¶1*103 Respondent's determinations not erroneous. Various arguments made by petitioner were asserted for purposes of delay. Respondent awarded a penalty under section 6673(a).
¶2MEMORANDUM OPINION
¶3COHEN, Judge: In separate notices of deficiency for each year, respondent determined the following deficiencies and additions to tax:
¶4 Additions to Tax, I.R.C.
¶5Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1)Sec. 6654(a)
¶6____ __________ _______________ ____________
¶71995 $ 2,864 $ 716.00 $ 155.29
¶81996 2,592 648.00 137.96
¶91997 2,737 684.25 146.43
¶101998 3,666 916.50 167.75
¶11The only bona fide issue for decision is whether a penalty should be imposed on petitioner under section 6673.
¶12Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
¶13 Background
¶14The relevant facts have been deemed stipulated pursuant to*104Rule 91(f). Petitioner resided in Tempe, Arizona, at the time he filed his petition.
¶15During the years in issue, petitioner was a retired Federal employee. He received a pension paid by the U. S. Office of Personnel Management in the amounts of $ 19,272, $ 19,782, $ 20,484, and $ 20,904 for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively.
¶16During the years in issue, petitioner also received payments as follows:
¶17Payor Year Amount
¶18Enrich International 1995 $ 2,461.21
¶19 1996 1,051.82
¶20 1997 868.58
¶21Scottsdale Camelback Resort 1996 382.20
¶22Kyrene School District 1997 427.71
¶23Petitioner received other items of income during the years in issue that were included in respondent's determination based on third-party records received by respondent. Petitioner failed to file Federal income tax returns for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. Respondent has now conceded that the income that petitioner*105 received in 1996 as reflected on the notice of deficiency from Scottsdale Camelback Resort should be reduced by $ 382 to the amount shown in the above table.
¶24The first numbered paragraph of the Amended Petition filed August 16, 2000, alleged that "The Petitioner is a single man". Paragraph 5 b alleged the following error: "Error in failing to account for deductions the Petition would be entitled to as a person who is married filing jointly." Paragraph 6 alleged:
¶25 6. The facts upon which the Petitioner relies, as the basis
¶26 for his case, are as follows:
¶27 a. The Petitioner did not receive any of the income alleged
¶28 in the Notices of Deficiency.
¶29 b. The Petitioner is married. Arizona Law establishes a
¶30 joint indivisible half interest in all property and income
¶31 owned and held in the State of Arizona by the marital
¶32 community. No deficiency can lawfully issue that is not a
¶33 joint Notice of Deficiency addressed to both spouses
¶34 jointly.
¶35Attached to the Amended Petition was a verification under penalty of perjury signed by petitioner.
¶36*106 By notice served August 24, 2001, this case was set for trial in Phoenix, Arizona, on January 28, 2002. Attached to the Notice Setting Case for Trial was a Standing Pre-Trial Order that provided in part:
¶37 ORDERED that all facts shall be stipulated to the maximum extent
¶38 possible. All documentary and written evidence shall be marked
¶39 and stipulated in accordance with Rule 91(b), unless the
¶40 evidence is to be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.
¶41 Objections may be preserved in the stipulation. If a complete
¶42 stipulation of facts is not ready for submission at trial, and
¶43 if the Court determines that this is the result of either
¶44 party's failure to fully cooperate in the preparation thereof,
¶45 the Court may order sanctions against the uncooperative party.
¶46 Any documents or materials which a party expects to utilize in
¶47 the event of trial (except for impeachment), but which are not
¶48 stipulated, shall be identified in writing and exchanged by the
¶49 parties at least 15 days before the first day of the trial
¶50 session. The Court may refuse to receive in evidence any
¶51 document*107 or material not so stipulated or exchanged, unless
¶52 otherwise agreed by the parties or allowed by the Court for good
¶53 cause shown. …
¶54On November 8, 2001, Respondent's Request for Admissions was filed. Petitioner's Response to Requests for Admissions was filed December 4, 2001. Petitioner's responses included assertions such as the following: "Admit the Petitioner lived in Phoenix, Arizona, but denies he resided." With respect to each notice of deficiency attached to the Request for Admissions, petitioner's response was: "Admit this a copy of the Notice of Deficiency. Deny that there has been a taxable year."
