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← 2002 WI 14 - Jackson v. Benson

Jackson v. Benson’s Empirical Analysis

2002

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
July 2011
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California · 218 Wis. 2d 835 - Jackson v. Benson · 151 Wis. 2d 175 - State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc. · Doris Simmons-Harris v. Susan Tave Zelman · Case v. Hoffman

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of the following situations occurs: (a) When a judge is related to any party or counsel thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree of kinship. (b) When a judge is a party or a material witness, except that a judge need not disqualify himself or herself if the judge determines that any pleading purporting to make him or her a party is false, sham or frivolous. (c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to any party in the same action or proceeding. (d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal instrument or paper whose validity or construction is at issue. (e) When a judge of an appellate court previously handled the action or proceeding while judge of an inferior court. (f) When a judge has a significant financial or personal interest in the outcome of the matter. Such interest does not occur solely by the judge being a member of a political or taxing body that is a party. (g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner. (3) Any disqualification that may occur under sub. (2) may be waived by agreement of all parties and the judge after full and complete disclosure on the record of the factors creating such disqualification.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “(3) Frivolous appeals, (a) If an appeal or cross-appeal is found to be frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the successful party costs, fees and reasonable attorney fees under this section. A motion for costs, fees and attorney fees under this subsection shall be filed no later than the filing of the respondent's brief, or if a cross-appeal is filed, the cross-respondent's brief. (b) The costs, fees and attorney fees awarded under par. (a) may be assessed fully against the appellant or cross-appellant or the attorney representing the appellant or cross-appellant or may be assessed so that the appellant or cross-appellant and the attorney each pay a portion of the costs, fees and attorney fees. (c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to be frivolous under par. (a), the court must find one or more of the following: The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring another. The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “. . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law; and that the pleading, motion or other paper is not used for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. ... If the court determines that an attorney or party failed to read or make the determinations required under this subsection before signing any petition, motion or other paper, the court may, upon motion or upon its own initiative, impose an appropriate sanction on the person who signed the pleading, motion or other paper, or on a represented party, or on both. The sanction may include an order to pay to the other party the amount of reasonable expenses incurred by that party because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including reasonable attorney fees.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.