¶1dissenting, with whom Watt, V.C.J., Opala, Winchester, JJ., join.
¶21 The majority's analysis of the "arising out of" jurisdictional element of the worker's claim is lamentably defective. This Court has reached a conclusion directly contrary to the controlling statute and to decisions of this Court based on that statute.
¶3T2 "Prior to the 1986 amendment to Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, Oklahoma cases relied primarily on the increased risk doctrine to determine whether a risk arose out of a worker's employment. However, the peculiar risk and positional risk tests had also been applied." Odyssey/Americare v. Worden, 1997 OK 136, 948 P.2d 309, 312. In 1986, however, the Legislature rejected the positional risk and peculiar risk doctrines in favor of the increased risk doctrine. Id. The Act now provides that "[oluly injuries having as their source a risk not purely personal but one that is causally connected with the conditions of employment shall be deemed to arise out of the employment." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 3,(10)(a) (Supp. 1997). Since 1986, this Court has held that, as provided by the Act, purely personal and neutral risks are not covered. See e.g., American Management Sys. v. Burns, 903 P.2d 288, 292, Odyssey, 948 P.2d at 312.
¶413 It is difficult to imagine a risk that is more purely personal than a pre-existing medical condition. The worker's epilepsy, and thus her risk of falling, had nothing to do with a risk of employment. But rather than accept the obvious result mandated by the Act, the majority embarks on a tortuous, illogical, and irrelevant journey through the common law in a thinly veiled attempt to compensate the injured worker no matter the applicable law.
¶514 The journey begins by first burying Burns and its progeny in footnote 1 and dismissing them as cases analyzing only neu*977tral risks. In reality, these cases implicitly recognized the Legislature's declaration that the Act covers "ouly injuries having as their source a risk not purely personal." Freed from the confines of applicable law, the majority then proceeds to resurrect the positional risk and peculiar risk tests via English common law and pre-1986 Oklahoma cases which applied those tests. Ultimately, the majority holds that "the presence of the coffee pot" was a factor peculiar to the worker's employment such that she should be compensated.
¶65 The coffee pot was not a "condition of employment" and thus, was not a risk factor in the worker's injury. It was in no way related to her work activity. It was merely there when she fell. She could just as easily have been injured by falling on a piece of furniture or some other object present in any work setting; nor was the worker operating or even handling the coffee pot. It was just there. The cause of her injury was the fall and that fall was caused by her purely personal medical condition. The coffee pot was part of the resulting injury, not its cause.
¶716 As much as the majority may wish to compensate the worker, this Court is required to apply the law. The applicable law is to be found in the Legislature's declaration that injuries resulting from purely personal risks are not compensable. In refusing to apply the applicable law this Court has usurped the Legislature's role of policy making, abandoned its judicial responsibility, and introduced confusion into what had become a settled matter of law.