¶55In response to the balance of the requested admissions, petitioner asserted the following:
¶56 OBJECTION: Because the request could be used as evidence to
¶57 incriminate the Petitioner, the Petitioner can neither admit nor
¶58 deny this fact.
¶59On December 13, 2001, respondent filed a Motion to Show Cause Why Proposed Facts in Evidence Should Not Be Accepted as Established. The proposed Stipulation of Facts attached to the motion set forth facts that should not reasonably have been disputed, in accordance with Rule 91. The documents that were*108 attached included copies of third-party records provided to respondent that were the basis of the notices of deficiency. Also attached to respondent's motion were copies of correspondence between the parties. In a letter to petitioner dated September 28, 2001, respondent's counsel enclosed the proposed stipulation and supplemental stipulation. Respondent's counsel reminded petitioner of the Tax Court Rule that facts and documents about which there should be no disagreement should be stipulated. Respondent also attached a copy of the notice of trial and Standing Pre-Trial Order. Respondent's counsel letter also stated:
¶60 Lastly, although you were vague about your theory of the case
¶61 during our last meeting, it is my understanding that you are
¶62 planning to argue to the Tax Court that the money you received
¶63 for your retirement and the work you did during the years at
¶64 issue, is not taxable. Please be advised that should you advance
¶65 such frivolous arguments before the Tax Court, I will ask the
¶66 Tax Court to impose a sanction against you. The authority for
¶67 such a sanction is at I. R. C. sec. 6673, and allows the Tax
¶68 Court*109 to impose a penalty of up to $ 25,000.00.
¶69Petitioner's response to the above letter was erroneously dated May 22, 2001, and stated:
¶70 I am writing in response to your letter of September 28, 2001.
¶71 It is clear from the tone of your letter that you do not
¶72 comprehend the issues of this case. Either that or I am left
¶73 with no alternative but to treat your letter as an idle and
¶74 improper threat against me and my property. If it is such a
¶75 threat, I don't think I need to remind you of the consequences
¶76 of 26 U.S.C. sec. 7214 which provide criminal sanctions for such
¶77 threats and intimidation under color of law.
¶78 This is a case of unreported income. I have denied receipt of
that income. Under the current state of the law you have the
burden of proving receipt of that income and that the income was
from a taxable source. United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1976) ;
Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir., 1991);
Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir., 1979);
Gerardo v. C.I.R., 552 F.2d 549, 552 (3rd Cir., 1977).
*110 Given the tone of your letter, I cannot sign the Stipulation of
¶79 Facts as proposed. I am going to have to go over them thoroughly
¶80 and amend them. In the interim, you must do the following.
¶81 Produce all documents you intend to use at trial to prove that I
¶82 received the income alleged in the Notices of Deficiency and
¶83 identify all witnesses you intend to call to introduce and
¶84 authenticate those documents.
¶85 You have until October 25, 2001 to produce the evidence and list
¶86 of witnesses.
¶87 If you fail to do so, then I will have no alternative but to use
¶88 formal discovery methods to compel you to provide the
¶89 information. In addition, I will file a Motion for Summary
¶90 Judgment. Since you will be the one who has the burden of proof,
¶91 all I have to do is establish that there is an absence of
¶92 evidence to prove an essential element of your case.
¶93 I hope we now understand each other. If you persist in
¶94 continuing with your idle threats, then I will take appropriate
¶95 action to inform the court that you are unnecessarily delaying
¶96 the*111 proceedings and if possible I will seek sanctions against
¶97 you.
¶98In a letter dated October 18, 2001, respondent's counsel responded to petitioner's letter. The response included the following paragraphs:
¶99 Furthermore, I am attaching a letter written by you in 1996.
