US v. Douglas-Ramos

US v. Douglas-Ramos                    CR-02-021-M         02/14/03
                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                      DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


United States of America,
     Plaintiff

     v.                                      Criminal No. 02-21-3-M
                                             Opinion No. 

Stephanie Douglas-Ramos,
     Defendant


                               O R D E R


     At sentencing, facts were developed, through defendant's

testimony and her counsel's representations, that demonstrated

the absence of an adeguate factual basis for her earlier plea of

guilty to the conspiracy offense charged in Count One of the

indictment.   Accordingly, the court, sua sponte, vacated the

plea, concluding that:    (1) a sufficient factual basis to support

the plea did not exist; and (2) defendant did not knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently plead guilty to the charged

offense.   See Fed. R. Cr. P. 1 1 (b) (3) (2002) .   That she pled

guilty, or wishes to plead guilty, to a conspiracy different from

the one charged in the indictment does not address the adeguacy

of her plea to the actual crime charged.
     Count One charges that from approximately December 2001

through February 2002, defendant conspired with Juan Costillo,

Peter Ramos, and "other persons known and unknown to the Grand

Jury, to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute

[ e c s t a c y ] D e f e n d a n t entered a seemingly provident plea to that

charge, but, later, during sentencing, she disavowed any

participation in a conspiracy involving "others" beyond Juan

Costillo and Peter Ramos      (she points out that the one intended

distributee of the ecstacy involved in the conspiracy to which

she pled guilty was acting at the time as a government agent).

She also disavowed participation in any conspiracy whose scope

and purpose extended beyond the limited goal of possessing and

distributing ecstacy on two occasions: January 9, 2003            (charged

substantively in Count Two), and January 30, 2003           (charged

substantively in Count Three).



     That is, defendant acknowledges her guilt only with regard

to a conspiracy different from that charged in the indictment.1


     1 To be fair, defendant seems to take the view that the
conspiracy to which she pled guilty i_s the same as that described
in the indictment, at least as she construes the indictment.   The
government disagrees that her construction is accurate, and the
court disagrees as well.  The charged conspiracy is not limited
to one whose object extended only to the two distributions of

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This is not a case in which the defendant admits to participation

in the conspiracy as charged, but seeks to avoid sentencing

accountability for drug guantities that were distributed by co­

conspirators whom she did not know, or in transactions she could

not reasonably foresee.   Rather, this is a situation in which

defendant describes a different conspiracy than that charged, and

believes she pled guilty only to that different conspiracy.



     According to defendant, the conspiracy to which she pled

guilty began shortly before January 9, 2003, and ended on January

30, 2003, when the objects of the conspiracy were fully

accomplished and its purposes fulfilled.   Consistent with that

view, she argues that the entire drug guantity involved in the

conspiracy to which she pled guilty is fixed, consisting of the

ecstacy possessed and distributed on January 9 and 30.    She

agrees that she should be held accountable under the sentencing

guidelines for that full amount, since she was personally

involved in distributing that amount, and the conspiracy involved


ecstacy defendant admits to participating in, and that conspiracy
undeniably involved "others" in addition to Costillo and Ramos,
and it began well before the conspiracy defendant describes.
Defendant uneguivocally represented at sentencing that she did
not admit guilt with regard to any conspiracy involving "others"
in addition to Costillo and Peter Ramos.

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only that amount.   That is, no apportionment of any greater drug

guantity is necessary (or appropriate), because the conspiracy

did not involve any other drugs, she participated in

accomplishing the full objective of the conspiracy, the objective

was in fact accomplished, and the conspiracy ended when its goals

(the two sales) were fully achieved.



     Defendant disavowed knowledge of, or participation in, any

other drug possession or distribution acts by Peter Ramos, or

Juan Costillo, or any other alleged co-conspirators, and she

argued that she was not guilty of any conspiracy involving

"others" beyond Costillo and Ramos, and was not guilty of a

conspiracy broader in scope that the conspiracy to distribute

ecstacy on January 9 and 30, 2003.     But Count One of the

indictment plainly charges a conspiracy whose purpose and

objectives were broader in scope than that admitted by defendant,

and, the indictment plainly charges a conspiracy involving

"others" in addition to Ramos and Costillo.



     While it is not necessary for defendant to know all the

participants in a conspiracy, or to be aware of it's actual



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scope, she cannot providently plead guilty to the conspiracy

charged in the indictment by redefining it as some other distinct

conspiracy - one of more limited scope, purpose, duration, and

membership.   See United States v. Broce, 

     ("A

guilty plea 'is more than a confession which admits that the

accused did various acts.'   It is an 'admission that he committed

the crime charged against him.'   . . . '[T]he precise nature and

extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the

agreement which embraces and defines its objects.'"   (citations

omitted; emphasis added)).   Before judgment of guilty can be

entered on Count One, defendant must either providently plead

guilty to the crime actually charged, or a jury must determine

her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.   She has not entered a

provident plea to the conspiracy charged in Count One.



     Since defendant pled guilty to three counts of the

indictment pursuant to a plea agreement, and the court has

vacated the plea to Count One, the other pleas shall also be

vacated, at defendant's option, and pleas of not guilty

reinstated.   Trial will be scheduled on Count One, and, as

appropriate. Counts Two and Three.



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      SO ORDERED.



                               Steven J. McAuliffe
                               United States District Judge

February 14, 2003

cc:   Terry L. Ollila, Esq.
      Phillip R. Desfosses, Esq.
      R. Brian Snow, Esq.
      Brian T. Tucker, Esq.




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