concurrence">THORNE, Judge

(concurring in part and concurring in the result):

¶ 42 I agree with Judge Davis’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in permitting the State’s expert to discuss the activities of the accelerant detecting dog. The expert testified that he had used the dog merely as an investigative tool to assist him in arriving at a conclusion concerning the cause and origin of the fire. As suggested by Judge Davis, such reliance is clearly permissible under rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Moreover, while the actions of the dog may not be themselves admissible evidence, there is no question that in the course of testifying an expert is permitted to explain the basis for his opinion. See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 18,1 P.3d 546.

¶ 43 However, in the face of Judge Davis’s conclusion that the expert’s reliance on the dog does not implicate State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), I cannot agree with his decision to then discuss the reliability factors articulated in Rimmasch. See id. at 398-99. I would prefer to limit our analysis to the confines of rules 702 and 703, and defer addressing the reliability of accelerant detecting dogs to another day.

¶44 Similarly, I see no need to conclude that the trial court committed error in admitting the evidence, regardless of how harmless the effect. The trial court properly permitted the expert to testify concerning the basis for his conclusion that the fire was the result of arson. Furthermore, while the trial court may have permitted testimony that was not necessary concerning the dog’s training regimen, I cannot see how this was error.

¶ 45 Accordingly, I concur in Judge Davis’s opinion only to the extent that I believe that the behavior of the dog was properly discussed under rule 703 and was not admitted as substantive evidence.

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