¶100 This letter indicates your frivolous positions regarding the
¶101 federal income tax. These positions include that you were unable
¶102 to determine that you are a citizen or resident of the United
¶103 States and that there is no evidence of "gross income from a
¶104 source within, or from a trade or business which is effectively
¶105 connected with the United States." You made these frivolous
¶106 statements even though you live in Arizona and received numerous
¶107 Forms 1099 for the 1995 taxable year (one of them even from the
¶108 federal government's Office of Personnel Management Retirement
¶109 and Insurance).
¶110 These arguments have failed repeatedly before the Tax Court.
¶111 Your arguments will fail. Furthermore, I believe the Tax Court
¶112 will impose a sanction on you for wasting their time with these
¶113 frivolous positions. It really*112 is in your best interest to try
¶114 and settle this case. I would be happy to look at any deductions
¶115 you may have that would decrease your tax.
¶116 I am looking forward to receiving a proposed Stipulation of
¶117 Facts from you. If I do not receive one from you by November 9,
¶118 2001, I will file a motion under Tax Court Rule 91(f) to compel
¶119 you to stipulate to facts.
¶120On December 14, 2001, the Order to Show Cause Under Rule 91(f) was issued to petitioner. Petitioner responded to that order, attempting to condition his stipulation on recognition of his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, but he showed neither reasonable fear of incrimination nor reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the proposed stipulations. By Order dated January 10, 2002, the matters set forth in the proposed stipulation were deemed established for purposes of this case.
¶121The case was called from the calendar in Phoenix, Arizona, on January 28, 2002. The respective trial memoranda of the parties were filed. Petitioner's trial memorandum set forth inapplicable legal authorities dealing with illegal income in support of his argument that respondent had the burden of proof.*113 Under evidentiary problems, petitioner set forth the following:
¶122 Evidentiary Problems: The evidence the Respondent
¶123 apparently intends to use the W-2's or 1099's. The W-2's are
¶124 jurisdictionally barred as they are reports from "Wages"
¶125 alleged to have been paid under Subtitle C. This Court is
¶126 without jurisdiction to determine the Petitioner's 'employment'
¶127 status absent a self-employment tax claim. The W-2's or 1099's
¶128 are otherwise invalid because they must be submitted to the IRS
¶129 by the preparer under penalty of perjury. 26 U.S.C. sec. 6065.
¶130Trial was set for January 30, 2002.
¶131At the time of trial, respondent presented copies of Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters, under seal, for each year. Petitioner objected to the exhibits as hearsay. Rule 803(10) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
¶133 ABSENCE OF PUBLIC RECORD
¶134 OR ENTRY
¶135 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
¶136 the*114 declarant is available as a witness:
¶137 * * * * * * *
¶138 (10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of
¶139 a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form,
¶140 or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a
¶141 record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was
¶142 regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency,
¶143 evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule
¶144 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the
¶145 record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
¶146Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth rules for self- authentication of various types of records.
¶147Respondent also presented copies of third-party records accompanied by declarations under rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those records satisfied the conditions of rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides:
¶149 RECORDS OF REGULARLY
¶150 CONDUCTED ACTIVITY
¶151*115 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
¶152 the declarant is available as a witness:
¶153 * * * * * * *
¶154 (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum,
¶155 report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
¶156 events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
¶157 time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
¶158 knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
¶159 business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
¶160 business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
¶161 data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
¶162 or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies
¶163 with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting
¶164 certification, unless the source of information or the method or
¶165 circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
¶166 The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes
¶167 business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and
¶168 calling of every kind, whether or*116 not conducted for profit.
¶169Petitioner presented no evidence or argument suggesting that any of the records received in evidence were not reliable. While generally asserting that he had not received the amounts stated, petitioner relied on his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer questions or to testify about his income.
