohio St.3d 209,
522
N.E.2d 551, where we issued a comparable writ of prohibition. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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J. David Ingersoll, for appellee.
Kevin M. Spellacy, Lakewood Law Director, for appellants.
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