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2002 Pa. Super. 113

797 A.2d 353

Nigra v. Walsh

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Decided April 17, 2002

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · decided 2002-04-17

Relies on 409 Pa. Super. 50 - Gigliotti v. MacHuca · 301 Pa. Super. 319 - Collins v. Cement Express, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2002-04-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently March 2026

1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

80200220102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Concurring and dissenting opinion by

OLSZEWSKI, J.

¶2¶ 1 While the expression of the majority view provides a persuasive analysis and sound rationale, I am obliged to differ and must respectfully offer a concurring and dissenting memorandum.

¶3¶2 I review this case in light of our holding in Collins v. Cement Express, 301 Pa.Super. 319, 447 A.2d 987 (1982). In Collins, plaintiff appealed the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding his application for and receipt of social security benefits as violative of the collateral source rule. Id. at 988. At trial, plaintiff had his doctor appear as an expert to testify that plaintiffs disability was a result of the car accident in issue. Id. Two years after the accident, however, the doctor supplied information on a benefits application to the Social Security Administration, stating plaintiff suffered from severe diabetes and hypoglycemia, making no mention of the car accident. Id. The facts as such, we refused to address plaintiffs arguments on appeal because he had first introduced the subject matter at trial. We held that it was proper for defendant to “probe into the subject matter in cross-examination.” Id. We reaffirmed this holding in Gigliotti v. Machuca, 409 Pa.Super. 50, 597 A.2d 655, 660-61 (1991).

¶4¶3 In this factually analogous case, counsel for appellants placed the subject of Mr. Nigra’s heart condition in issue at the start of trial. Appellants’ counsel raised Mr. Nigra’s heart condition in opening statements, N.T., 1/25/01, at 7; the direct examination of Mrs. Nigra, N.T., 1/25/01, at 38-39; and the direct examination of Mr. Nigra, N.T., 1/25/01, at 136-139. I believe that once appellants raised the issue on direct examination, appellee was justified in probing the issue on cross-examination. Collins, supra.Probing the issue effectively included Mr. Nigra’s application for social security benefits, and the statements made within. Mr. Nigra claimed as a result of this accident he suffered “severe and disabling injuries” causing him “great” financial detriment. Nigra Complaint ¶¶7, 9. Appellee’s counsel, through cross-examination, attempted to show that Mr. Nigra’s disabilities were not solely the result of injuries suffered in the accident sub judice. Appellants’ attempt to discount the severity of Mr. Ni-gra’s heart condition on direct examination was properly impeached by appellee on cross-examination. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent to the majority’s finding that appellee’s cross-examination was improper and that appellants are entitled to a new trial.

¶5¶ 4 I do, however, concur with the majority in the result reached on the second issue raised by appellants; the prejudicial effect of the doctor’s testimony outweighed its probative value.

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