State v. Gross

, quoting State v. Waddy (1992),

63 Ohio St.3d 424, 438

588 N.E.2d 819

. We have previously recounted those factors to be considered: “(1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the
witness’ degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of
the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.”
State v. Broom (1988),

40 Ohio St.3d 277, 284

533 N.E.2d 682

, citing Manson v.
Brathwaite (1977),

432 U.S. 98, 114

97 S.Ct. 2243

53 L.Ed.2d 140

.
{¶20} Here, Gross contends that the state subjected the juveniles who were
present at the gas station to numerous viewings of Gross or Gross’s photograph
before the photographic arrays and in-court identifications. The totality of the
circumstances, however, weighs in favor of admitting the identifications.
{¶21} Only one of the four juveniles positively identified Gross from two
photographic arrays. That witness stated that he ranked the certainty of his pretrial

7
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

identification of Gross as a “five” on a scale of one to ten, with ten equaling the
most certainty. On cross-examination, the juvenile then admitted that he had seen
Gross’s picture in the newspaper and that his subsequent in-court identification had
been a “three” on the certainty scale. Of the remaining three juveniles, two could
identify Gross only as part of a group that included other photographs—and one of
these juveniles testified that, after failing to identify Gross in an earlier courtroom
appearance, his at-trial identification of Gross depended in part on flashback
dreams that he had been having in the interim. The fourth juvenile made no
identification.
{¶22} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the identifications. The juveniles’ accounts of the investigators’ procedures
undercut Gross’s argument that impermissibly suggestive state action tainted the
identification process. To the contrary, the record reflects the state’s careful efforts
to avoid suggestiveness. The investigators showed the juveniles between 30 and
100 photographs, and there is no evidence that the investigators made suggestions
or comments to the juveniles, rushed them, or told them whether they had picked
Gross’s photograph. Moreover, the circumstances that Gross cites as suggestive—
that the juveniles encountered media reports and saw Gross in the courtroom—go
to the weight to be given the identifications, rather than their admissibility. See
Brown,

38 Ohio St.3d at 310-311

528 N.E.2d 523

 (holding that allegedly
suggestive circumstances that did not constitute state action go to weight and
reliability of testimony, not admissibility). Even if we were to conclude that the
trial court erred, however, no prejudice attached. See

id. at 311

528 N.E.2d 523

.
Defense counsel conducted a probing examination of the circumstances
surrounding both the photographic arrays and the identifications to allow the jury
to assess the value of the juveniles’ testimony.          Given the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the photograph selection procedures and the
identifications, we cannot say that reversible error exists.




                                           8
                                January Term, 2002




        {¶23} Nor can we say that the show-up identification procedures constitute
reversible error. Several hours after the murder of Lieutenant Lutz, investigators
took both Karen Wright and Shawn Jones to view Gross, who was in custody near
the scene. Neither witness spoke to the other. From separate police vehicles, the
witnesses observed Gross, who stood with his hands behind his back, between two
officers. Both Wright and Jones identified Gross at the scene, in court for a motion
hearing, and at trial. Gross complains that the trial court erred in admitting these
identifications.
        {¶24} We agree with Gross that the show-up identification was suggestive.
We also reiterate that “ ‘[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the
purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.’
” Broom,

40 Ohio St.3d at 284

533 N.E.2d 682

, quoting Stovall v. Denno (1967),

388 U.S. 293, 302

87 S.Ct. 1967

18 L.Ed.2d 1199

. But the ultimate focus in
determining whether reversible error exists is not just on whether the practice was
used, but on whether it was so suggestive as to create         “ ‘ “a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” ’ ”

 quoting Neil v. Biggers (1972),

409 U.S. 188, 198

93 S.Ct. 375

34 L.Ed.2d 401

 (quoting Simmons v. United States
[1968],

390 U.S. 377, 384

88 S.Ct. 967

19 L.Ed.2d 1247

).
        {¶25} Our consideration of the Manson factors,

432 U.S. at 114

97 S.Ct. 2243

53 L.Ed.2d 140

, leads us to conclude that there is not a “ ‘very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification’ ” in this case.

Id. at 105

97 S.Ct. 2243

53 L.Ed.2d 140, fn. 8

.      Both witnesses had time to view Gross during the
commission of the crimes; both testified that they had focused their attention on
him; both described him prior to the show-up identification; both were confident in
their respective identifications (Wright, in fact, testified both at a pretrial motion
hearing and at trial that she was 100 percent certain of her identification); and both
identified Gross mere hours after witnessing the crime. Although the show-up
identification procedures were suggestive, the totality of the circumstances




                                          9
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




persuade us that the procedures did not create a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the identifications.
           {¶26} We therefore reject Gross’s third and fourth propositions of law.
                             C. Venue and Voir Dire Issues
           {¶27} In connection with his fifth proposition of law, Gross raises
numerous issues related to venue or the selection of the jury. We address each issue
in turn.
                                    Change of Venue
           {¶28} Citing “overwhelming news coverage” and the fact that he “was
charged with killing a beloved member of the community,” Gross argues that the
jury was not free from outside knowledge or influence and bias. As a result, Gross
speculates, “[p]otential jurors were necessarily aware that the failure to impose the
death penalty against [him] would be dealt with harshly in the media and in the
community.” Gross therefore argues that because an impartial jury was impossible,
the trial court erred in denying his motion to change venue.
           {¶29} A motion for change of venue is governed by Crim.R. 18(B), which
provides that “[u]pon the motion of any party or upon its own motion the court may
transfer an action … when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held
in the court in which the action is pending.” We have recently reiterated that the
rule “does not require a change of venue merely because of extensive pretrial
publicity. State v. Landrum (1990),

53 Ohio St.3d 107, 116-117

559 N.E.2d 710, 722-723

. Any decision on a change of venue rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court.

Id. at 116

559 N.E.2d at 722

. ‘ “ ‘[A] careful and searching voir dire
provides the best test of whether prejudicial pretrial publicity has prevented
obtaining a fair and impartial jury from the locality.’ ” ’

Id. at 117

559 N.E.2d at 722

, quoting State v. Bayless (1976),

48 Ohio St.2d 73, 98

2 O.O.3d 249, 262

357 N.E.2d 1035, 1051

, vacated on other grounds (1978),

438 U.S. 911

98 S.Ct. 3135

,




                                           10
                                January Term, 2002

57 L.E.2d 1155

. A defendant claiming that pretrial publicity has denied him a fair
trial must show that one or more jurors were actually biased. Mayola v. Alabama
(C.A.5, 1980),

623 F.2d 992, 996

. Only in rare cases may prejudice be presumed.

Id. at 997

; see, also, Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976),

427 U.S. 539, 554-555

96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800-2801

49 L.Ed.2d 683, 694-695

.” State v. Treesh (2001),

90 Ohio St.3d 460, 463-464

.
       {¶30} It is indeed true that “[p]retrial publicity can undermine a trial’s
fairness.” Landrum,

53 Ohio St.3d at 117

559 N.E.2d 710

. But Gross has failed
to show that “the publicity in this case was so pervasive that it impaired the ability
of the empaneled jurors to deliberate fairly and impartially.” Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 464

. Here, as in Landrum, the trial court took effective steps to
protect the defendant’s rights. The record is replete with instances of the trial court
questioning individual prospective jurors about their exposure to media coverage
and their ability to function as fair, impartial jurors. During the lengthy voir dire,
the trial court excused over one hundred prospective jurors, often because they
knew an individual involved in the case or because they had formed an opinion
regarding Gross’s guilt or innocence that they could not set aside. Each empanelled
juror, however, stated—without exception—that he or she had not formed an
opinion about Gross’s guilt or innocence, or that he or she could put aside any such
opinion, and that he or she could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the
law and evidence presented. We have previously explained that where “it appears
that opinions as to the guilt of the defendant of those called for examination for
jurors are not fixed but would yield readily to evidence, it is not error to overrule
an application for a change of venue, in absence of a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Swiger (1966),

5 Ohio St.2d 151

34 O.O.2d 270

214 N.E.2d 417

, paragraph one of the syllabus. Gross has failed to demonstrate that any seated
juror was not impartial. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Gross’s motion for change of venue.




                                          11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                                 Limited Voir Dire
       {¶31} Gross argues that the trial court’s restrictions on and repeated
interruption of voir dire impaired his ability to use peremptory challenges
effectively to remove prospective jurors. Gross also complains that the trial court
summarily denied defense counsel challenges for cause without permitting counsel
to ask appropriate followup questions. We find no merit to these arguments. “The
scope of voir dire is within the trial court’s discretion and varies depending on the
circumstances of each case. Any limits placed thereon must be reasonable.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Bedford (1988),

39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129

529 N.E.2d 913

. See, also, State v. Twyford (2002),

94 Ohio St.3d 340, 345

.
Accordingly, “[n]o prejudicial error can be assigned to the examination of
veniremen in qualifying them as fair and impartial jurors unless a clear abuse of
discretion is shown.” State v. Cornwell (1999),

86 Ohio St.3d 560, 565

715 N.E.2d 1144

. The transcript shows that the trial court was not unduly restrictive; to the
contrary, the trial court balanced its obligation to control the inquiry with according
counsel latitude in questioning the prospective jurors. See State v. Lorraine (1993),

66 Ohio St.3d 414, 419

613 N.E.2d 212

, quoting State v. Durr (1991),

58 Ohio St.3d 86, 89

568 N.E.2d 674

 (“ ‘[a]lthough R.C. 2945.27 affords the prosecution
and defense the opportunity to conduct a reasonable examination of prospective
jurors, … the trial court reserves the right and responsibility to control the
proceedings of a criminal trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.03, and must limit the trial to
relevant and material matters with a view toward the expeditious and effective
ascertainment of truth’ ”). Voir dire lasted eleven days, encompassed over 2,500
pages of transcript, and, as we noted in our discussion on venue, featured extensive
examination of the prospective jurors by the court, the state, and defense counsel.
Although the trial court limited certain areas of inquiry, these limitations were
within the discretion of the court. Nor do we find the trial court’s interaction with
counsel unduly intrusive.




                                          12
                                      January Term, 2002




                                        Excusal of Jurors
         {¶32} Gross claims that the trial court erred in regard to excusing various
prospective jurors. First, he asserts that the trial court incorrectly excused jurors
who possessed objections to capital punishment but who were not unequivocally
opposed to it under all circumstances. Second, he argues that by failing to excuse
jurors who stated that they would automatically impose a death sentence upon a
conviction for murder, the trial court forced defense counsel to use peremptory
challenges unnecessarily. Third, he contends that the trial court failed to fully voir
dire the seated jurors to determine whether their knowledge of the facts or persons
involved would prevent a fair trial by an impartial jury. Finally, he objects
specifically to the trial court’s having excused prospective juror Catherine Decker.
         {¶33} The standard for our review of Gross’s complaints is well settled:
“[A] court’s determination in a voir dire proceeding of a prospective juror’s fairness
and impartiality constitutes reversible error only when it can be shown that the
court, in conducting the examination, clearly abused its discretion.” State v.
Williams (1983),

6 Ohio St.3d 281, 288

, 6 OBR 345,

452 N.E.2d 1323

.
         {¶34} We find no reversible error in regard to Gross’s first two complaints.
Gross first argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in excusing jurors
for cause, thereby eliminating many jurors who had expressed conscientious but
not unequivocal objections to the death penalty. Our decision to reverse his death
sentence and remand for resentencing in Section IV(A), infra, renders Gross’s first
argument moot.
         {¶35} Gross next asserts that the trial court improperly denied challenges
for cause concerning jurors who stated that they could not consider mitigating
evidence and would automatically vote to recommend imposition of the death
penalty. Gross identifies 19 prospective jurors who he asserts fit into this category.1


1. Gross fails to identify with accuracy several of the events to which he assigns error. His brief,




                                                 13
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




As a result of his need to prevent any of these individuals from sitting on the jury,
Gross argues, he had to exercise peremptory challenges that he could have reserved
for other prospective jurors. Again, given the need for resentencing, Gross’s
argument is moot insofar as it pertains to the actual sentence he received. Thus, we
address Gross’s claim of error only to the extent that it could have deprived him of
peremptory challenges that he could have used in an attempt to affect the first phase
of the trial.
         {¶36} The record reflects that Gross’s asserted classification is unfounded.
Contrary to his representations, many of the 19 prospective jurors Gross identifies
stated in response to further questioning—some emphatically so—that, despite any
personal inclinations favoring capital punishment, they could, and would, follow
the law in the sentencing phase. It is well settled that “a prospective juror in a
capital case may be excluded for cause if his views on capital punishment                     ‘…
would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ ” State v. Coleman (1989),

45 Ohio St.3d 298, 305

544 N.E.2d 622

, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985),

469 U.S. 412, 424

105 S.Ct. 844

83 L.Ed.2d 841

, and Adams v. Texas (1980),

448 U.S. 38, 45

100 S.Ct. 2521

65 L.Ed.2d 581

. See, also, State v. Rogers (1985),

17 Ohio St.3d 174

, 17 OBR 414,

478 N.E.2d 984

, paragraph three of the syllabus.
Consistent with this rule is our holding that “even if a juror shows a predisposition
in favor of imposing the death penalty, the trial court does not abuse its discretion
in overruling a challenge for cause if the juror later states that she will follow the
law and the court’s instructions.” (Emphasis sic.) Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 468

, citing State v. Mack (1995),

73 Ohio St.3d 502, 510

, 653 N.E.2d

for example, incorrectly states the names of several prospective jurors and cites transcript pages
that do not contain what he represents occurred at that point in the proceedings. We have
reviewed the entirety of the transcript and have afforded Gross every benefit of the doubt in
searching for support for his argument.

