¶1Concurring statement by
¶2¶ 1 While the Opinion of the dissent reflects a persuasive analysis of the issue before us, I concur in the result of the majority’s opinion. I believe the controlling precedent of our Supreme Court compels the majority’s result. Commonwealth v. Hill, 558 Pa. 238, 736 A.2d 578 (1999); Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 627 A.2d 1176 (1993). In each of the preceding cases, the Commonwealth’s due diligence could be demonstrated once it was shown that the case had been listed for trial before the adjusted run date of Rule 600 (formerly Rule 1100). See also, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 765 A.2d 389, 394 (Pa.Super.2000).
¶3¶ 2 In Appellant’s case, the Commonwealth admits that it listed the case for trial after the adjusted run date. Thus, the condition precedent expressed in our judicial precedent to a finding of “due diligence” did not occur in Appellant’s case.
¶4¶ 3 Our Supreme Court has emphasized that “due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Hill, 736 A.2d at 588. Accordingly, and as the dissent suggests, the Commonwealth’s due diligence should be a function of the circumstances of the case, whether or not the case is listed for trial after the adjusted run date. I would urge the Supreme Court to refine the standards trial courts use in assessing whether the *45Commonwealth has exercised due diligence.