¶1(concurring specially).
¶2[¶ 29.] I concur and write only to add that at the time the trial court ruled in this case, it did not have the benefit of the United States Supreme Court decision we *277use in our “reasonable suspicion” analysis today.
¶3[¶ 30.] In analyzing the reasonable suspicion issue in 2001, the trial court considered each of the officers’ articulated factors in isolation. The trial court then discounted many of the individual factors because, when standing alone, they were susceptible of innocent explanation. For example, the trial court attached some negative inference to the fact that this was a “young officer.” The trial court also discounted the suspicion arising from the observation of trash and junk in the backseat of the vehicle that Kenyon said he had just purchased. The trial court finally discounted the suspect’s sweating and nervousness by making the three observations: the trial court observed that there was nothing wrong with wearing long sleeved shirts; it observing that sweating occurs for “numerous reasons”; and it observed that although there was an unusual degree of nervousness displayed, nervousness “standing alone” was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
¶4[¶ 31.] Unfortunately, at the time the trial court undertook this analysis, it did not have the benefit of the recent decision in Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Arvizuclarified that courts should not analyze the reasonable suspicion factors standing alone: a process the Supreme Court described as a “divide- and-conquer” analysis. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750. The Supreme Court also rejected an analysis that discounts individual factors that could have some innocent explanation. Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750. The Supreme Court ruled that even though individual factors may be susceptible to innocent explanation, the Terry analysis requires that they must be considered together to determine whether a further investigation is warranted. Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906). The Supreme Court noted that “[although each of [a] series of acts [is] ‘perhaps innocent in itself,’ ” taken together they may collectively amount to reasonable suspicion and “warrant further investigation.” Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750. Additionally, the Supreme Court reiterated that in determining whether an officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing, officers may draw upon their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751-52, 151 L.Ed.2d 740.
¶5(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
¶6[¶ 32.] I dissent on issue one for the same reasons I have dissented in Fourth Amendment cases on numerous prior occasions. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 2001 SD 93, ¶¶ 27-31, 631 N.W.2d 206, 212-13 (Amundson, J., dissenting) (stating “the majority has all but eviscerated general principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence .... ”); State v. Faulks, 2001 SD 115, ¶¶ 25-33, 633 N.W.2d 613, 620-22 (Amundson, J., dissenting) (discussing unreasonable search and seizure); State v. Buchholz, 1999 SD 110, ¶¶ 40-52, 598 N.W.2d 899, 906-10 (Amundson, J., dissenting) (discussing overbreadth of the exigency exception to the warrant requirement).
¶7[¶ 33.] All of these writings elucidate the severe erosion of citizens’ rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. It appears as though citizens no longer possess any constitutional rights the moment they seat themselves in their *278vehicles and start down the public roads and highways. Today, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence simply encompasses too many buzzwords, which have swallowed the protections created by our forefathers.
¶8[¶ 34.] The order of suppression should be affirmed.
¶9. This record clearly evinces a classic example of a fishing expedition. The transcript of the suppression hearing provides as follows:
Q. At this point, why were you going to talk to the passenger?
A. [Hayes] Mr. Kenyon still seemed a little— seemed nervous. He didn't have any warrants. The vehicle was not coming back as stolen or anything. I haven't informed him of anything like that so I went up, thought that maybe he was possible aware that she [the passenger] had warrants or that something else was wrong in the vehicle. So I went to make contact with her, see if she seemed nervous about the situation.
Q. What do you mean there might be something else wrong with the vehicle?
A. Something inside the vehicle that he’s concerned about. Gives me another chance to go up there and make contact with her, if I see something else laying around. He was still nervous even though I had informed him by that point that he was just going to be getting warnings. I thought that there might be possibly something else wrong still.