¶170Petitioner did testify that he was married during the years in issue, but he refused to answer any questions about whether his wife earned any income or filed a tax return for the years in issue. He refused to answer questions about whether he had a community property or premarital agreement with his wife. He refused to answer questions concerning who prepared the documents filed by him in this case, which documents contained inconsistent and frivolous claims and spurious threats, as set forth above. Respondent called as a witness a revenue agent who explained how respondent determined petitioner's receipt of income from the third-party records in the file.
¶171 Discussion
¶172The stipulation proposed by respondent, the motion for order to show cause, the order to show cause, and the order deeming facts stipulated for*117 purposes of this case were all consistent with Rule 91. The statements made in the stipulation and the documents attached to it were all matters "which fairly should not be in dispute." See Rule 91(a). Petitioner did not raise at any time a dispute as to the factual accuracy of the stipulation. His objections relate solely to his erroneous theory about respondent's burden of proof and his Fifth Amendment privilege.
¶173Petitioner's assertion that respondent has the burden of proof is not a sufficient objection to a proposed stipulation. Rule 91(a) specifically states that "The requirement of stipulation applies under this Rule without regard to where the burden of proof may lie with respect to the matters involved." See, e.g., Console v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-232.
¶174Petitioner's argument that Rule 91(f) could not be applied without violating his Fifth Amendment privilege must be rejected. The phrase that comes readily to mind was first used by the U. S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 264 (1927), to wit, a taxpayer may not "draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter" of his or her tax liability. See also Steinbrecher v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1983),*118 affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-12; McCoy v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983), affg. 76 T.C. 1027 (1981); Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1982), affg. an unreported decision of this Court; United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 1980). In a civil tax case, the taxpayer must accept the consequences of asserting the Fifth Amendment and cannot avoid the burden of proof by claiming the privilege and attempting to convert "the shield … which it was intended to be into a sword". United States v. Rylander, 460 U. S. 752, 758 (1983); see Steinbrecher v. Commissioner, supra ; Traficant v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 501 (1987), affd. 884 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1989).
¶175Petitioner also contends that respondent erroneously relied on third-party information to determine that he had unreported income for the years in issue. He has not, however, raised any bona fide dispute as to the amounts reported on the third-party documents. His arguments, as he was advised by respondent during pretrial preparation, have been consistently and thoroughly rejected and may*119 be the basis for sanctions. See also Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1119-1122 (1983). Petitioner's response to counsel's letters was premised on faulty and totally unfounded factual and legal assertions.
¶176In these circumstances, respondent was entitled to rely on the third-party information. See Parker v. Commissioner, 117 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1997); see also sec. 6201(d). In any event, the facts and documents that were deemed stipulated establish petitioner's receipt of taxable income. Petitioner had the burden of identifying and proving any deductions to which he might be entitled. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975), affg. T.C. Memo. 1972-133. He failed to do so and has not shown that respondent's determination is in any way erroneous.
¶177The stipulated facts also satisfy respondent's burden of production with respect to the additions to tax in issue. See sec. 7491(c); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446-449 (2001).
¶178Section 6673(a)(1) provides:
¶179SEC. 6673. SANCTIONS AND COSTS AWARDED BY COURTS.
¶180 (a) Tax Court Proceedings. --
¶181 (1) Procedures instituted*120 primarily for delay, etc. --
¶182 Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that --
¶183 (A) proceedings before it have been instituted or
¶184 maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay,
¶185 (B) the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is
¶186 frivolous or groundless, or
¶187 (C) the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue
¶188 available administrative remedies,
¶189 the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the taxpayer to
¶190 pay to the United States a penalty not in excess of
¶191 $ 25,000.
¶192The various arguments that petitioner made in this case have been long discredited and patently were asserted for purposes of delay. His inconsistent pleadings show disregard for truthfulness and for the seriousness of these proceedings. We conclude that a penalty under section 6673(a) should be awarded to the United States in the amount of $ 10,000.
¶193To reflect the foregoing,
¶194An appropriate order and decision will be entered.