¶1dissenting, with whom HILL, Justice, joins.
¶2[¶ 19] I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. After stating the applicable standard of review, the majority proceeds to disregard the substantial evidence supporting the district court's findings and make its own determination without the benefit of observing 'the witnesses. The majority uses preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof. This standard is met if the evidence leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1078 (Wyo.1993). "The conclusion of what preponderates is with the trier of fact." Id.; see also Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 429 (Wyo.1985).
[I]t is important that the exercise of discretion be accompanied by the trial court's articulation of the factors considered and the weight accorded to them.... [AJrticu-lation of the reasons for the decision tends to provide a firm base for an appellate judgment that discretion was soundly exercised. It confines review of the exercise of discretion to its appropriate seope-Le., whether the relevant factors were considered and given appropriate weight....
¶3United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir.1981); see also WJH v. State, 2001 WY 54, ¶ 18, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2001); Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 15, 22 P.3d 861, 15 (Wyo.2001). The district court concelud-ed, based on all the evidence and consideration of the statutory factors, Mr. Avery presented a high risk of reoffense.
¶4[¶ 20] If the record contains substantial evidence, we will not disturb a judge's factual findings on appeal unless they are against the great weight of the evidence. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo.1994); Leavell v. Linn, 884 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Wyo.1994).
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
¶5Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo.1997) (citation omitted); see also Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 (Wyo.1999). Although a different judgment may have been reached and the question the district court faced may have been a close one, the court's findings are not clearly erroneous. It cannot be reasonably concluded, based upon this record, that a mistake was made.
¶6[¶ 21] Two factors cause me to disagree with the majority's decision to reverse the district court's order. First, the record indicates the court considered substantial evidence, the most persuasive of which may have been Mr. Avery's own testimony. See-ond, the court carefully explained how the statutory factors were considered and weighed. Nothing in the statute mandates one factor should be determinative of the outcome. Instead, the district court is directed to find the appropriate level of risk of reoffense based upon a review of all the factors, weighing them equally. The majority places undo emphasis on the lack of evidence of actual reoffense and Mr. Avery's physical condition, which, contrary to the inference of the majority, does not prevent him *980from committing another sexual assault similar to those for which he was convicted.
¶7[¶ 22] Evidence indicating a high risk of reoffense included the testimony of Lynn Cohee, an investigator for the Natrona County sheriff's office, and Mr. Avery and the record of the original offense. The nature of the original offense establishes several of the statutory factors. Mr. Avery was charged with and convicted of first-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault of very young victims who were six and seven years old. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d)(ii)(C) (LexisNexis 2001). The children were Mr. Avery's step-grandehildren who were living with him at the time the crimes were committed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-308(d)@©(H)(I) (LexisNexis 2001). Mr. Avery pleaded no contest to the charges which constitutes an admission of all the essential elements of the charges. Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 139 (Wyo.1989); State v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Wyo.1980).
¶8[¶ 23] Significantly, at the hearing on the state's petition to designate Mr. Avery as high risk for reoffense, Mr. Avery was no longer subject to probation or parole; was not receiving any counseling, therapy, or treatment; and was not residing in a home situation that provided guidance and supervision. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § (Lex-isNexis 2001). Further, he refused to accept any responsibility for his conduct and denied ever having physical contact with his step-grandchildren. This denial directly contradicted his nolo contendere plea. His convietion required that he register his address with the sheriffs office and send a written notice of any change of address within ten days of establishing a new residence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-802(e) (LexisNexis 2001). Despite this, he admitted he had not been living at his registered address for over a year.
¶9[¶ 24] Fundamental to a sexual offender's success in avoiding future offenses is acceptance of his problem and commitment to seek help. Mr, Avery's testimony showed neither. His blatant refusal to even admit the prior offense occurred and failure to comply with the registration requirements provided ample foundation for the district court's conclusion he was not credible and its belief Mr. Avery presented a high risk for reoffense.
¶10[¶ 25] The majority dismisses Ms. Cohee's testimony as an attempt to "hearsay in" evidence concerning improper conduct by Mr. Avery with other minors since his conviction. While it is true that the alleged victims did not testify, Ms. Cohee testified she received a complaint against Mr. Avery in 1996 regarding allegations of sexual intercourse with two minors. She also testified to receiving a complaint in 1999 in which a ten-year-old girl claimed Mr. Avery performed oral sex with her. Ms. Cohee offered the results of a lie detector test administered on Mr. Avery as a result of those complaints, and Mr. Avery successfully objected to its admission into evidence. Ms. Cohee also testified regarding Mr. Avery's repeated denials of any wrongdoing during her interview with him. The record contains no explanation why the complaints did not result in formal charges. While certainly not proof beyond a reasonable doubt of repetitive behavior or recent threats, which are additional statutory factors to consider, this evidence demonstrated allegations of improper sexual contact with minors continued to be an aspect of Mr. Avery's life. Since this was not a eriminal proceeding but, as noted by the majority, was a regulatory one subject to the more lenient standard of proof of preponderance of the evidence, Ms. Cohee's testimony could certainly have substantiated the district court's belief, when considered together with the other evidence, that Mr. Avery presented a high risk of reoffense.
¶11[¶ 26] The primary factor upon which Mr. Avery relied to demonstrate a low risk of reoffense was an injury he incurred which apparently caused him to be unable to achieve an erection. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001) directs the court to consider "[plhysical conditions that minimize the risk of reoffense, including advanced age or debilitating illness." Neither Mr. Avery nor the majority provides an explanation, and none logically exists, how an inability to achieve an erection reduces the risk a sexual offender will reoffend through other means including fondling and oral sex. Mr. Avery and the majority also suggest that *981his age of seventy-two years and his aneurysm surgery somehow militate against the risk of reoffense. While advanced age and poor health may weigh in favor of a lower risk, those factors alone do not mandate such a conclusion.
¶12[¶ 27] The majority effectively requires district courts to find a reoffense or a more recent conviction before a sexual offender can be designated as high risk. The legislature did not see fit to require such a finding to justify a high risk designation, and this court should refrain from allowing its apparent disagreement with the district court's factual finding to rationalize creation of a requirement not provided by the statute.