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2002 Pa. Super. 22

791 A.2d 419

Kersey v. Jefferson

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Decided January 31, 2002

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Superior Court of Pennsylvania · decided 2002-01-31

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently July 2010

13 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Effectively, [an][a]ppellant “must present evidence as to why he or she voluntarily left the prior employment and also as to why the acceptance of a lower paying job was necessary.” Id. Where a party willfully fails to obtain appropriate employment, his or her income will be considered to be equal to his or her earning capacity. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4). A determination of earning capacity must consider the party’s age, education, training, health, work experience, earnings history, and child care responsibilities.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Ney v. Ney

Relies on 408 Pa. Super. 158 - Grimes v. Grimes

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2002-01-31

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

OLSZEWSKI, J.,

¶1Dissenting.

¶2¶ 1 While the expression of the majority view provides a persuasive analysis and sound rationale, I am obliged to differ and respectfully dissent.

¶3¶ 2 Although I agree with the majority that Grimes is controlling, I must disagree as to the majority’s application of that standard to the facts of this case. Under Grimes, appellant must

first establish that the voluntary change in employment which resulted in reduction of income was not made for the purpose of avoiding a child support obligation and secondly, that a reduction in support is warranted based on petitioner’s effort to mitigate any income loss. In effect, petitioner must present evidence as to why he or she voluntarily left the prior employment and also as to why the acceptance of the lower paying job was necessary.

¶4Grimes v. Grimes, 408 Pa.Super. 158, 596 A.2d 240, 242 (1991).

¶5¶ 3 Although appellant cannot avoid his support obligation simply because he is now a full-time student, he is entitled to a reduction in support payments if his change in circumstances warrants such a reduction. The majority found, and I agree, that appellant did not choose to return to medical school to avoid his support obligations, but rather to better his station in life. Unlike the majority, however, I believe appellant has also met the second prong of the Grimestest.

¶6¶ 4 Appellant has attempted to mitigate the income loss associated with his return to medical school through the acceptance of part-time employment. Somehow appellant manages to be a full-time medical student and work part time as a clinical research coordinator. As the research position pays $32,000 per year, it appears appellant has found a job which is comparable to his experience. In his previous position, working full time, appellant earned $70,000 per year.

¶7¶ 5 Appellant also demonstrated why the acceptance of this lower-paying position was necessary. Appellant presented evidence of his full-time return to medical school. It is reasonable to infer from that evidence that it would be impossible for him to continue to work full time.

¶8¶ 6 Although while enrolled in medical school appellant will be unable to provide as much support to his child, upon graduation his financial situation will improve greatly. Not only will appellant benefit from the sacrifices made in the coming years, but his child will also reap what appellant sows. Just as an increase in support is warranted when a higher-paying position is accepted, a reduction of support may also be warranted when a lower-paying position is accepted. Since appellant did not voluntarily reduce his income to avoid his support obligations and has taken steps to mitigate the income loss, he is entitled to a reduction in his support payments until graduation from medical school. Appellant is doing the best he can and should not be penalized for attempting to further his education.

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