14
January Term, 2002

329. The prospective jurors here fell into this category, and the record supports the
trial court’s appropriate exercise of its discretion in refusing to excuse them for
cause.
{¶37} By joint agreement of the parties, the trial court excused for cause
those identified prospective jurors who did express an inability to consider
mitigation evidence. And, of those remaining identified prospective jurors, the
court excused one for cause solely at defense counsel’s urging and another by
agreement of the parties based on that individual’s position as the county dog
warden, a position they regarded as too closely aligned with law enforcement.
Therefore, Gross is correct only in that some of the prospective jurors whom he
later struck by peremptory challenge initially stated that they regarded capital
punishment as the appropriate penalty for the intentional killing of another. But
Gross has not identified jurors who maintained that view and whom the trial court
nevertheless permitted to remain as prospective jurors, thereby necessitating the
use of a peremptory. His claim that the trial court’s denials of challenges for cause
prejudicially affected his use of peremptory challenges thus lacks support and
credibility.
{¶38} The record also contradicts Gross’s third complaint, that the trial
court conducted an incomplete voir dire. We have already recounted the trial
court’s efforts to seat an impartial jury in our discussion on venue. The trial court
conducted a probing inquiry that addressed the issues of prospective jurors’
personal knowledge of the individuals involved in this case and the influence of
media reports. The court then permitted counsel for both sides to question the
prospective jurors. In the course of this three-pronged examination, all empanelled
jurors indicated that they would be able to perform their duties as demanded by the
law. The fact that they had heard of the case does not obviate their stated
willingness to function as impartial jurors. “While fairness requires that jurors be
impartial, jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. State

15
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

v. Sheppard (1998),

84 Ohio St.3d 230, 235

703 N.E.2d 286

, 292. The trial court
[is] entitled to accept [a juror’s] assurances that he would be fair and impartial and
would decide the case on the basis of the evidence. ‘[D]eference must be paid to
the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ Wainwright,

469 U.S. at 426

105 S.Ct. at 853

83 L.Ed.2d at 853

.” State v. Jones (2001),

91 Ohio St.3d 335, 338

744 N.E.2d 1163

. Gross has failed to persuade us either that the trial court acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in declining to excuse any jurors
challenged for cause or in deciding that each of the seated jurors would serve
impartially.
         {¶39} Finally, Gross argues that the trial court should not have granted the
state’s challenge for cause in regard to Catherine Decker, a prospective juror. Gross
asserts that Decker “did not express any reservations about the death penalty” and
that “[t]he trial court excused her because of her role as a pharmacist.” Excusing
Decker because she was a pharmacist cannot constitute prejudicial error. “[A]n
erroneous excusal for cause, on grounds other than the venireman’s views on capital
punishment, is not cognizable error, since a party has no right to have any particular
person sit on the jury. Unlike the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, an
erroneous excusal cannot cause the seating of a biased juror and therefore does not
taint the jury’s impartiality.” State v. Sanders (2001),

92 Ohio St.3d 245, 249

.
                            Death-Qualification Process
         {¶40} Gross contends that the trial court and the state sought commitments
from prospective jurors to sign a recommendation of death, thereby denying him a
fair trial. But our reversal of Gross’s death sentence renders moot Gross’s claim
that he did not receive a fair and impartial sentencing jury. See Section IV(A),
infra.
                                 Jury Sequestration




                                          16
                                 January Term, 2002




        {¶41} Gross argues that because the trial court did not sequester the jury
throughout the course of the trial, he was denied a fair trial. The decision of whether
to sequester a jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Maurer
(1984),

15 Ohio St.3d 239, 252-253

, 15 OBR 379,

473 N.E.2d 768

. See, also, State
v. Osborne (1976),

49 Ohio St.2d 135, 141-142

3 O.O.3d 79

359 N.E.2d 78

; White
v. Maxwell (1963),

174 Ohio St. 186

, 189,

22 O.O.2d 140

187 N.E.2d 878

. As in
Maurer, the trial judge in the instant case routinely admonished the jury not to
discuss the case or to read any news accounts about the matter. The trial court was
in the best position to gauge the atmosphere of the trial proceedings and to evaluate
whether these instructions sufficed over sequestration.          Consequently, as in
Maurer, “[w]e believe that the precautions taken, based in part on our finding that
the pretrial publicity fell well short of justifying a change of venue, clearly
demonstrate that the court’s decisio[n] relative to sequestration [was] not in error.”

15 Ohio St.3d at 253

, 15 OBR 379,

473 N.E.2d 768

. We cannot say that the
trial court’s declining to sequester the jury throughout the trial was an unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable decision.
                                III. Trial Phase Issues
                                A. Evidentiary Issues
        {¶42} Gross asserts in his sixth proposition of law that the trial court erred
in permitting the testimony of Ron Johnson, which placed Gross’s purchase of
crack cocaine before the jury. In his seventh proposition of law, Gross then claims
prejudice from the admission of nine allegedly redundant autopsy photographs,
three allegedly irrelevant photographs, and the flashlight. He additionally claims
that the trial court erred in permitting two individuals to testify as experts on atomic
absorption testing. Further, Gross argues in his eleventh proposition of law that the
impermissible admission of victim-impact evidence created an emotional
atmosphere that rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, he claims in his




                                          17
                                 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




twelfth proposition of law that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions. None of these propositions of law is well taken.
                                  “Other Acts” Testimony
        {¶43} The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a trial
court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence
of an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice. State v. Issa (2001),

93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64

752 N.E.2d 904

. Therefore, we confine our inquiry to
determining whether the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
unconscionably in deciding the evidentiary issues about which Gross complains.
See State v. Barnes (2002),

94 Ohio St.3d 21, 23

759 N.E.2d 1240

.
        {¶44} Gross argues that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial “other
acts” evidence—specifically, the testimony by Ron Johnson that Gross traded the
murder weapon for crack cocaine. But our review of the record indicates that Gross
failed to timely object to Johnson’s testimony at trial. Accordingly, Gross has
forfeited all but plain error. See State v. Hartman (2001),

93 Ohio St.3d 274, 281

754 N.E.2d 1150

; State v. Allen (1995),

73 Ohio St.3d 626, 634

653 N.E.2d 675

.
        {¶45} Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
We have previously explained that this rule “places three limitations on a reviewing
court’s decision to correct an error despite the absence of a timely objection at trial”:
(1) “there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule,” (2) “the error must
be plain,” which means that it “must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial
proceedings,” and (3) “the error must have affected ‘substantial rights,’ ” which
means that “the trial court’s error must have affected the outcome of the trial.”2



2. We note—without deciding the issue in this case—that the phrase “affecting substantial rights”
may not always be synonymous with “prejudicial.” See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735,

 (“There may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected
regardless of their effect on the outcome”).




                                               18
                                January Term, 2002




Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27,

759 N.E.2d 1240

. Further, the decision to correct a
plain error is discretionary and should be made “ ‘with the utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ”

 quoting State v. Long (1978),

53 Ohio St.2d 91

7 O.O.3d 178

372 N.E.2d 804

,
paragraph three of the syllabus.
       {¶46} We find no plain error here.           Evid.R. 404(B) provides that
“[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” We
have previously held that this rule sets forth “an exception to the common law with
respect to evidence of other acts of wrongdoing …. The rule … contemplate[s]
acts which may or may not be similar to the crime at issue. If the other act does in
fact ‘tend to show’ by substantial proof any of those things enumerated, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or
absence of mistake or accident, then evidence of the other act may be admissible.”
(Citations omitted.) Broom,

40 Ohio St.3d 277

533 N.E.2d 682

, paragraph one of
the syllabus.
       {¶47} By testifying as to the details of the crack transaction, Johnson placed
the murder weapon in Gross’s possession, explained the sequence of events leading
to its recovery and connection to Gross, and demonstrated Gross’s concern about
discovery of the weapon.       His “could be life or death” comment reflects
consciousness of guilt. See State v. Tibbetts (2001),

92 Ohio St.3d 146, 161

. See, also, Hartman,

93 Ohio St.3d at 283

754 N.E.2d 1150

. And,
similar to the defendant in Tibbetts, Gross was charged with committing aggravated
murder while in the course of an aggravated robbery. His desire for drugs was
probative of a possible motive to steal and kill.

 92 Ohio St.3d at 161,

, citing State v. Henness (1997),

79 Ohio St.3d 53, 61

679 N.E.2d 686

.




                                         19
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Therefore, because Johnson’s testimony concerning Gross’s postmurder visit to his
house tended to show by substantial proof Gross’s motive and intent and Gross’s
identity as Lieutenant Lutz’s killer, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the testimony under Evid.R. 404(B). Because there is no
error, Gross has failed to satisfy the first prong of plain-error analysis.
        {¶48} Moreover, even if we were to decide that the trial court erred in
permitting Johnson to testify as to why Gross was at his house, Johnson’s testimony
as to everything but Gross’s purpose was proper. And because the “other act”
complained of here—purchasing crack cocaine—is of minor significance compared
to the gravity of the aggravated murder counts against Gross, any error would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tibbetts,

92 Ohio St.3d at 161

. Gross has therefore also failed to demonstrate that the “error” would
have affected the outcome of the trial, the third prong of plain-error analysis.
                                  Gruesome Photographs
        {¶49} Gross contends that the trial court erred in permitting the state to
introduce nine autopsy photographs that were gruesome and repetitive.3 He further
claims that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed any probative
value. Although Gross asserts that his trial counsel objected to the photographs—
he even directs our attention to two transcript pages said to contain the objection—
the record reveals that Gross’s counsel objected at trial only to the timing of the
formal admission of the photographs; counsel wanted to delay the admission of
exhibits so any legal debate would not occur in front of the jury. In fact, on one of
the transcript pages Gross cites, his counsel stipulates to the admission of the nine
photographs in question. Consequently, Gross has forfeited all but plain error.
State v. Coley (2001),

93 Ohio St.3d 253, 265

.


3. Gross’s appellate brief states that the state showed the photographs as slides. The exhibits
themselves are photographs. We have considered the potential prejudicial impact of both
photographs and slides in determining any effect on the trial.




                                              20
                                 January Term, 2002




       {¶50} No plain error occurred.          The law regarding the admission of
photographic evidence is well settled:
       {¶51} “Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Landrum,

53 Ohio St.3d at 121

559 N.E.2d at 726

; State v. Maurer (1984),

15 Ohio St.3d 239

, 15 OBR 379,

473 N.E.2d 768

, paragraph seven of the syllabus. Close-up photographs of victims’
injuries, even if gruesome, are admissible in capital cases if the probative value of
the photographs outweighs the danger of material prejudice and if the photographs
are not repetitive or cumulative in number. Id.” Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 483

.
       {¶52} We have reviewed the nine photographs at issue, all of which depict
the wounds Lieutenant Lutz suffered. The photographs serve purposes that we have
time and again found sufficiently probative to overcome their inherently disturbing
nature. They helped the jury appreciate the nature of the crimes, they illustrated
the coroner’s testimony, and, by portraying the wounds, they helped to prove
Gross’s intent and the lack of accident or mistake. See Coley,

93 Ohio St.3d at 266

; Tibbetts,

92 Ohio St.3d at 156-157

; State v.
Evans (1992),

63 Ohio St.3d 231, 250-251

586 N.E.2d 1042

. Further, the fact that
several of the photographs show the same wounds from varying distances does not
automatically mean that they are repetitive. Several of the photographs establish
the location of a wound but fail to depict the wound as clearly as another photograph
that presents a closer view of the wound—which in turn fails to establish the
location of the wound as clearly as the more distant photograph. Therefore, we
conclude that, given the substantial probative value of the photographs and the fact
that they were not particularly inflammatory, coupled with the consequent lack of
any unfair prejudice to Gross, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the evidence. See Coley,

93 Ohio St.3d at 265

 (“Decisions on
the admissibility of photographs are ‘left to the sound discretion of the trial court,’




                                          21
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




” quoting State v. Slagle [1992],

65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601

605 N.E.2d 916

). See,
also, Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 483-484

; Landrum,

53 Ohio St.3d at 121

559 N.E.2d 710

; State v. Morales (1987),

32 Ohio St.3d 252

513 N.E.2d 267

. Further, even if we were to say that because some of the photographs show
several of the same wounds from varying distances—a characteristic that this court
regarded as nonreversible error in State v. Thompson (1987),

33 Ohio St.3d 1, 9

,
514 N.E.2d 407—there is no doubt that any such error here is harmless in regard to
the guilt phase because of the abundant evidence against Gross. See

id.

 See, also,
State v. Moore (1998),

81 Ohio St.3d 22, 32-33

. Gross has failed to
satisfy at least the first and third prongs of our plain-error analysis.
        {¶53} Similarly, we find no plain error in regard to the three photographs
that Gross claims are irrelevant. Each photograph depicts Gross at the Bethesda
Hospital emergency room following his apprehension and shows his head wounds.
Again, Gross failed to object to the admission of these photographs. Relevancy
attaches to the photographs because they illustrate witness testimony regarding the
head wound Gross sustained that morning, a wound that goes to his identity as the
man who struggled with and ultimately killed Lieutenant Lutz. Cf. Coley,

93 Ohio St.3d at 266

. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting photographic evidence of the head wound. To the extent
that the photographs are repetitive, any such error is harmless in light of the
abundant remaining evidence of guilt introduced at trial. Moore,

81 Ohio St.3d at 32-33

; Thompson,

33 Ohio St.3d at 9

514 N.E.2d 407

. Gross’s
argument fails to satisfy at least the third prong of our plain-error inquiry.
        {¶54} Finally, Gross asserts that, because the autopsy photos were before
the jury during both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase, “the court created a
climate in which the jury was unable to dispassionately weigh the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating factors.” Given our resolution of Gross’s




                                           22
                                  January Term, 2002




argument concerning alternate-juror misconduct in Section IV(A), infra, this
portion of Gross’s photographic-evidence argument is moot.
                                     The Flashlight
          {¶55} At trial, the state introduced a flashlight that belonged to Lieutenant
Lutz, which, according to witnesses, the officer had used to strike Gross in the head
during their struggle. The state further introduced DNA test results indicating that
material on the flashlight was consistent with six genetic markers present in blood
obtained from Gross; the forensic scientist/molecular biologist who conducted the
test testified that such a result would appear only once in every 6,900 Caucasians
tested.
          {¶56} Gross argues that admission of the flashlight and test results was error
because (1) the officer who retrieved the flashlight from the gas station did not use
fresh latex gloves, (2) FBI testing found no genetic material on the flashlight, while
subsequent testing by another lab did, and (3) the state failed to preserve a sample
of the material for independent testing by the defense. Gross concludes that such
alleged errors failed to establish a chain of custody sufficient to satisfy Evid.R.
901(A)’s requirement of proper authentication of evidence as a condition precedent
to admissibility.
          {¶57} We find no merit in Gross’s arguments. As a general matter, “the
state [is] not required to prove a perfect, unbroken chain of custody.” State v. Keene
(1998),

81 Ohio St.3d 646, 662

693 N.E.2d 246

. Accordingly, “[a] strict chain of
custody is not always required in order for physical evidence to be admissible.”
State v. Wilkins (1980),

64 Ohio St.2d 382, 389

18 O.O.3d 528

415 N.E.2d 303

.
The arguments that an officer failed to change gloves and that a second round of
testing found previously undiscovered genetic material on the flashlight go to the
weight to be afforded the evidence, not to the admission of the evidence. See State
v. Richey (1992),

64 Ohio St.3d 353, 360

595 N.E.2d 915

 (“The possibility of
contamination goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility”), overruled




                                            23
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




on other grounds, State v. McGuire (1997),

80 Ohio St.3d 390, 402-404

686 N.E.2d 1112

. Finally, the state represented to the court at sidebar that a sample of the
material sufficient for testing remained available, and that it had informed defense
counsel of this fact. The trial court apparently credited this representation and
denied a motion for a mistrial by Gross. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the flashlight and related test results
over objection.
                                  Expert Testimony
        {¶58} Similarly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting testimony from two technicians from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal
Investigating and Identification. Both technicians testified about the results of an
atomic absorption test performed on Gross’s hands shortly after his arrest. The test
revealed gunshot residue on the back of Gross’s left hand. Gross asserts that the
trial court erred in finding the technicians qualified to present such scientific
testimony.
        {¶59} But the implicit substance of Gross’s argument—that it is unusual to
find residue on the left hand of a right-handed individual—goes to the weight of
the evidence and not to the qualifications of the expert witnesses. Gross provides
no substantive explanation as to why either technician was not qualified. Rather,
he presents this court with unsupported conclusory statements challenging the
expert’s findings and credentials (“Neither [technician] had the appropriate
expertise to conduct this testing or [to] present their testimony or to give their
opinions. [Evid.R.] 602, 701, 702, 703. Their testimony was neither within their
personal knowledge nor was it rationally based on their perceptions nor helpful to
the jury”).
        {¶60} Both technicians supplied their credentials during extensive voir dire.
“Pursuant to Evid.R. 104(A), the trial court determines whether an individual
qualifies as an expert, and that determination will be overturned only for an abuse




                                          24
                              January Term, 2002




of discretion.” State v. Baston (1999),

85 Ohio St.3d 418, 423

709 N.E.2d 128

.
We have reviewed the voir dire of both technicians and can discern no reason why,
under the Evid.R. 702(B) standards for qualifying witnesses as experts, we should
consider the trial court’s decision unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Gross’s conclusory argument is rejected.




