2002 Pa. Super. 206 - Commonwealth v. Clark’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Appellant also asserts that the court erred in allowing the jury to be selected in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 681(E)(2) in that his attorney was forced to exercise peremptory challenges prior to exercising all “for cause” challenges. In the present case, a pool of jurors was first selected and subjected to a group voir dire. They had also filled out the jury questionnaires, as required by the rule. After the group examination, the jurors were individually called up to the counsel table and subjected to individual questioning. After the individual questioning, counsel were required to express a challenge for cause if they believed one existed. Barring the striking of a juror for cause, counsel were then required to either exercise a peremptory challenge or “accept” the juror. Once accepted, the juror could not be later stricken with a peremptory challenge. In this respect, the system employed was a combination or hybrid of the “individual voir dire and challenge system” and the “list system of challenges.” See Pa.R.Crim.P. 631(E)(1) & (2) [respectively]. It is clear that the system of jury selection employed in the present case violates the strict wording of Pa. R.Crim.P. 631. As a review of that rule bears out, if the “list system” of challenges is employed, then peremptory challenges are not to be exercised until after all challenges for cause have been exercised. The primary characteristic of this approach is that each attorney has the opportunity to exercise his peremptory ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2012 Pa. Super. 193 - Commonwealth v. Noel

2. “Both Petroll and Colon involved seizures of items from automobiles that were observed in plain view inside the interior of a motor vehicle. In both cases the Commonwealth argued that the seizures were legal under the plain view doctrine, and in both cases the seizures were upheld. With respect to the applicability of the plain view doctrine, Colon seemingly draws a distinction between searching a vehicle without a warrant and seizing an item in “plain view,” even if the item happens to be inside a motor vehicle. Thus, under Colon , police officers might be prohibited from searching a vehicle once the occupants have been removed, but the officers are not prohibited from seizing contraband observed in plain view inside the vehicle after a lawful stop. Petroll asserts that “there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an item that is in plain view.” 738 A.2d at 999 . With respect to the position of the police officer when the item is observed, Petroll merely requires that the officer be in a “lawful vantage point.” Thus, we can see no material distinction between the facts of the present case and Petroll and Colon . As such, Appellant’s argument fails.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2004 Pa. Super. 312 - Commonwealth v. McCree