2002 Pa. Super. 71 - Norton v. Glenn’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The privilege may be forfeited by a publisher who exaggerates or embellishes its account of the occasion ... which must be “fair, accurate and complete.” Sciandra, 187 A.2d at 589 . Publication of defamatory material solely for the purpose, of causing harm to the person defamed results in loss of the fair report privilege. DeMary , [762 A.2d] at 762. Whether a privileged occasion occurred is a matter for the defendant to establish and for the trial court to decide, ... but whether abuse of the privilege has occurred is a question for the jury. DeMary , [762 A.2d] at 763. The DeMary Court held, albeit in the context of preliminary objections, that the burden of proof borne by a public figure in order to succeed in making out a defamation case against (a) media defendant ] requires two types of malice to be demonstrated. “First, in order to make a prima facie case the plaintiff must show that the newspaper acted with actual malice toward the truthfulness of the statement.” Id. at 765 . The actual malice referred to is that which was defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in New York Times v. Sullivan ..., as knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statements or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. DeMary , [762 A.2d] at 764. “Second, to defeat the fair report privilege once it has been properly raised, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was motivated by ill will toward the plaintiff,” id. at 765 , that is, by common law malice. As the DeMary Cour”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Norton v. Glenn