                                       25
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                               Victim-Impact Evidence
        {¶61} In his eleventh proposition of law, Gross argues that the admission of
victim-impact evidence in both phases of the trial rendered the proceedings
fundamentally unfair. He cites the following as constituting such victim-impact
evidence: statements by jurors that they knew Lieutenant Lutz or had encountered
media coverage of the crime; autopsy photographs; testimony that Lieutenant
Lutz’s son, who is also a police officer, had arrived at the scene of the crime;
testimony by Karen Wright that when she returned to the gas station after hearing
the gunshot, Lieutenant Lutz rolled over and looked at her before he died; the fact
that officers were visibly emotional while testifying; and the admission of
Lieutenant Lutz’s clothes and some personal items.
        {¶62} Nothing Gross identifies, however, presents us with reversible error.
Juror statements and exposure to media reports are not evidence. We have already
rejected Gross’s arguments in regard to these issues in our discussion of venue and
voir dire.     We also find unpersuasive his arguments related to the autopsy
photographs, Wright’s discovery of Lieutenant Lutz, and the admission of the
victim’s clothes and personal belongings. It is well settled that “[e]vidence relating
to the facts attendant to the offense … is clearly admissible during the guilt phase.
As a result, we find that evidence which depicts both the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the murder and also the impact of the murder on the victim’s
family may be admissible during both the guilt and the sentencing phases.”
(Emphasis sic.) State v. Fautenberry (1995),

72 Ohio St.3d 435, 440

650 N.E.2d 878

. Each of the items about which Gross complains establishes the circumstances
of the crime. See Lorraine,

66 Ohio St.3d at 420

613 N.E.2d 212

 (holding that
“the physical condition and circumstances of the victims are relevant to the crime
as a whole” and are admissible as evidence illustrating the nature and circumstances
of a crime).




                                           26
                                January Term, 2002




        {¶63} We also find no merit in Gross’s complaint about an incidental
mention of Lieutenant Lutz’s son, also a law enforcement officer. The first law
enforcement officer to arrive at the Certified gas station after the shooting testified
as to his discovery of Lieutenant Lutz, the condition of the victim, and the fact that
Lieutenant Lutz’s gun was missing. After the officer testified that other officers
had arrived and assumed his duties, the state asked, “What did you do then?” The
officer responded, without objection, “I went over to grab Matt. He wanted to see
his dad.” The officer then explained that he left the gas station. To the extent that
the mention of the victim’s son can be said to constitute victim-impact evidence,
we conclude that it does not constitute a violation of Gross’s constitutional rights.
The reference to the victim’s son was not detailed, not inflammatory, and not the
focus of the testimony. Viewing the facts of this case as a whole, we cannot say
that these two sentences of testimony constitute prejudice. See Lorraine,

66 Ohio St.3d at 420-421

613 N.E.2d 212

 (in determining whether prejudice exists,
evidence that would cause a jury to empathize with a victim must be viewed against
all of the facts of a case).
        {¶64} Finally, given our resolution of that portion of Gross’s fourteenth
proposition of law concerning the penalty phase, see Section IV(A), infra, his
arguments as to all evidence introduced during that phase are moot.
        {¶65} Accordingly, confining our inquiry to any victim-impact evidence
introduced in the guilt phase, we find that any evidence that may have constituted
victim-impact evidence did not prejudice Gross. To the extent that testimony
included emotional responses—such as testimony by officers—we agree with the
court of appeals that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of an aggravated murder trial that
does not include an element of strong emotion.” Gross’s eleventh proposition of
law is rejected.




                                          27
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                            Sufficiency of the Evidence
        {¶66} In his twelfth proposition of law, Gross asserts that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated murder, any of the aggravating
specifications, and aggravated robbery. He therefore argues that the trial court
erred in failing to grant his Crim.R. 29 motions. This argument is without merit.
        {¶67} “When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal
conviction, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Tibbetts,

92 Ohio St.3d at 161-162

, quoting State v. Jenks (1991),

61 Ohio St.3d 259

574 N.E.2d 492

, paragraph two of the syllabus. See, also, Jackson v.
Virginia (1979),

443 U.S. 307, 319

99 S.Ct. 2781

61 L.Ed.2d 560

. When
conducting this review, we do not weigh the evidence; rather, our inquiry is limited
to whether reasonable minds could reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.
See Tibbetts,

92 Ohio St.3d at 162

; Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 484

. Issues concerning the weight given to the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact. State v. DeHass (1967),

10 Ohio St.2d 230

39 O.O.2d 366

227 N.E.2d 212

, paragraph one of the syllabus.
        {¶68} We begin with the essential elements of the crimes. The state charged
Gross with two counts of aggravated murder in violation of former R.C. 2903.01(A)
and (B). This statute provided:
        {¶69} “(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and
design, cause the death of another.
        {¶70} “(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while
committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing
or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated
robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.” 139 Ohio Laws,
Part I, 3.




                                         28
                                   January Term, 2002




        {¶71} The state also charged Gross with four counts of aggravated robbery
in violation of former R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (2). That statute provided:
        {¶72} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as
defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after
such attempt or offense, shall do either of the following:
        {¶73} “(1) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in
section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, on or about his person or under his control;
        {¶74} “(2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another.”
140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 590.
        {¶75} R.C. 2913.01(K)(1) in turn defines a theft offense to include “[a]
violation of … 2911.13 [or] 2913.02.” The state charged Gross with violations
of both statutes. R.C. 2911.13, the breaking-and-entering statute, provides:
        {¶76} “(A) No person[,] by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an
unoccupied structure, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense, as defined
in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any felony.
        {¶77} “(B) No person shall trespass on the land or premises of another, with
purpose to commit a felony.”
        {¶78} R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), the theft statute, provided that “[n]o person, with
purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or
exert control over either the property or services … [w]ithout the consent of the
owner or person authorized to give consent[.]”
        {¶79} The state further sought to prove the charged specifications.4 Under
R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gross
committed the aggravated murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or
punishment for another offense. Under former R.C. 2929.04(A)(6), the state had


4. Gross’s appellate brief states that the state showed the photographs as slides. The exhibits
themselves are photographs. We have considered the potential prejudicial impact of both
photographs and slides in determining any effect on the trial.




                                              29
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lieutenant Lutz was a peace officer as
defined in R.C. 2935.01, that Gross knew or had reason to know this fact, and either
that Lieutenant Lutz was engaged in his duties at the time of the offense or that
Gross’s specific purpose was to kill a peace officer. The definition of a peace
officer includes “a sheriff [or] deputy sheriff.” R.C. 2935.01(B). Under R.C.
2929.04(A)(7), the state also had to prove that Gross committed the aggravated
murder while “committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after
committing or attempting to commit … aggravated robbery,” and that Gross was
either “the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not
the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and
design.” All counts also carried a firearm specification, requiring that the state
prove that Gross had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while
committing the offense. The state also had to prove that Gross had a prior
aggravated felony conviction.
       {¶80} The evidence adduced at trial, construed in a light most favorable to
the state, supports concluding that a rational trier of fact could have found that the
state proved each necessary element beyond a reasonable doubt. Four juveniles
observed a man, whom one of them later identified as Gross, break a lock off a
restroom door and enter the Certified gas station. They also observed the man’s
car, with one of them attempting to memorize the license plate. The juvenile’s
memorized plate number was similar to the plate number on Gross’s car.
       {¶81} Upon arriving at the gas station, Lieutenant Lutz radioed police
dispatch a description of the car he found there, as well as the license plate number.
Both corresponded to Gross’s vehicle.
       {¶82} From different vantage points, the juveniles also observed Gross
attack Lieutenant Lutz. They watched as Lieutenant Lutz struck Gross in the head
with a flashlight, as Gross took the officer’s firearm, and as Gross shot the deputy




                                         30
                                January Term, 2002




sheriff, wounding him. Gross then walked up to the fallen officer and shot him
repeatedly in the head, killing him, before fleeing in the yellow car.
        {¶83} Testimony by other witnesses confirmed these events and provided
further identifications. While Gross was attacking Lieutenant Lutz, motorist Karen
Wright passed by the gas station. She saw the men fighting, observed Gross’s face,
and heard gunfire as she passed the gas station. Similarly, motorist Shawn Jones
saw the fight and watched as Gross—and only Gross—shot Lieutenant Lutz
repeatedly, killing him. Wright also saw Gross’s vehicle speed from the gas station
as she returned to assist the officer. Motorist Sherry Fugate testified that she
watched a yellow car, which she later identified as Gross’s car, as it sped away from
the gas station and into an alley that morning.
        {¶84} Ron Johnson, who lived in a house located off that same alley,
testified that Gross came to his house that morning in the yellow car. He explained
how Gross traded a gun (later identified through serial numbers to be Lieutenant
Lutz’s gun) for crack cocaine. He also testified that Gross was bleeding from a
head wound, and that Gross told him to hide the gun, because “it could be life or
death.” Johnson explained the sequence of events that led to his turning the gun
over to the authorities.
        {¶85} Numerous officers testified concerning Gross’s capture. The South
Zanesville Chief of Police testified that he had arrived at Gross’s trailer and found
the yellow car, still warm and bearing none of the condensation that a car not
recently driven would have had. After forming a perimeter around Gross’s trailer,
officers found Gross hiding in nearby weeds. He had a head wound that appeared
to be fresh. Shortly after Gross was taken into custody, Karen Wright identified
Gross as the man she had seen fighting with Lieutenant Lutz. Shawn Jones
similarly identified Gross as the man he had watched murder the officer. Both
witnesses, as well as the juveniles, identified Gross’s car as the vehicle that they
had seen at the gas station.




                                         31
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶86} The state introduced all of this testimony at trial. The state also
introduced evidence demonstrating that Lieutenant Lutz was a deputy sheriff
performing his duties at the time of his murder, facts that Gross did not contest.
Two of the juveniles testified that Gross was the man they had observed. Wright
and Jones also again identified Gross. The state further presented the testimony of
a pathologist who had examined Lieutenant Lutz’s body, and who had determined
that the officer died as a result of the gunshot wounds to his head. Testimony
regarding the serial number established that the gun recovered from Ron Johnson
was Lieutenant Lutz’s gun. Additional scientific evidence linked Gross to the
crime. Expert testimony established that it was “very probable” that a shoe
recovered from Gross’s trailer matched a shoe print found on a toilet seat taken
from the gas station restroom. Material found on Lieutenant Lutz’s flashlight
matched Gross’s DNA, and Gross’s head wound was consistent with the juveniles’
account of the fight. Further, the results of an atomic absorption test revealed
gunshot powder residue on Gross’s hand.
       {¶87} We also note that prior to sentencing, the state introduced into
evidence without objection a certified copy of Gross’s prior 1980 conviction for
felonious assault. Because Gross challenges “all” of his convictions, we assume
that his sufficiency challenge includes his conviction for having a weapon while
under disability, which was tried to the court. Under former R.C. 2923.13(A)(2),
the state had to prove that Gross knowingly acquired, had, carried, or used a firearm
or dangerous ordnance after having been convicted of a felony of violence. 134
Ohio Laws, Part II, 1966. Felonious assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.11, is such a
felony. R.C. 2903.11(B).
       {¶88} Given the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the trial court
properly denied Gross’s Crim.R. 29 motions and that sufficient evidence exists to
support the charge of having a weapon under a disability and related specifications
tried to the trial court. We find Gross’s twelfth proposition of law not well taken.




                                         32
                                  January Term, 2002




                                  B. Jury Instructions
        {¶89} In connection with his eighth proposition of law, Gross alleges that
the trial court erred in five instructions given to the jury as part of the first phase of
the trial. Because none of his arguments demonstrates reversible error, we find that
this proposition is not well taken.
        {¶90} First, Gross argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury
properly on purpose and causation. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
        {¶91} “Purpose to kill is an essential element of the crime of aggravated
murder.
        {¶92} “A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a
certain result. It must be established in this case that at the time in question there
were [sic] present in the mind of the Defendant a specific intention to kill
Lieutenant Michael Lutz.
        {¶93} “Purpose is a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious
objective of producing a specific result. To do an act purposely is to do it
intentionally and not accidentally. Purpose and intent mean the same thing.
        {¶94} “…
        {¶95} “No purpose—no person be [sic] may be convicted of aggravated
murder unless he specifically intended to cause the death of another.
        {¶96} “…
        {¶97} “… Cause is an essential element of the offense. Cause is an act
or failure to act which in a natural and continuous sequence directly produces the
death of a person and without which it would not have occurred.
        {¶98} “The Defendant’s responsibility is not limited to the immediate or
most obvious result of the Defendant’s act or failure to act. The Defendant is also
responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences or results that follow in
the ordinary course of events from the act or failure to act.”




