2002 Pa. Super. 30 - Commonwealth v. Ayala’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, our role is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In making this determination, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses and so much of the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontra-dicted. When the evidence supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we may reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings. As a reviewing court, we are therefore not bound by the legal conclusions of the suppression court and must reverse that court’s determination if the conclusions are in error or the law is misapplied.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2005 Pa. Super. 177 - Commonwealth v. Miller · 2003 Pa. Super. 264 - Commonwealth v. Morris

2. “[A] radio dispatch based on information provided from an informant whose identity is unknown, and which accuses an individual of involvement in criminal activity, will not, standing alone, provide the requisite basis for an investigatory detention of a person who happens to match the physical description of the 'accused individual provided by the tipster .... Because of its unreliability, an anonymous radio call alone is insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court in [Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484 , 698 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1997) ] further explained that the fact that the police proceeded to the designated location and saw a person matching the description in the call did not corroborate any alleged criminal activity. Since anyone can describe a person who is standing in a particular location, something more is needed to corroborate the caller’s allegations of criminal conduct. In the typical anonymous caller situation, the police will need an independent basis to establish reasonable suspicion. ... When the police receive unverified information that a person is engaged in illegal activity, the police may observe the suspect and conduct an investigation. If police surveillance produces a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, the suspect may be stopped and questioned.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 194 - Commonwealth v. Morrison

3. “The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Likewise, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution státes, “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures .... ” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. Under Pennsylvania law, there are three levels of encounter that aid courts in conducting search and seizure analyses. The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect-to a stop and period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 194 - Commonwealth v. Morrison