                                           33
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶99} Gross contends that the result of including “foreseeable” in this
instruction was that the trial court “relieved [the state] of its burden to prove an
essential element of the crime—specific intent to kill the victim.” We disagree.
This court has previously upheld a trial court instruction on causation that was for
all practical purposes identical to the instant charge in State v. Jalowiec (2001),

91 Ohio St.3d 220, 230-231

. There, we reaffirmed that “ ‘[a] single
instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in
the context of the overall charge.’ ”

Id. at 231

, quoting State v.
Price (1979),

60 Ohio St.2d 136

14 O.O.3d 379

398 N.E.2d 772

, paragraph four
of the syllabus. See, also, Cupp v. Naughten (1973),

414 U.S. 141, 146-147

94 S.Ct. 396

38 L.Ed.2d 368

. In both cases, when viewed in the requisite full context,
the trial court’s instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that it could not convict
the defendants of aggravated murder unless it found specific intent to kill. “The
instruction on foreseeable consequences does not constitute error … since other
instructions given by the court limited any prejudicial effect.” Jalowiec,

91 Ohio St.3d at 231

, citing State v. Getsy (1998),

84 Ohio St.3d 180, 196

702 N.E.2d 866

. See, also, State v. Frazier (1995),

73 Ohio St.3d 323, 331

652 N.E.2d 1000

; State v. Burchfield (1993),

66 Ohio St.3d 261, 262-263

611 N.E.2d 819

. We therefore find the purpose and causation instructions sufficient.
        {¶100} We also find that the following trial court instruction does not
constitute reversible error:
        {¶101} “If a wound is inflicted upon a person with a deadly weapon in a
manner calculated to destroy life, the purpose to cause the death may be inferred
from the use of the weapon.”
        {¶102} Gross argues that there is no statutory basis for such an instruction
and that it is an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. But we have recognized
that “ ‘where an inherently dangerous instrumentality was employed, a homicide
occurring during the commission of a felony is a natural and probable consequence




                                          34
                                January Term, 2002




presumed to have been intended. Such evidence is sufficient to allow a jury to find
a purposeful intent to kill.’ ” State v. Esparza (1988),

39 Ohio St.3d 8, 14

529 N.E.2d 192

, quoting State v. Jester (1987),

32 Ohio St.3d 147, 152

512 N.E.2d 962

. The trial court’s use of “may” communicates that the jury was free to accept
or reject a permissive inference; it does not communicate a conclusive presumption
that “relieved the state of its burden of persuasion on the issue of criminal intent.”
See Price,

60 Ohio St.2d at 142

14 O.O.3d 379

398 N.E.2d 772

. See, also, Francis
v. Franklin (1985),

471 U.S. 307, 315

105 S.Ct. 1965

85 L.Ed.2d 344

 (“If a
specific portion of the jury charge, considered in isolation, could reasonably have
been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of
persuasion on an element of an offense, the potentially offending words must be
considered in the context of the charge as a whole. Other instructions might explain
the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have
considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption”);
Sandstrom v. Montana (1979),

442 U.S. 510, 527-528

99 S.Ct. 2450

61 L.Ed.2d 39

 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (recognizing that jury charges that describe
permissive inferences do not run afoul of constitutional protections against
impermissible burden-shifting presumptions and conclusive presumptions). Thus,
we conclude that the jury instruction did not prejudice Gross.
       {¶103} Gross also attacks the trial court’s instruction defining “reasonable
doubt” based on the definition set forth in R.C. 2901.05(D). We have continuously
rejected this argument. See State v. Jones (2000),

90 Ohio St.3d 403, 417

739 N.E.2d 300

; Moore,

81 Ohio St.3d at 33

; Frazier,

73 Ohio St.3d at 330

652 N.E.2d 1000

; State v. Jenkins (1984),

15 Ohio St.3d 164

, 15 OBR 311,

473 N.E.2d 264

, paragraph eight of the syllabus.
       {¶104} Finally, Gross claims prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure
to define for the jury key terms used in the instructions regarding R.C. 2929.04
specifications. He faults the trial court for not defining what constitutes “escaping




                                         35
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




detection” in its instruction that, if the jury reaches the third aggravated murder
specification, it must then decide “whether the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant … committed the offense of aggravated
murder for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for
another offense committed by the Defendant.” Gross further faults the trial court
for not requiring unanimity from the jury on the “other offense” and for not defining
“principal offender.”
       {¶105} Gross timely objected on the issue of unanimity. But there is no
record of Gross’s timely raising his “escaping detection” and “principal offender”
arguments to the trial court. While the trial court permitted defense counsel to build
a record of objections to the instructions after the jury retired to deliberate, those
objections never included these specific arguments.         Accordingly, Gross has
waived all but plain error for these arguments. See State v. Underwood (1983),

3 Ohio St.3d 12

, 3 OBR 360,

444 N.E.2d 1332

, syllabus; Crim.R. 30(A).
       {¶106} In regard to his lack-of-definition arguments, Gross has failed to
establish plain error. Because “terms of common usage … need not be defined
for the jury,” State v. Riggins (1986),

35 Ohio App.3d 1, 8

519 N.E.2d 397

, the
trial court’s failure to define “escaping detection” presents no error. Moreover, we
note that considering that Lieutenant Lutz arrived and found Gross in the gas
station, the officer had already detected Gross. We therefore cannot say that the
lack of a detailed “escaping detection” instruction can constitute prejudice under
the third prong of our plain-error inquiry when the unchallenged “escaping …
apprehension, trial or punishment for another offense” qualifiers are more likely to
have contributed to the jury’s verdict.
       {¶107} Nor does prejudice arise from the trial court’s failure to define
“principal offender.” Gross contends that the failure to define the term “relieved
the state of its burden of proof and denied Gross due process and a fair trial.” The
trial court should have defined “principal offender” for the jury. See State v. Chinn




                                          36
                                 January Term, 2002




(1999),

85 Ohio St.3d 548, 559

709 N.E.2d 1166

. But the state’s theory of the case
was that Gross acted alone in killing Lieutenant Lutz. As in Chinn, “[t]here was
no evidence to suggest that appellant, if he was present at the time of the aggravated
murder, was anything but the actual killer.”

Id. at 560

709 N.E.2d 1166

. Thus, to
have found Gross guilty under the state’s theory of the case, the jury necessarily
must have found that Gross was the principal offender. Gross has failed to satisfy
the third prong of our plain-error analysis. Given the overwhelming evidence of
guilt, “[t]he facts in this case fall far short of meeting the criteria for plain error.
We see no miscarriage of justice in this case.” Underwood,

3 Ohio St.3d at 14

, 3
OBR 360,

444 N.E.2d 1332

. See, also, Barnes,

94 Ohio St.3d at 27

759 N.E.2d 1240

.
        {¶108} Last, we note that the trial court stated that it had sufficiently
instructed the jury regarding unanimity. We need not parse the trial court’s
instructions to decide the issue because, even assuming error, the fact that the jury
unanimously found Gross guilty of the “other offense” would render any such error
harmless. Cf. Moore,

81 Ohio St.3d at 40

. Accordingly, we reject
Gross’s complaints regarding the guilt-phase jury instructions.
C. Juror Misconduct
{¶109} In his fourteenth proposition of law, Gross asserts that his
convictions and death sentence were the result of juror misconduct. Specifically,
he argues that the trial court should have dismissed a juror for discussing the case
outside the courtroom and for forming an opinion as to Gross’s guilt or innocence
prior to deliberations, that this conduct necessitated that the trial court declare a
mistrial, and that the trial court should have declared a mistrial or granted a new
trial based on the participation of alternate jurors in the penalty-phase deliberations.
Gross also alleges that the trial court’s failure to correct these errors “deprived [him]
of a full and fair opportunity to develop the full factual predicate for this error, thus
depriving him of due process.”

37
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶110} We address here Gross’s claim that a juror had disobeyed the trial
court’s instructions by discussing the case and forming an opinion before
deliberations. Although defense counsel had learned of an instance of alleged juror
misconduct prior to closing arguments, counsel waited until just prior to the jury’s
returning with its verdicts at the end of the guilt phase to bring the matter to the trial
court’s attention. In response, before the sentencing phase commenced, the trial
court received testimony from Travis Gross, Gross’s nephew. Travis testified that
while attending a community picnic/fitness competition, he overheard one of the
jurors discussing the trial from a distance of twenty-five to thirty feet away.
According to Travis, the juror had stated, when asked by another person how the
trial was going, “It shouldn’t be much longer because I think he’s guilty.”
{¶111} After receiving this testimony, the trial court then questioned the
juror accused of misconduct. The juror testified that while at the picnic, two people
asked him about the case because they had heard that he was on the jury. He
testified that he acknowledged that he was a juror but that he did not discuss the
merits of the case. The juror also specifically denied that he had told anyone that
he had made up his mind about the case.
{¶112} The trial court decided that the juror should remain part of the jury.
In so doing, the trial court considered that Travis admitted that at the time of the
alleged impropriety, he had been twenty-five to thirty feet away from the juror, in
a crowded area where many people were talking, with ten to fifteen tables
separating him from the juror. The trial court also noted the juror’s specific denial
of misconduct and that the juror had confirmed only that he was on the jury, a matter
of public record.
{¶113} Gross argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial over
this issue. But the record does not reflect that Gross ever moved for a mistrial on
these grounds. Rather, Gross merely asked that the trial court replace the juror with

38
January Term, 2002

an alternate juror. Accordingly, we review only the decision actually made by the
trial court.
{¶114} A trial court is permitted to rely on a juror’s testimony in
determining that juror’s impartiality. State v. Herring (2002),

94 Ohio St.3d 246, 259

762 N.E.2d 940

, citing Smith v. Phillips (1982),

455 U.S. 209, 217

102 S.Ct. 940

71 L.Ed.2d 78, fn. 7

. Here, the trial court’s ruling reflects that the court
believed the juror and apparently did not believe Travis.          As noted, issues
concerning the weight given to the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are
primarily for the trier of fact. DeHass,

10 Ohio St.2d 230

39 O.O.2d 366

227 N.E.2d 212

, paragraph one of the syllabus. Cf. State v. Fears (1999),

86 Ohio St.3d 329, 337-338

715 N.E.2d 136

 (acknowledging that a trial judge is in the best
position to observe the demeanor and body language of prospective jurors and
decide whether they can be impartial and follow the law). Further, given the trial
court’s rejection of Travis’s account, Gross has failed to demonstrate the requisite
prejudice resulting from the alleged communication. See State v. Sheppard (1998),

84 Ohio St.3d 230, 233

703 N.E.2d 286

. We thus cannot say that the trial court
erred in declining to seat an alternate in place of the juror.
        {¶115} We reserve our discussion of Gross’s claim of alternate-juror
misconduct during the penalty phase for Section IV(A), infra.
                        D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
        {¶116} In his thirteenth proposition of law, Gross argues that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel. It is well settled that a reviewing court may not
reverse a conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel unless a
defendant shows “first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive defendant of a
fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984),

466 U.S. 668, 687

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064

80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693

. ‘To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel’s
deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable




                                           39
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different.’ State v. Bradley (1989),

42 Ohio St.3d 136

538 N.E.2d 373

,
paragraph three of the syllabus.” Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 489

. “
‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” Sanders,

92 Ohio St.3d at 273

, quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694

104 S.Ct. 2052

80 L.Ed.2d 674

. As part of this inquiry, “[a] reviewing
court must strongly presume that ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance,’ and must ‘eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, … and … evaluate [counsel’s] conduct from counsel’s perspective
at the time.’ ” Sanders,

92 Ohio St.3d at 273

, quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689

104 S.Ct. 2052

80 L.Ed.2d 674

.
         {¶117} Applying this standard, we have reviewed Gross’s extensive list of
his trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, all of which we find meritless. 5 Gross’s
claim that counsel failed to engage in reasonable investigation and preparation must
fail because the record before us does not reveal these alleged errors. See State v.
Nields (2001),

93 Ohio St.3d 6, 35

752 N.E.2d 859

, citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691

104 S.Ct. 2052

80 L.Ed.2d 674

; Sanders,

92 Ohio St.3d at 274

. And given our examination of defense counsel’s extensive questioning of
prospective jurors, discussed supra, the record also fails to support Gross’s
allegations that counsel were ineffective during voir dire. Similarly, the record does
not support Gross’s complaints that counsel failed to argue for a change of venue
effectively (counsel sought to obtain a change vigorously), that counsel failed to
counter the state’s challenges for cause (counsel did, and often joined the
challenges), and that counsel failed to challenge the state’s use of a peremptory




5. Given our reversal of Gross’s death sentence in Section IV(A), infra, those instances of alleged
ineffective assistance that Gross cites as affecting the sentencing phase are moot.




                                                40
                                 January Term, 2002




challenge under Batson v. Kentucky (1986),

476 U.S. 79

106 S.Ct. 1712

90 L.Ed.2d 69

 (counsel objected).
        {¶118} Gross also faults counsel for not requesting funds to employ expert
investigators and witnesses (1) to challenge the state’s testing procedures of
evidence, (2) to demonstrate the unreliability of eyewitness identifications, (3) to
support his motions to suppress, and (4) to help provide an adequate defense in
general.   To obtain such funds, however, Gross would have had to make a
particularized showing of a reasonable probability that the requested expert would
have aided his defense, and that the denial of the requested expert assistance would
have resulted in an unfair trial. See State v. Mason (1988),

82 Ohio St.3d 144

694 N.E.2d 932

, syllabus. Gross, however, has failed to demonstrate either proposition.
See, e.g., State v. Madrigal (2000),

87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391

721 N.E.2d 52

(declining to find ineffective assistance based on failure to employ eyewitness
identification expert because “[n]othing in the record indicates what kind of
testimony an eyewitness identification expert could have provided. Establishing
that would require proof outside the record, such as affidavits demonstrating the
probable testimony. Such a claim is not appropriately considered on a direct
appeal”). Thus, we cannot say that counsel was ineffective in this regard by
employing only a psychiatrist, a mitigation specialist, and an investigator. See
Jalowiec,

91 Ohio St.3d at 236

.
        {¶119} Further, we reject Gross’s allegation of ineffectiveness predicated
on his claim that “[c]ounsel failed to properly and effectively demand that the State
provide a detailed and descriptive Bill of Particulars.” The record reflects that
Gross’s original trial counsel (later replaced) filed a motion for a bill of particulars,
that Gross’s second counsel obtained a trial court order for the state to supply the
bill, and that the state complied. Given that counsel was conducting extensive
discovery during this process, we agree with the court of appeals that a more
detailed bill of particulars was unnecessary.




                                           41
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶120} Gross cites one instance in which counsel waived his presence
without first obtaining an on-the-record waiver. This occurred when the trial court
gave prospective jurors a witness list so that they could mark on the list anyone they
knew. Without deciding that this was error, we conclude that Gross has failed to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial would have been
different had he been present. Treesh,

90 Ohio St.3d at 489

. See,
also, Herring,

94 Ohio St.3d at 262

762 N.E.2d 940

; State v. Green (2000),

90 Ohio St.3d 352, 371-372

738 N.E.2d 1208

; State v. Clark (1988),

38 Ohio St.3d 252, 258

527 N.E.2d 844

.
       {¶121} Finally, Gross asserts—often without explanation or elaboration—
perceived deficiencies ranging from counsel’s failure to suppress evidence, to
challenge effectively the jury array, to move for a change of venue successfully, to
object successfully to testimony and evidence, to cross-examine witnesses
effectively, and to move for a change in the starting date of the trial. We note that
in many instances, such as in regard to the jury array issue, Gross overlooks that
counsel mounted vigorous but unsuccessful challenges. Counsel filed over fifty
pretrial motions concerned with substantive aspects of the proceedings. Gross’s
allegations thus equate a lack of success with a failure to render effective assistance
of counsel. But we cannot say that the manner in which counsel conducted
unsuccessful challenges falls below the wide range of what constitutes reasonable
professional assistance. Further, Gross ignores that counsel’s decisions often fell
within the realm of trial strategy. See Hartman,

93 Ohio St.3d at 296

754 N.E.2d 1150

 (failure to object can be legitimate tactical decision); Issa,

93 Ohio St.3d at 68

752 N.E.2d 904

, citing State v. Taylor (1997),

78 Ohio St.3d 15, 31

676 N.E.2d 82

 (“Counsel is certainly not deficient for failing to raise a meritless issue”). Gross
also overlooks that minor missteps are not tantamount to ineffective assistance; a
complaining defendant must still demonstrate prejudice. See Fears,

86 Ohio St.3d at 347

715 N.E.2d 136

, quoting State v. Holloway (1988),

38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244

,




                                          42
                                 January Term, 2002

527 N.E.2d 831

 (“ ‘[t]he failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel’ ”). None of the instances Gross cites,
either individually or collectively, determined the outcome of the guilt phase of his
trial. See Bradley,

42 Ohio St.3d 136

538 N.E.2d 373

, paragraph three of the
syllabus. Gross’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail.
                              IV. Penalty-Phase Issues
                           A. Alternate-Juror Misconduct
       {¶122} As noted, Gross asserts in his fourteenth proposition of law that the
trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial based on the
participation of alternate jurors in the penalty-phase deliberations. During the trial
court’s sentencing recommendation instructions to the jury, the trial court also
instructed the alternate jurors as follows:
       {¶123} “Now, there are five of you who have been selected as alternate
jurors in this case. You will retire to the jury room with the original panel of 12
jurors. However, you are instructed that you will in no way participate in the
deliberations.
       {¶124} “You will listen and watch the deliberations, but under no
circumstances are you to participate in said deliberations by discussing with the
original jurors or among yourselves, or even make gestures during these
deliberations. You are there to listen and to watch only. Again, under no conditions
are you to engage in any conversations during any deliberations.”
       {¶125} The members of the jury and the five alternate jurors then retired to
the jury room. Subsequent events, however, revealed that at least one alternate did
not follow the trial court’s instructions. During deliberations, the jury foreman
forwarded a signed note to the trial court that read:
       {¶126} “Question: Are the alternates allowed to play a game of cards with
attention to the process in section [sic, session]?”




                                          43
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶127} The trial court responded in the negative. Just over two hours later,
the jury foreman forwarded another signed note to the trial court:
        {¶128} “Question: One alternate is expressing his feelings about the other
jurors in a manner that he thinks isn’t right. Everyone is really tense about this. He
feels things are going wrong and thinks some people are getting pressured in
making decisions. It’s to the point he thinks it [sic] wrong. I on the other hand feel
no one has been swayed by force.”
        {¶129} In response to this note, the trial court took sworn testimony, subject
to examination by counsel, from the two bailiffs responsible for the sequestered
jury. Both bailiffs testified that during the jury’s deliberations, the jury foreman
knocked on the jury room door and told the bailiffs, “It’s getting out of hand in
here, the alternates are throwing pens and thing[s].” One of the bailiffs told the
foreman to put his concerns in writing; this concern constituted the second note set
forth above. At that point, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial.
The record reflects that the trial court decided to bring the jury and alternates back
into the courtroom and repeat the instructions. Before this occurred, however, the
jury foreman sent the trial court another signed note:
        {¶130} “Question: Both people that were accused of being ‘pressured’ by
the alternate told me when asked if they were pressured, that they did not feel that
way.
        {¶131} “We have come to a decision.”
        {¶132} The record next indicates that, without following through on the
plan to reinstruct the jury, the trial court brought the jurors and five alternates into
the courtroom and received the recommendation that Gross be sentenced to death.
        {¶133} The foregoing scenario evinces error on the part of the trial court.
In State v. Jackson (2001),

92 Ohio St.3d 436

, this court
unanimously held that allowing alternate jurors to sit in on sentencing deliberations
constituted error.

Id. at 439

, citing United States v. Olano (1993),




                                          44
                                      January Term, 2002

507 U.S. 725

. See, also, Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 531-533

 (explaining that “[i]n an ordinary criminal case,
Crim.R. 24[F] requires that any alternate juror not substituted for a regular juror be
discharged when the jury retires”). In both Jackson and Murphy, the respective
defendants had failed to object to the presence of the alternate jurors. We therefore
confined our review to a plain-error analysis that does not presume prejudice.
Jackson,

92 Ohio St.3d at 440

; Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 533

. Further, in both cases the facts presented no indication of actual harm
to the defendant. There was, for example, no showing by the defense that “the
alternates disobeyed the court’s instructions [not to participate] by participating in
the deliberations, either verbally or through body language, or that their presence
chilled the deliberative process.” Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 533

.
See, also, Jackson,

92 Ohio St.3d at 440

. Thus, although error,
the presence of the alternate jurors failed to constitute prejudicial error.
         {¶134} But the instant case is distinguishable from Jackson and Murphy.
Here, Gross’s trial counsel did object to the presence of the alternate jurors in the
sentencing deliberations.6 And here the record contains indicia of participation by
alternate jurors that create a presumption of prejudice that the state has failed to
rebut.
         {¶135} As we noted in Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 533

, the
United States Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n theory, the presence of
alternate jurors during jury deliberations might prejudice a defendant in two
different ways: either because the alternates actually participated in the


6. In her separate opinion, Justice Resnick attempts to discredit defense counsel’s objection, stating
that “[a]lthough appellant did raise on the record an objection to the alternate jurors’ presence in
penalty-phase deliberations, the circumstances surrounding that objection … show that it was
made in passing and was not emphasized.” In the absence of authority for the concept that an
objection lodged without sufficient vigor justifies a court’s deeming it forfeited, we must discount
the dissenting view. Likewise, in light of the objection, we dismiss the suggestion that Gross had
somehow acquiesced in the presence of the alternate jurors.




                                                 45
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




deliberations, verbally or through ‘body language’; or because the alternates’
presence exerted a ‘chilling’ effect on the regular jurors.” Olano,

507 U.S. at 739

. Courts have construed the foregoing Olano
language to mean that “evidence that an alternate juror participated in jury
deliberations is sufficient to demonstrate prejudice.” Manning v. Huffman (C.A.6,
2001),

269 F.3d 720, 726

. See, also, United States v. Acevedo (C.A.11, 1998),

141 F.3d 1421

, 1424 (“[Olano] implied that once the alternate participates in any way—
whether through words or gestures—prejudice is manifest”); United States v.
Ottersburg (C.A.7, 1996),

76 F.3d 137, 140

 (court conducted plain-error inquiry in
case where alternates signed the jury form and explained that “the substantive
participation of the alternates, once established, is sufficient to establish
prejudice”).7 But, see, United States v. Myers (C.A.4, 2002),

280 F.3d 407, 412

.
         {¶136} Once Gross objected to the presence of the alternates in jury
deliberations, the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate an absence of prejudice.
Cf. Olano,

507 U.S. at 734

 (discussing the
government’s burden under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52[a]); Crim.R. 52(A). The state has
failed to demonstrate the absence of prejudice, while Gross has pointed to specific
evidence that at least one alternate inserted himself into the actual deliberations
through intrusive verbal participation, while more than one alternate participated
through nonverbal acts. We cannot say that the last note from the jury foreman—
the one in which he stated that the jurors whom the alternates accused of being
pressured “did not feel that way”—cures either the involvement of the alternate set
forth in the preceding note or the nonverbal acts of the alternates relayed through
the bailiffs’ testimony. Once the problems became known, the trial court needed




7. Justice Resnick’s dissenting analysis misses the distinguishing factor in Acevedo–that the court
of appeals found no prejudice in that case because, unlike here, the ultimate verdict was the result
of deliberations that were separate from the deliberations contaminated by the alternate jurors.




                                                46
                                     January Term, 2002




to inquire about the extent and effect of the alternates’ participation. See State v.
Hessler (2000),

90 Ohio St.3d 108

 (trial court conducted
searching inquiry of juror to ascertain whether misconduct occurred and whether
juror fully understood breadth of her duty and implications of polling prior to
accepting jury verdict and polling jury).
         {¶137} Accordingly, we conclude that reversible error occurs where, over
objection, an alternate juror participates in jury deliberations resulting in an
outcome adverse to a defendant and either (1) the state has not shown the error to
be harmless, or (2) the trial court has not cured the error. Here, we find specific
evidence of active disruption of the deliberative process that poses a significant risk
of affecting jury functions—a risk that carries presumptive prejudice that the state
has failed to counter. Further, the trial court accepted the jury’s verdict regarding
the death sentence without making any attempt to cure the apparent error.8 See
Acevedo,

141 F.3d 1421

 (trial court placed under seal the verdict in which alternate
jurors participated, gave curative instruction, and had jurors redeliberate without
alternates). Such unaddressed evidence of disruption carries a presumption of
prejudice.
         {¶138} We further note that the polling of the jury fails to remove the
substantive due process concerns. When polled, each juror confirmed only that the
death sentence recommendation was his or her verdict. Without more—such as the
actions by the trial court in Hessler before the verdict in that case was reached—
we cannot say that the polling here equates to an affirmation that each juror arrived
at his or her verdict free from the improper influence of the alternates. We are
therefore confined to recognizing that in this case the substantive verbal and




8. Because the trial court and counsel refer to the jury’s sentencing recommendation as a “verdict,”
we use those terms interchangeably here. See State v. Hessler (2000),

90 Ohio St.3d 108, 116

734 N.E.2d 1237, fn. 2

.




                                                47
                                   SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




potentially substantive nonverbal involvement by the alternates establishes
prejudice.9
         {¶139} To conclude otherwise would be to identify an error without
recognizing means to determine whether prejudice occurred. This is because we
cannot now determine, for example, that the alleged physical act intrusions—the
inexplicable pen throwing—exerted a chilling effect on the jury deliberations, or
even constituted implicit threats against jurors, because a majority of this court has
foreclosed fruitful inquiry in that regard by preventing a trial court from examining
the alternate jurors following receipt of the verdict. See Hessler,

90 Ohio St.3d at 123

 (considering alternate juror part of the jury for purposes of
the aliunde rule), following State v. Reiner (2000),

89 Ohio St.3d 342

731 N.E.2d 662

, paragraph two of the syllabus (“Evidence received from an alternate juror,
without other outside evidence, is insufficient aliunde evidence under Evid.R.
606[B] upon which a court may rely in order to conduct an inquiry of other jurors
into the validity of a verdict”), overruled on other grounds (2001),

532 U.S. 17

121 S.Ct. 1252

149 L.Ed.2d 158

. But, see, Reiner,

89 Ohio St.3d at 360-361

731 N.E.2d 662

 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing the
view—prior to adhering to stare decisis in Hessler—that “the testimony of a
discharged alternate juror is not categorically insufficient aliunde evidence for
purposes of Evid.R. 606[B]”). This and the presumed actual prejudice remove us
from the realm of Remmer v. United States (1954),

347 U.S. 227

74 S.Ct. 450

98 L.Ed. 654

 (holding that when improper contacts with a jury are discovered after a
verdict, the trial court must hold a hearing to ascertain the effect of those contacts).
         {¶140} The extant question then becomes what remedy we must apply.
Because the error is related only to sentencing and not to guilt, we reject Gross’s


9. Justice Resnick states that “[t]he lead opinion, by not placing the trial judge’s decisions in proper
perspective, portrays the practice as more extreme and unjustified than it actually was at that time.”
Yet, even understandably committed legal error entitles an aggrieved party to correction of the error.




                                                  48
                                      January Term, 2002




contention that he is entitled to a new trial. We conclude instead that we must
vacate Gross’s death sentence and remand this cause for resentencing.10 Cf. State
v. Campbell (2000),

90 Ohio St.3d 320

738 N.E.2d 1178

.
B. Moot Issues
{¶141} Our remand for resentencing moots Gross’s ninth, tenth, fifteenth,
sixteenth, and seventeenth propositions of law. These propositions addressed the
effect of duplicative aggravating circumstances on the weighing process, the
sentencing-phase jury instructions, the effect of alleged cumulative errors that
included the foregoing sentencing-phase errors, the appropriateness of the death
sentence in this case, and this court’s proportionality review, respectively. Also
moot is Gross’s eighteenth proposition of law, which challenged Ohio’s death-penalty scheme on numerous constitutional grounds.

10. In Section IV of her opinion, Justice Resnick attempts to take us to task for expressing no
opinion on the merits or lack thereof of hypothetical ex post facto or retroactivity challenges to
application of R.C. 2929.06(B) on remand. We do not opine on the issues because no party has
raised these points of law, and in fact no party could raise them, given that no court has applied the
statute to Gross.

49
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

V. Conclusion
{¶142} We find that alternate juror misconduct necessitates that we vacate
Gross’s sentence of death. Having found no prejudicial error in regard to Gross’s
convictions or remaining sentences, the judgment of the court of appeals is
otherwise affirmed in all respects. The cause is hereby remanded for resentencing.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, J., concur in judgment only.
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and
dissent in part.
__________________
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶143} I respectfully concur only in the judgment. Crim.R. 24(F), both
before and after amendment, required that the alternate jurors should have been
discharged when the actual sworn jury retired to deliberate. The rule was not
followed and this, in and of itself, was error. Given the clear dictates of the rule,
nothing more needs to be said.
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
__________________
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶144} As I stated in State v. Murphy (2001),

91 Ohio St.3d 516, 564

 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), “allowing alternate jurors to be present during
jury deliberations violate[s] the sanctity of the jury process. See United States v.
Virginia Erection Corp. (C.A.4, 1964),

335 F.2d 868, 872

; Koch v. Rist (2000),

89 Ohio St.3d 250, 252

730 N.E.2d 963

, 965.” As the lead opinion explains, the juror
misconduct that occurred during the penalty phase of this trial justifies a reversal
of the death sentence. Accordingly, I concur with that part of the lead opinion.




                                          50
                                January Term, 2002




       {¶145} Whether there was juror misconduct during the guilt phase of the
trial is less obvious, primarily because counsel unaccountably did not raise the
issue. What we do know is that the same alternate jurors who disrupted the penalty
phase of the jury deliberations were present throughout the guilt-phase
deliberations.
       {¶146} In Koch, despite the absence of specific factual allegations of
misconduct, this court upheld a trial court’s grant of a mistrial based on an alternate
juror’s presence in the deliberation room.

89 Ohio St.3d 250

730 N.E.2d 963

.
We so held because the alternate juror was present throughout the deliberations,
because of the possibility of nonverbal communication, and because of the
difficulty of determining whether the alternate juror prejudiced the jury. Id. at 252,

730 N.E.2d 963

. The same factors apply to this case, in the extreme. Here, five
alternate jurors were present throughout deliberations. Any of the five could have
engaged in nonverbal communication, and determining whether the jury was
prejudiced is exceedingly difficult, especially at this time. Further, since Crim.R.
24(F)(2) provides that “[n]o alternate juror shall be substituted during any
deliberation,” the presence of the alternate jurors in the deliberations could have
served no useful purpose. I believe that the sanctity of the jury was violated during
the guilt-phase of the deliberations. Accordingly, I dissent from the portion of the
lead opinion that affirms the appellant’s conviction.
                                   __________________
       RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
       {¶147} I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s convictions. However, I
disagree with the determination that appellant’s death sentence must be vacated and
this matter returned to the trial court for resentencing. Specifically, I believe that
the record does not contain evidence of improper alternate-juror behavior of the
type necessary to raise a presumption of prejudice. Moreover, the record does not




                                          51
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




reveal indicia of improper alternate juror behavior sufficient to support a finding of
actual prejudice to appellant.
       {¶148} The conclusion that the death sentence should be vacated is purely
speculative and is a result of the lead opinion’s failure to place the narrow incidents
focused on to support a supposed presumption of prejudice within the context of a
long, emotionally charged and complex death-penalty trial. When viewed from a
perspective based on the trial as a whole, it is apparent that no prejudice occurred.
Therefore, I vigorously dissent, not only because the facts of this case necessitate
it but also because affirmance on this issue is supported by case law and applicable
legal standards.
       {¶149} Crim.R. 52(A) provides, “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” In United States v.
Olano (1993),

507 U.S. 725, 737

, a case
implicating Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), the United States Supreme Court observed that
“[t]he presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of error
that ‘affect[s] substantial rights’ independent of its prejudicial impact.” Because
there is no prejudicial impact, we should affirm the judgment of the court of appeals
and go on to resolve the other issues found moot.
       {¶150} The lead opinion attempts to articulate standards for its analysis
based on a presumption of prejudice and a resulting burden on the state to rebut the
presumption. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the entire
inquiry, since jury deliberations are confidential and conducted in secrecy, the state
will virtually never be able to rebut a presumption of prejudice. Therefore, as a
practical matter, there is no difference between a presumption of prejudice and
actual prejudice in these types of cases. The standard the lead opinion sets forth,
based on an apparent presumption of prejudice, is actually tantamount to a
standardless inquiry into actual prejudice, and becomes little more than “we know




                                          52
                                  January Term, 2002




it when we see it” or perhaps, “we think we know it when we think we see it” due
to the lack of any concrete evidence of what actually occurred.
          {¶151} The lead opinion appears to discount the significance of the answers
the jurors gave when they were individually polled after determining to recommend
a death sentence. The polling gave each juror a clear opportunity to state any
disagreement with the jury’s final decision, and each juror distinctly stated that a
death sentence was his or her true verdict.          The jurors’ answers in polling
significantly weaken any presumption of prejudice that might attach to the
deliberation proceedings and also make it apparent that no actual prejudice
occurred.
          {¶152} Defense counsel did not enter on the record an objection to the
alternates’ presence at the guilt-phase deliberations. Furthermore, counsel waited
to object on the record until after the sentencing deliberations had already
commenced. This could be viewed as substantial acquiescence in the practice the
lead opinion focuses on in its search for prejudice. The lead opinion fails to grasp
that the reasons for this acquiescence must be comprehended to place the essence
of appellant’s objection in its proper context.
          {¶153} Similarly, the trial judge’s decisions in this case to allow alternates
to sit in on deliberations at both phases of the trial should not be considered in a
vacuum. Those decisions must be analyzed from a perspective that recognizes that
the approach taken by the trial judge in this case was by no means unique and was
consistent with the approach being taken at the time of this trial by many other trial
judges.     The lead opinion’s impercipient analysis verifies the old adage that
“hindsight is 20/20” in that the lead opinion totally fails to appreciate that only very
recently has the extent of this practice come to light. The lead opinion’s failure to
appreciate the actual setting of the trial leads it to the inevitable and almost
preordained conclusion that prejudicial error must have occurred.




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶154} For the specific reasons that follow, a close scrutiny of the entire
trial record evinces insufficient evidence of prejudice, either presumed or actual, to
require reversal.
                                           I
                            Alternate-Juror Misconduct
       {¶155} The lead opinion begins its consideration of the section of its
opinion titled “Alternate-Juror Misconduct” with the statement that “Gross asserts
in his fourteenth proposition of law that the trial court erred in not declaring a
mistrial or granting a new trial based on the participation of alternate jurors in the
penalty-phase deliberations.” However, this statement is misleading, since the
fourteenth proposition, as reproduced in the Appendix to the opinion, actually
reads: “A capital defendant is entitled to a fair and reliable determination of his
guilt and sentence by a jury that is properly instructed and that follows the court’s
instructions. Where the jury ignores the court’s admonitions and discusses the case
outside of the jury room and where jurors intimidate other jurors there is a denial
of due process and a fair trial in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10, and 16 of the Ohio
Constitution.”
       {¶156} In framing the alternate-juror issue in a way that best suits its own
agenda, the lead opinion recasts this proposition to facilitate its analysis. There are
several problems with this approach.
       {¶157} In this fourteenth proposition of law, as in the fourteenth assignment
of error raised in the court of appeals, appellant makes a claim that is generally
based on juror misconduct. This claim does not focus on the presence of alternate
jurors in deliberations but rather on the alleged misconduct of individual regular
jury members, and not the alternates. In turning this proposition into one based on
alternate juror misconduct in penalty-phase deliberations, the lead opinion uses it
to justify placing a burden on the state to demonstrate an absence of prejudice — a




                                          54
                                 January Term, 2002




burden that the lead opinion finds the state was unable to meet. However, because
the issue has never been articulated in this manner, the state never had an
opportunity to meet this burden. The lead opinion announces for the first time that
the burden is on the state and then faults the state for failing to meet its burden of
proof on a question that the state did not even know was being raised. The way
appellant actually raises this issue, along with a consideration of all relevant events
that occurred at trial, reinforces the view that no prejudicial error is present in this
case. That conclusion is further reinforced by an inquiry into the reasons the
alternates were in the jury room in the first place, discussed later in this opinion.
        {¶158} Furthermore, the federal cases cited by the lead opinion for its
determination that prejudice is presumed in this case are distinguishable, since they
focus on the actual substantive participation of alternates in deliberations, through
such actions as signing a jury form. In light of the fact that appellant’s argument in
proposition of law number fourteen focuses on general juror misconduct and not
specifically on the substantive participation of alternate jurors in deliberations, this
case should be evaluated under an “actual prejudice” standard, and should not give
rise to a presumption of prejudice.
        {¶159} Finally, even where alternates substantively participate in
deliberations, the federal courts have not been as inclined to find prejudice and to
overturn guilty verdicts as the lead opinion seems to indicate. In United States v.
Acevedo (C.A.11, 1998),

141 F.3d 1421

, 1422-1423, the trial judge forgot to
dismiss two alternates when the jurors retired to deliberate the defendant’s guilt,
and the alternates fully participated in the deliberations and joined in a unanimous
verdict of guilty composed of 14 votes. When the problem came to light, the trial
judge sealed that verdict without reading it, dismissed the two alternates, gave
curative instructions, and sent the jury of 12 regular jurors back to deliberate again.
After only five minutes of deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On
appeal, despite this obviously active and full participation by the alternates in the




                                          55
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




first deliberations, the court actually upheld the defendant’s conviction, finding
insufficient prejudice to justify reversal. The court did not speculate on the
influence the alternates may have had on the jury during deliberations, as the lead
opinion seems to do. Even though the lead opinion in the case sub judice cites
Acevedo,

141 F.3d at 1424

, for the proposition that “[Olano] implied that once the
alternate participates in any way—whether through words or gestures—prejudice
is manifest,” it is apparent that the Acevedo court did not find the prejudice to be
sufficiently manifest in the situation it reviewed to reverse the conviction. The
Acevedo court upheld the conviction despite the fact that the alternates’
participation in that case was active and not subtle, unlike the alleged
“participation” in this case.
II
Proceedings at Trial
{¶160} Events earlier in the trial are relevant to the issue the lead opinion
considers to be confined to the penalty phase. The alternates involved in the
incidents cited by the lead opinion were not strangers to the twelve members of the
jury. The alternates, along with the jury members, were part of an extensive voir
dire to seat a jury, and they listened to the testimony of witnesses and sat through
detailed presentations of evidence and arguments in the guilt phase of the trial, sat
in on deliberations in the guilt phase without objection, heard evidence and
arguments in the penalty phase of the trial, and sat in on deliberations at the penalty
phase.
A
{¶161} The parties and the judge painstakingly endeavored to seat an
impartial jury. Voir dire covered eleven days and makes up approximately 2,500
pages of transcript in the record. The ensuing trial in this case was lengthy, with
the state presenting numerous witnesses and the defendant calling several as well.
The guilt phase of the trial started on July 30, 1996, and lasted ten days, concluding

56
January Term, 2002

on August 12, 1996. When the trial judge addressed the 12 members of the jury
and the five remaining alternates prior to deliberations in the guilt phase on August
12, 1996, at the close of the evidence and arguments, the judge cautioned the jurors
not to surrender their “honest convictions” for the sake of simply arriving at a
verdict.
{¶162} At that point, the judge specifically mentioned the five alternates,
and stated that they would be going into the jury room with the 12 jurors. He
instructed the alternates to “in no way” participate in deliberations, told them
several times that they were to listen and watch only, and counseled that “under no
conditions are you to engage in any conversations during these deliberations.” The
jury was then sent to the jury room to deliberate. There is no evidence anywhere
in the record that the defense attorney objected to the presence of alternates in guilt-phase deliberations, although the defense attorney raised various other issues
through objections at that time.
{¶163} The jury deliberated from 3:23 p.m. to 5:40 p.m., less than two and
one-half hours, and reached its findings of guilty on all charges. All five alternates
and 12 jurors were present in the courtroom as the jury verdicts were announced.
The jury was polled on each charge, and all 12 jurors individually stated that their
verdict on each count was “guilty.” After the jury was polled, the trial judge
informed the five alternates that they would be returning as alternates in the penalty
phase. There is no evidence in the record at this point in the proceedings of any
misconduct or inappropriate behavior by any jury member or alternate juror.
{¶164} On August 19, 1996, the trial judge held an afternoon session with
the attorneys for both sides to put on the record earlier discussions of motions
relating to the penalty hearing, which was to start the next day. No participant in
this session raised any issue regarding alternate jurors on the record.
{¶165} The sentencing phase began on August 20, 1996. Before the jury
came in, some matters from the day before were entered on the record. Also,

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

appellant’s nephew was sworn in to testify about his claim that he had overheard a
juror talking about the case a few days before the guilty verdict and that the juror
implied that he had already formed the opinion that appellant was guilty. The juror
denied that he had said anything improper, and the trial judge refused to remove
him as a juror. The jury was then brought in, and the mitigation evidence and
testimony, as well as appellant’s unsworn statement, were presented for the rest of
the day’s session.
{¶166} On August 20, 1996, the defense attorney submitted proposed jury
instructions for the sentencing phase, stating that appellant did not “waive or
withdraw his objection to sending the alternate jurors back into the jury room during
deliberations with the twelve regular jurors.” Although this statement implies that
an objection had already been made, this appears to be the first time the record
contains any indication of any objection over the presence of alternates during
deliberations.
{¶167} The second day of the penalty phase began the morning of August
21, 1996. Outside the presence of the jury, several matters were discussed for the
record, none of them relating to alternate jurors. The jury came in and closing
arguments were held. The trial judge then instructed the jury for its penalty-phase
deliberations. Again, as in the guilt phase, he told them not to surrender their
“honest convictions” simply to reach a verdict. The five alternate jurors were told
that they would retire to the jury room with the jury, and the trial judge instructed
them in clear terms that they were not to participate in deliberations and were to
listen and watch only.
{¶168} The penalty-phase deliberations started at 10:59 a.m., and there was
later a break for lunch. There were still no objections made on the record to the
alternates in the jury room at this point. At 1:26 p.m., shortly after the lunch break
ended, the jury foreman sent a question to the judge asking whether the alternates
were allowed to play cards during deliberations. The trial judge responded “[N]o.”

58
January Term, 2002

The jury foreman then sent a question out at 1:59 p.m. regarding the sentencing
forms, and the trial court answered it. Then, there were some discussions on the
record among the judge, the defense attorney, and the prosecutor, with the defense
attorney stating that he wanted to get some things on the record that had been
discussed with the prosecutor and the judge, apparently off the record, in the last
few days. At this point, in the middle of several other matters not relevant to the
alternate-juror issues, the defense attorney stated, with no elaboration, and with no
comment on the point by either the judge or prosecutor, “I also object to sending
the alternates back into the deliberation room, which was done here.” At the close
of the defense attorney’s recitation of all the issues he raised, the trial judge stated,
“Overrule everything.” This terminated the discussion without specifying any
details on any point being denied.
{¶169} At 3:31 p.m., the jury foreman passed a question to the judge: “One
alternate is expressing his feelings about the other jurors in a manner that he thinks
isn’t right. Everyone is really tense about this. He feels things are going wrong
and thinks some people are getting pressured in making decisions. It’s to the point
he thinks it [sic] wrong. I on the other hand feel no one has been swayed by force.”
Shortly thereafter, two bailiffs were sworn in and questioned on the record about
conversations with the jury foreman. One bailiff stated that the jury foreman had
knocked on the door at 3:25 p.m. and told him, “It’s getting out of hand in here, the
alternates are throwing pens and thing[s].” The bailiff testified that he told the
foreman to put it in writing and knock on the door again.
{¶170} The specific statement about throwing pens apparently never was
put in writing, but the note about the alternate expressing his feelings appears to
have been a result of the conversation between the bailiff and the jury foreman.
Based on the note and the bailiffs’ statements, the trial judge made a decision to
bring the jurors into the courtroom to instruct them again, remarking that tension
runs high in a trial like this.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶171} Before the jurors could be returned, the foreman sent out a note at
3:52 p.m.: “Both people that were accused of being ‘pressured’ by the alternate
told me when asked if they were pressured, that they did not feel that way. We
have come to a decision.” Before the jury came in, the judge told the courtroom
spectators that it would be an emotional moment when the jury’s decision was
announced, and cautioned them to control themselves.
{¶172} At 3:59 p.m., the jury was brought in, along with the five alternates,
and the jury’s recommendations of death on both counts were announced. The jury
was polled, as it was at the end of the guilt phase, with each individual juror
verifying that it was his or her verdict that a death sentence should be imposed on
appellant. The trial judge thanked the jury for its service, observing that they had
deliberated “some three and a half hours” and remarked that it had been a difficult
case. He specifically expressed his appreciation to the alternates for their efforts
and also thanked them for their “patience” and “courtesy.” The jury was then
finally dismissed.
{¶173} On October 18, 1996, the trial judge held a hearing on a motion for
a new trial filed by appellant. Among the issues raised in that motion, filed August
30, 1996, were several relating to alleged juror misconduct. The judge dismissed
that part of the motion because no supporting affidavits were supplied.
B
{¶174} The preceding facts reveal much about the trial beyond the narrow
confines the lead opinion focuses on. This was a high-profile case involving the
cold-blooded killing of a deputy sheriff (with two of the shots fired point blank into
the victim’s head) and tensions were running high. As in any case where the death
penalty is sought, the jury felt the weight of its responsibility. It is eminently
understandable that individuals could have trouble controlling their emotions in
these circumstances. The lead opinion’s myopic view of the record ignores the
overall setting surrounding the trial.

60
January Term, 2002

{¶175} Although appellant did raise on the record an objection to the
alternate jurors’ presence in penalty-phase deliberations, the circumstances
surrounding that objection, as indicated above, show that it was made in passing
and was not emphasized. The lead opinion keys on the fact that there was an
objection to the practice in this case to distinguish it from similar cases finding no
plain error when no objection was raised. However, although appellant did
technically raise an objection at trial, it is apparent from the relevant proposition of
law and associated briefing that appellant on appeal has not targeted the presence
of alternate jurors in penalty-phase deliberations as a basis for reversal, probably
because of the way courts were applying the law on this issue at the time appellant’s
brief was filed, which was before this court’s decision in State v. Murphy (2001),

91 Ohio St.3d 516

.
{¶176} Moreover, by not objecting to the presence of alternates in the
earlier guilt-phase deliberations, appellant had already acquiesced in a practice that
he formally objected to on the record only after penalty-phase deliberations had
begun. In addition, appellant filed no written motion specifying the reasons for the
objection to alternates in penalty-phase deliberations. While the record does
indicate that some oral discussion of this issue with the trial judge must have taken
place off the record, it is impossible to discern whether appellant argued the
specifics of the issue to the trial judge. All that appears in the record is a bare
objection unsupported by any legal reasoning with no citation of any criminal rule
or case law. In light of appellant’s earlier acquiescence in allowing the alternates
to sit in on guilt-phase deliberations, and the perfunctory manner in which the
objection was presented, it was not surprising that the trial court overruled the
objection at the penalty phase.
{¶177} It does not appear at all clear that there was any activity that could
be described as “participation” that is prejudicial to a defendant by the alternates
detailed in the record of this case. The cryptic notes written by the jury foreman

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and the statements relayed by the bailiffs reveal very little that could be actually
termed participation. It seems clear that alternates who are playing cards and
throwing pens are not by those acts participating in deliberations. In the absence
of further elaboration on those activities, it seems fruitless to speculate one way or
the other on the impact those actions might have had on the deliberations of the
jury.
{¶178} Although an alternate was expressing his feelings about some jurors
being pressured in deliberations, the record of course does not show any details,
such as whether these sentiments were conveyed during a break or during the heat
of the deliberations. In addition, the substance of the alternate’s allegation was that
others in the jury room (the regular jurors themselves) were being pressured; there
is no indication that this alternate was participating in deliberations beyond
expressing the view that others were (as the statement was relayed by the jury
foreman) “getting pressured.”
{¶179} While it is apparent that this alternate was thus violating the trial
judge’s instructions “to listen and to watch only,” the alternate’s “participation” in
this case is not of the type that should lead to a presumption of prejudice or the
reversal of the death penalty. Due to the aliunde rule, Evid.R. 606(B), which clearly
should apply to any juror (whether regular or alternate) who is present in the jury
room during deliberations despite the lead opinion’s protracted discourse to the
contrary, any inquiry into what actually went on is foreclosed. But, if we are going
to speculate through applying an unanswerable presumption of prejudice, for all we
know the alternate may have been against the death penalty and may have
considered statements in favor of it as “pressuring” undecided jurors.
{¶180} There is nothing in the record indicating that the jurors themselves
felt pressured, and there are significant indications that they did not. The jury
foreman’s note regarding the alternate expressing his feelings reveals the foreman’s
view that no one was being swayed, and the final note sent out by the foreman

62
January Term, 2002

reveals that the jurors did not feel pressured. The trial judge, who presided over
this long and involved trial, made some inquiries and was satisfied that no undue
pressure was asserted. The jury was polled after the verdicts of death were reached,
and each juror verified that his or her vote was for recommending the death
sentence.
{¶181} While it may have been preferable to question individually each
juror and alternate in more detail at this point, the failure to do so was not error in
these circumstances. The trial court’s focus at this time was on whether there was
misconduct or improper influence on the jury as a whole. It is true that the alternate
jurors in the jury room, like the jurors, played some role owing to their presence in
the jury room in the overall inquiry into jury misconduct. However, there were no
specific reasons for the court to inquire into whether the alternates, by their mere
presence in the jury room, had contaminated the deliberations, and appellant’s
complaints at the time were not directed at that question. Appellant’s fourteenth
proposition of law approaches this entire situation in the same way that the trial
judge did at the time the scenario actually unfolded. The lead opinion drastically
departs from that scenario in evaluating this proposition of law.
{¶182} Finally, the alternates had been present at all previous stages of this
trial and appellant raised no complaints on the record about their behavior until the
series of events at the penalty-phase deliberations. Anyone who has been present
at or participated in an aggravated murder trial involving death specifications can
readily appreciate the stress that was present during this final stage of the
proceedings, and we should not be too hasty to presume prejudice merely because
emotions were running high. See State v. Hessler (2000),

90 Ohio St.3d 108, 120

 (heightened emotions and intense feelings are part and parcel of
the jury-deliberation process).
                                          III
                    Alternate Jurors’ Presence in Deliberations




                                          63
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶183} The lead opinion does not delve into the specifics of why the
alternates were in the jury room, and thus does not explain the implications of
former Crim.R. 24(F) and this court’s opinion in State v. Hutton (1990),

53 Ohio St.3d 36

, on the issue it reverses. A consideration of former
Crim.R. 24(F) and Hutton is essential to understand this case.
        {¶184} As the lead opinion recognizes, former Crim.R. 24(F) required on
its face that alternate jurors must be discharged when the jury retires. See State v.
Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 531

, and State v. Jackson (2001),

92 Ohio St.3d 436

, 438-439,

 (both of which found no plain error when
alternate jurors sat in on deliberations and defendants failed to object). The lead
opinion fails to note, however, that this rule was judicially modified as it applies to
capital cases in State v. Hutton,

53 Ohio St.3d at 46-48

, and
paragraph three of the syllabus, to allow a trial judge to retain alternates after guilt-phase deliberations in case a regular juror becomes incapacitated before penalty-phase deliberations begin. See Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 531

(citing Hutton,

53 Ohio St.3d at 46-48

, and paragraph three of the
syllabus).
        {¶185} Crim.R. 24 has recently been amended, effective July 1, 2002,
apparently to reflect the holding of Hutton. Crim.R. 24(F)(2) now reads:
        {¶186} “Capital cases. The procedure designated in division (F)(1) of this
rule shall be the same in capital cases, except that any alternate juror shall continue
to serve if more than one deliberation is required. If an alternate juror replaces a
regular juror after a guilty verdict, the court shall instruct the alternate juror that the
juror is bound by that verdict. No alternate juror shall be substituted during any
deliberation. Any alternate juror shall be discharged after the trial jury retires to
consider the penalty.”
        {¶187} According to the Staff Note to amended Crim.R. 24(F), dealing with
alternate jurors, “The amendment effective July 1, 2002 divided division F of the




                                            64
                                January Term, 2002




previous rule into divisions (F)(1) and (F)(2). Division (F)(1) [Non-capital cases]
contains the substance of previous division (F), plus the inclusion of an exception
for capital cases. Division (F)(2) [Capital cases] was added to permit alternate
jurors in capital murder cases to continue to sit as alternate jurors after a guilty
verdict has been rendered. If an alternate juror replaces a regular juror for the
penalty phase of the trial, the trial judge shall instruct the alternate juror that the
alternate juror is bound by the guilty verdict.” (Brackets sic.)
                                          A
                                   State v. Hutton
       {¶188} It is apparent that Hutton generated a degree of confusion in both
trial and appellate courts over its judicial modification of former Crim.R. 24(F) in
capital cases. The specific issue in this case as the lead opinion approaches it —
the propriety of alternate jurors being present in the jury room during deliberations
— was a subject of much misunderstanding until this court’s recent decision in
Murphy offered some clarification. See 91 Ohio St.3d at 532,

(“nothing in Hutton authorizes alternates who have not replaced regular jurors to
be present during deliberations”) (emphasis sic). It is impossible to grasp the extent
of this misunderstanding without a detailed discussion of Hutton.
{¶189} A capital trial involves essentially four different definable stages:
(1) guilt-phase presentation of evidence and arguments, (2) guilt-phase
deliberations, (3) penalty-phase presentation of evidence and arguments, and (4)
penalty-phase deliberations. Crim.R. 24(F), both before and after its recent
amendment, authorizes alternate jurors to be present at the first stage. Former
Crim.R. 24(F), since it provided simply that alternate jurors who do not replace
regular jurors “shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict,” on
its face required that alternate jurors would not be present at any of the final three
stages. If an alternate juror replaced a regular juror before the jury retired to

65
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deliberate, that juror could be present at the final three stages, but it was as a regular
juror, and no longer as an alternate.
{¶190} Recognizing that a capital case is different from other criminal
cases, this court in Hutton held at paragraph three of the syllabus that former
“Crim.R. 24(F) is not violated in a capital case where an alternate juror is
substituted for another juror after the guilt phase verdict, but before deliberations
begin in the penalty phase.”

53 Ohio St.3d 36

. With this holding,
this court in Hutton authorized trial court judges to retain alternates in capital cases
past the time that the jury retires to consider the guilt-phase verdict. There is no
mention in the Hutton opinion of whether these alternates would sit in on, without
participating in, the guilt-phase deliberations. It is impossible to tell from the
Hutton opinion whether the alternate who was retained in that case had been present
at the guilt-phase deliberations, although as will be discussed subsequently, it may
be safe to presume that the alternate was not.
        {¶191} To be precise, this court in Hutton was authorizing and upholding
only the practice that occurred in the case before it, in which a juror was replaced
with an alternate after the jury had found the defendant guilty and before the start
of the penalty phase. Id. at 44-45,

. The extent of this court’s ruling
in Hutton was only that alternates could be present at the penalty-phase presentation
of evidence and arguments in a capital case, and if an alternate juror replaced a
regular juror at that stage, then that alternate could be present at and participate in
deliberations at the penalty phase, but as a regular juror and not as an alternate.
        {¶192} An important question in Hutton was whether an alternate who is
retained while the jury reaches a guilty verdict in the guilt phase can be sufficiently
familiar with the case that he or she is able to competently replace a removed juror
who has fully participated in all proceedings to that point. If the alternate has not
participated in deliberations at the guilt phase, there is some fear that the alternate
cannot be as fully informed and functioning a member of the jury as the continuing




                                           66
                                 January Term, 2002




jurors. It is important to note at this point that there is a difference between not
participating in deliberations and being absent from deliberations.
       {¶193} Hutton did not specifically address the issue of alternate jurors
sitting in on deliberations in either phase of a capital trial. However, a very close
reading of Hutton reveals that this court’s opinion included an assumption that
alternate jurors in bifurcated cases who are retained after deliberations in the first
phase begin would not be sitting in on deliberations in either phase.
       {¶194} First, the Hutton opinion discussed State v. Dodis (Minn.1982),

314 N.W.2d 233

, a murder case that under Minnesota law was bifurcated into a guilt
phase and a mental-illness phase because the defendant raised mental illness as a
defense. As the Hutton court contemplated the reasons for and against fashioning
a specific exception to Crim.R. 24(F) for capital cases, it cited Dodis in support of
the idea that alternates could be retained between phases of a bifurcated trial. The
Hutton court characterized Dodis as finding that “[t]he alternate’s absence from
deliberations on guilt was ‘of no consequence’ to his ability to deliberate on mental
illness.” 53 Ohio St.3d at 46,

, quoting Dodis,

314 N.W.2d at 241

.
       {¶195} Second, in its discussion of People v. Fields (1983),

35 Cal.3d 329

197 Cal.Rptr. 803

673 P.2d 680

, the Hutton court again implied that the alternate
juror in a capital case who was retained once the first stage ended would not have
been present in guilt-phase deliberations. As support for not allowing an alternate
to become a juror at the penalty phase, the Hutton court cited Fields, which
reasoned that such a juror would be joining a group that had already deliberated
after the guilt phase, in which the group had conducted discussions and reached
conclusions. The Hutton court observed that this alternate “would be ‘ignorant of
those discussions and conclusions.’ ” 53 Ohio St.3d at 46,

, quoting

Fields at 351, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803

673 P.2d 680

. Obviously, if the alternate had sat
in on guilt-phase deliberations, the alternate would not be “ignorant” of what went
on during those deliberations.




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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶196} Despite the inferences in Hutton that seem clear to us now in
hindsight, it is an indisputable fact that many trial court judges relied on Hutton as
authorization for alternate jurors in capital cases to sit in on deliberations, both at
the guilt phase and the penalty phase, and that this view of Hutton was taken by the
trial court judge in the instant case. See, e.g., State v. Jackson,

92 Ohio St.3d at 438-440

 (practice was not plain error); State v. Murphy,

91 Ohio St.3d at 531-533

 (same); State v. Hessler,

90 Ohio St.3d at 123

 (alternate sat in at deliberations but no objection at trial and
defendant did not raise practice as error on appeal); State v. Henness (1997),

79 Ohio St.3d 53, 72

679 N.E.2d 686

 (apparently no objection at trial; proposition of
law challenging practice summarily rejected,

id. at 56

679 N.E.2d 686

); State v.
Voorhies (June 14, 1995), Guernsey App. No. 94-CA-8 (finding, based on Hutton,
Crim.R. 24[F] not applicable to capital murder case, so no error when trial judge
allowed alternate jurors to be present at guilt-phase deliberations in capital case in
which jury did not recommend death penalty). The fact that this was a common
practice perhaps was why the defense attorney in the instant case did not object to
the presence of alternates during guilt-phase deliberations. In addition, defense
attorneys in cases such as Jackson and Murphy did not object to the presence of
alternates in deliberations at either phase.
       {¶197} It was not until 2001 in Murphy that this court definitively found
that the practice was error. Perhaps judges presiding over jury trials in the time
between Hutton and Murphy reasoned that if the alternate was not allowed to sit in
on guilt-phase deliberations, it would be too difficult for the alternate to fully
participate at the penalty phase if called to replace a juror. Although such an
approach would be inconsistent with the Hutton court’s discussions of Dodis and
Fields detailed above, there is other language in Hutton that could be interpreted to
support that approach.      For example, Hutton stated that “the Fields court
‘recognize[d] that unforeseen circumstances may require substitution of a juror at




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                                  January Term, 2002




the penalty phase of a capital trial, even though the alternate did not take part in the
guilt phase deliberations.’ ” 53 Ohio St.3d at 47,

, quoting Fields,

35 Cal.3d at 351

197 Cal.Rptr. 803

673 P.2d 680, fn. 9

, citing People v. Green
(1971),

15 Cal.App.3d 524, 528

93 Cal.Rptr. 84

. If a trial judge failed to appreciate
the difference between “not taking part” in deliberations and “not being present” at
deliberations, this passage, read in isolation, could support a view that alternates
could be present at deliberations without taking part in them.
{¶198} Or perhaps the scope of Hutton’s holding on this issue was
misunderstood. In Voorhies, the court of appeals stated that in Hutton, this court
set forth “reasons why it would not be appropriate to apply Crim.R. 24(F) to a
capital murder case,” and proceeded to find that former Crim.R. 24(F) did not apply
to capital cases, by virtue of Hutton. That interpretation failed to appreciate that
Hutton merely established a narrow exception to Crim.R. 24(F), and certainly not
a carte blanche authorization to ignore the rule totally in capital cases.
{¶199} The court of appeals’ decision in Voorhies, along with the trial
scenarios in cases such as Murphy and Jackson, illustrate that it was a common
practice to allow alternate jurors to sit in on jury deliberations in capital cases at the
time the instant trial took place. Thus, the instant trial is clearly distinguishable
from trials that have occurred since Murphy was decided. The lead opinion, by not
placing the trial judge’s decisions in proper perspective, portrays the practice as
more extreme and unjustified than it actually was at that time. The lead opinion’s
presumption of prejudice is similarly distorted because much of the lead opinion’s
apparent insight into this issue is based on this court’s observations in Murphy and
Jackson, both of which were decided long after the trial in the instant case took
place.
{¶200} Current Crim.R. 24(F)(2), as amended, makes clear that alternate
jurors in a capital case are to be discharged when the jury retires to consider its
verdict in the penalty phase. I believe that this part of Crim.R. 24(F)(2) is not

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

inconsistent with the rule exception announced in Hutton. Therefore, since the
proper view of alternates’ positions in capital cases has not changed, the trial judge
in this case erred in allowing alternates to sit in on jury deliberations.
{¶201} However, one of the most compelling rationales behind Hutton was
that, if no exception were made to former Crim.R. 24(F) for capital cases,
discharging alternates after the guilt phase “would completely foreclose the state
from obtaining the death penalty” if a regular juror became unable to serve in the
penalty phase. See 53 Ohio St.3d at 47,

. But, see, R.C. 2929.06(B),
as amended effective September 21, 1996. While Hutton, and now amended
Crim.R. 24(F)(2), provide a procedure for replacing a juror with an alternate before
penalty-phase deliberations, the problem remains that, if a juror becomes unable to
serve after penalty-phase deliberations begin, the jury must be dismissed. Hutton
of course did not involve this scenario, and so that case did not consider it.
        {¶202} As will be discussed below, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure now address the replacement of a juror with an alternate during
deliberations (although there is no special federal rule for bifurcated cases, see
United States v. Johnson [C.A.7, 2000],

223 F.3d 665, 670

; United States v.
Webster [C.A.5, 1998],

162 F.3d 308, 345-347

). The approach of the Federal Rules
on this point is worth considering, especially in bifurcated cases. There are
significant advantages to retaining an alternate juror during deliberations at both
phases of a capital trial, and to being able to substitute that alternate during
deliberations if a regular juror becomes unable to serve, just as there are advantages
to allowing substitution of an alternate during deliberations in a regular trial.
Crim.R. 24(F)(2), which now provides that “[n]o alternate juror shall be substituted
during any deliberation,” specifically forecloses the possibility of substitution of an
alternate during deliberations in a capital case.
{¶203} Amended Crim.R. 24(F)(2) does not specify where the alternates
should be during the jury’s deliberations in the guilt phase. In light of the obvious

70
January Term, 2002

confusion that Hutton has generated on this issue, it may have been preferable for
the amended rule to clearly state that the alternates should not sit in on those
deliberations, although they are not to be dismissed at that point. The alternates
should be retained in a room separate from the jury and instructed not to discuss
the case among themselves. But, even though the amended rule does not
specifically say so, it is apparent that alternate jurors should not sit in on
deliberations. This is a natural consequence of the exception to former Crim.R.
24(F) announced in Hutton and clarified in Murphy (as discussed above) and also
fully consistent with the spirit of the recent amendment resulting in Crim.R.
24(F)(2).
B
Alternate Jurors and Federal Procedural Rules
{¶204} Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure have been modified to address problems sometimes presented
by the use of alternate jurors. In civil jury trials in the federal system, the provisions
for alternate jurors in former Fed.R.Civ.P. 47(b) were discarded in 1991.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 48 provides:
{¶205} “The court shall seat a jury of not fewer than six and not more than
twelve members and all jurors shall participate in the verdict unless excused from
service by the court pursuant to Rule 47(c). Unless the parties otherwise stipulate,
(1) the verdict shall be unanimous and (2) no verdict shall be taken from a jury
reduced in size to fewer than six members.” Ohio’s Civil Rules retain the concept
of alternate jurors in Civ.R. 47(C): “An alternate juror who does not replace a
regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.”
Obviously, Fed.R.Civ.P. 48 gives a federal trial judge much more flexibility in
seating a jury and proceeding through to a final verdict in a civil case than our Civil
Rules give an Ohio trial judge.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶206} Two provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
relevant to this discussion. Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) allows a jury of fewer than 12
members to reach a decision if a trial judge dismisses a juror for just cause after
deliberations have begun. Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) provides:
{¶207} “Jury of Less Than Twelve. Juries shall be of 12 but at any time
before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that
the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be
returned by a jury of less than twelve should the court find it necessary to excuse
one or more jurors for any just cause after trial commences. Even absent such
stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the
jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict
may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors.”
{¶208} For a collection of cases applying Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b), see
Annotation, Constitutionality and Application of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(b), Allowing 11-Person Jury to Return Verdict Absent Stipulation to
that Effect by Parties When One Juror Has Been Excused After Start of
Deliberations (1992), 107 A.L.R.Fed. 508. See, also, United States v. Gambino
(C.A.3, 1986),

788 F.2d 938, 946-949

, discussing the specifics of Fed.R.Crim.P.
23(b).
         {¶209} In addition, effective in 1999, Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c) was amended to
specify a procedure whereby a trial judge can replace a juror with an alternate after
deliberations have begun. Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3) provides:
         {¶210} “Retention of Alternate Jurors. When the jury retires to consider
the verdict, the court in its discretion may retain the alternate jurors during
deliberations. If the court decides to retain the alternate jurors, it shall ensure that
they do not discuss the case with any other person unless and until they replace a
regular juror during deliberations. If an alternate replaces a juror after deliberations
have begun, the court shall instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.”




                                          72
                                 January Term, 2002




        {¶211} A recent federal court of appeals decision serves to illustrate some
features of the Federal Criminal Rules mentioned above. In United States v.
Register (C.A.11, 1999),

182 F.3d 820

, a criminal case involving federal drug
trafficking and weapons charges, the trial judge did not dismiss the alternate jurors
at the start of deliberations, as required by former Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c) (and so
violated the rule in effect at the time of trial), but instead ordered the alternates to
wait in a separate room while the jury deliberated, instructing the alternates not to
discuss the case among themselves. After deliberations had started, the trial judge
dismissed one of the regular jurors and substituted an alternate, ordering the jury to
begin its deliberations again. The jury then found the defendants guilty of some of
the offenses they were charged on. The court of appeals applied a harmless-error
test and affirmed the convictions because it found no prejudice to the defendants.
Id. at 842-843.
        {¶212} The Register court found that the trial did not violate Fed.R.Crim.P.
23(b), reasoning that that rule, by allowing for a jury of fewer than 12 to render a
verdict, does not specifically foreclose the option of seating alternates during
deliberations if the trial judge so decides. See id. at 843, fn. 34. The Register court
also recognized that the proposed amendment to Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3), which had
not yet been adopted at the time of trial, would have allowed a trial judge to employ
exactly the procedure used by the trial judge in the case before it. Id. at 843, fn. 36.
Thus, under the Federal Criminal Rules, the trial judge has the option of proceeding
under Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) or 24(c) if a juror becomes unable to serve during
deliberations. The flexibility afforded by these rules appears to be a worthwhile
innovation.
        {¶213} The federal system’s modification of its rules, both civil and
criminal, attempts to address problems presented by complicated and protracted
jury trials. Whether civil or criminal, a lengthy jury trial presents special challenges
that require more flexibility. The federal rules mentioned above, at least as they




                                          73
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




relate to alternate jurors, address these special challenges, and Ohio should consider
making similar revisions to our rules that implicate alternates, and to any related
statutes, such as R.C. 2945.29.
        {¶214} In State ex rel. Columbus v. Boyland (1979),

58 Ohio St.2d 490, 492-493

12 O.O.3d 401

391 N.E.2d 324

, this court found that the Ohio
Constitution does not require that a jury in a criminal case be composed of 12
persons. That decision may indicate that our Crim.R. 23 could be amended in line
with the federal criminal rules to allow juries of fewer than 12 to deliver verdicts in
some situations. Also, since our rules have no provision allowing for replacement
of jurors during deliberations (a practice now specifically forbidden in capital cases
by Crim.R. 24[F][2]), a long hard look at Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(3) may be in order.
At the same time, our state’s recent amendment of Crim.R. 24(F), recognizing that
capital cases merit specialized rules in this area, is noteworthy. Further refinements
of procedures specific to capital cases would not be incompatible with the adoption
of some of the federal innovations discussed above relating to alternate jurors for
all criminal cases.
IV
Is the Death Penalty an Option on Remand?
{¶215} In vacating appellant’s death sentence and remanding this cause to
the trial court for resentencing, the lead opinion makes no mention of what should
happen on remand, and therefore does not discuss whether appellant remains
eligible to receive a death sentence. Specifically, the lead opinion does not address
whether R.C. 2929.06(B) applies to this case. There are two possible views to take
of the lead opinion’s failure to cite that statute. One is that the lead opinion believes
that it does not apply to appellant’s case. The other is that, even though the lead
opinion does not cite the statute, it does apply on remand. It is apparently up to the
trial judge to determine which of these two views is the correct one.

74
January Term, 2002

{¶216} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2929.06(B), effective in 1996,
to require a trial court to seat a new penalty-phase-only jury in order to resentence
an offender when an appellate court has vacated the original death penalty based
on penalty-phase error in a jury trial death-penalty case. See 1996 Sub.S.B. No.
258, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10539, 10548. That statute specifically lists death as
one of the options that is now available at resentencing. R.C. 2929.06(B) overruled
this court’s holding in State v. Penix (1987),

32 Ohio St.3d 369

513 N.E.2d 744

,
syllabus, that death is not an option for resentencing in this situation, and answers
the criticisms raised in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Penix that a defendant should
face a new sentencing-phase-only jury in that situation, in which the state may seek
the death penalty. See 32 Ohio St.3d at 375-379,

513 N.E.2d 744

 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
       {¶217} It is apparent that, for the same reasons cited in Justice Holmes’s
dissent in Penix, Section (A) of R.C. 2929.06 does not apply to the case sub judice.
See 32 Ohio St.3d at 375-376,

513 N.E.2d 744

 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Since
Section (A) does not apply, Section (B) does on its face and would seem to
authorize the state to seek a death sentence on remand.
       {¶218} The offenses appellant was convicted of were committed in 1994.
On remand, an argument will surely be made that applying R.C. 2929.06(B),
enacted two years after those offenses, would violate the constitutional prohibitions
against ex post facto laws and retroactive laws. No cases of this court interpret R.C.
2929.06(B), even though it was first effective six years ago. Its reach is limited to
a small number of cases. This case is one that seems to implicate all the conditions
specified within the statute for its application. However, if it should violate
prohibitions against ex post facto laws or against retroactive laws, R.C. 2929.06(B)
would not apply.
       {¶219} While a majority of this court has never addressed R.C. 2929.06(B),
that statute has been cited in a dissenting opinion to support the apparent view that




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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




the statute can be applied to a situation such as this. In State v. Twyford (2002),

94 Ohio St.3d 340

, the offenses occurred in 1992, the jury
recommended death, and the trial court imposed the death sentence. A majority of
this court affirmed the death penalty. One justice authored a separate opinion,
joined by another justice, expressing the view that the guilty verdict should be
affirmed but the death penalty should be reversed.

Id. at 368-372

(Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The authoring
justice reasoned that defense counsel’s ineffectiveness in the guilt phase in
soliciting inadmissible, highly inflammatory testimony about the defendant had a
carryover effect on the jury in the penalty phase, thereby requiring reversal of the
death sentence.

Id. at 372