Slovak v . SSA CV-02-231-M 05/29/03
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Bonnie S . Slovak,
Claimant
v. Civil N o . 02-231-M
Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 092
Jo Anne B . Barnhart,
Commissioner, Social
Security Administration,
Respondent
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant, Bonnie S . Slovak,
moves to reverse the Commissioner’s decision denying her
application for an earlier “onset date” for the disability that
entitles her to Social Security disability insurance benefits, or
DIB, under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”),
42
U.S.C. § 423, and supplemental security income, or S S I , under
Title X V I ,
42 U.S.C. § 1382. Specifically, Slovak claims an
onset date of March 3 1 , 1996, rather than the date determined by
the Commissioner, November 1 , 1998. The Commissioner, in turn,
moves for an order affirming her decision. For the reasons given
below, the matter is remanded to the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable in this case provides, in
pertinent part:
The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (setting out the standard of review for DIB
decisions); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(c) (establishing §
405(g) as the standard of review for SSI decisions). However,
the court “must uphold a denial of social security . . . benefits
unless ‘the [Commissioner] has committed a legal or factual error
in evaluating a particular claim.’” Manso-Pizarro v . Sec’y of
HHS,
76 F.3d 1 5 , 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Sullivan v . Hudson,
490 U.S. 8 7 7 , 885 (1989)).
The Commissioner’s findings of fact must be supported by
substantial evidence; “[t]he substantial evidence test applies
not only to findings of basic evidentiary facts, but also to
inferences and conclusions drawn from such facts.” Alexandrou v .
2
Sullivan, 764 F. Supp. 916, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Levine
v . Gardner,
360 F.2d 7 2 7 , 730 (2d Cir. 1966)). In turn,
“[s]ubstantial evidence is ‘more than [a] mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Currier v . Sec’y of HEW,
612
F.2d 5 9 4 , 597 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoting Richardson v . Perales,
402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Finally, when determining whether a
decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial
evidence, the court must “review[] the evidence in the record as
a whole.” Irlanda Ortiz v . Sec’y of HHS,
955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st
Cir. 1991) (quoting Rodriguez v . Sec’y of HHS,
647 F.2d 2 1 8 , 222
(1st Cir. 1981)). 1
Background
The parties have submitted a Joint Statement of Material
Facts (document n o . 1 2 ) , which is part of the court’s record.
1
“It is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] to
determine issues of credibility and to draw inferences from the
record evidence. Indeed, the resolution of conflicts in the
evidence is for the [Commissioner], not the courts.” Irlanda
Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (citations omitted). Moreover, the court
“must uphold the [Commissioner’s] conclusion, even if the record
arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is
supported by substantial evidence.” Tsarelka v . Sec’y of HHS,
842 F.2d 529, 535 (1st Cir. 1988).
3
All of the facts included in that statement are not reiterated
here, but will be referred to as necessary. Similarly, the court
surveys only as much of this case’s somewhat complicated
procedural history as is necessary to frame and decide the issues
raised in the appeal.
Slovak currently receives DIB and SSI benefits. Both
benefits are based upon a determination that she was disabled as
of November 1 , 1998. Subsequent to being awarded benefits, and
at the suggestion of the ALJ, Slovak asked to re-open the issue
of onset, for the purpose of claiming that she was disabled as of
March 3 1 , 1996. The ALJ held a hearing on the issue of onset
which began on April 1 2 , 2001, and resumed on October 1 6 , 2001,
at which time the ALJ heard testimony from vocational expert
(“VE”) Howard Steinberg. At that hearing, the ALJ framed a
hypothetical question for the VE in the following way:
Q . . . Well, then assume M s . Slovak was a
younger worker at the alleged onset date, which would
have been 3/31/96. At that time she would have been
approximately 43 years of age. She’s currently 4 8 .
And she confirmed that she had a 12th grade education.
And she has past work experience which you identified.
And has, at that time, the residual functional capacity
to perform light work. . . . At any rate, she had a
residual functional capacity at the alleged onset equal
4
[to] light work, but not a full range, she had
limitations. And the limitations are caused by some
impairments of the hands and the cervical and lumbar
spine. And on exertional impairments, based on the
fact that she had been diagnosed as having a bipolar
disorder with . . . some limitations. And those
limitations, altogether, are as follows, she must
avoid, she could only occasionally climb, stoop, kneel,
crouch and crawl. She had bilateral limitations with
respect to her upper extremity. She was limited with
respect to reaching in all directions, handling, gross
manipulation, fingering, fine manipulation, feeling.
She should avoid grasping[,] pulling and repetitive
hand motions. Limitations, as I said, in all of those
functions. She’s not precluded from using them, she’s
just limited in her ability to do all those things.
A Can I , can I stop you there?
Q Yes.
A I’m, I’m not sure that I have all of the upper
extremity limitations. I have limited reaching,
fingering, feeling, fine manipulation, avoid grasping –
Q And repetitive hand motions.
A Yes. Okay, that, that’s what I have. Was
there anything else?
Q N o . She would require, at that time, an
isolated work section where she would only have
occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers. She
would require a job that had only simple one step
instructions.
(Administrative Transcript (herinafter “Tr.”) at 37-39.) In
response to the foregoing hypothetical question, the VE opined
that Slovak would not be able to perform her past relevant work.
5
(Tr. at 39.) He also opined that there are no skilled jobs in
the national economy to which she had transferable skills. (Tr.
at 39.) The VE did, however, testify that there are unskilled
jobs in the national economy which Slovak could perform:
A . . . There are three jobs that I can identify
that would fit with this hypothetical question. . . .
The jobs that I feel would be physically appropriate
within the hypothetical that you’ve given me would be
the job of security guard at a light level. The
numbers that I have for this job are approximately
185,000 in the national economy and approximately 650
in the state. I’m doing the math on the fly, the job
security guard at the sedentary level, approximately
70,000 in the national economy and approximately 200 in
the state. And the job of storage facility rental
clerk, approximately 55,000 in the national economy and
approximately 150 in the state.
Q A security job, light and sedentary, do they
involve watching a monitor?
A They can, yes.
Q And in any of these jobs i s , do they, in any of
these jobs that you mentioned, do they require a
significant use of the upper extremities?
A N o . The use of the upper extremities for gross
and fine manipulation would be occasional.
Q By occasional you mean no more than one-third
of the day?
A No more than one-third of the day.
Q . . . What’s the source of your information?
6
A The Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Fourth
Edition Revised, 1991, U.S. Department of Labor and the
Employment Statistics Quarterly, Second Quarter of
2001. That is from United Statistical Publisher’s,
Kansas City, Kansas.
(Tr. at 39-40.)
In a decision dated January 2 5 , 2002, the ALJ made the
following findings:
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant
has severe bilateral carpal tunnel of the thumbs,
degenerative joint disease of the cervical and
lumbar spines and a bipolar disorder, but that she
does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments listed i n , or medically equal to one
listed in Appendix 1 , Subpart P, Regulations N o .
4.
4. Prior to November 1 , 1998, the undersigned does
not find the claimant’s testimony to be credible
regarding the severity of her subjective
complaints nor their effect on her ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
5. Prior to November 1 , 1998, the claimant had the
residual functional capacity to perform the
physical exertional requirements of work except
for work which required lifting and carrying more
than 20 pounds occasionally or 10 pounds
frequently or performing tasks that required more
than occasional climbing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, crawling or frequent balancing. She
could not perform tasks that require grasping or
pulling or tasks that require repetitive hand
motions. Additionally, the claimant was unable to
7
perform tasks that require handling or fingering.
The claimant had difficulty interacting
appropriately with supervisors and co-workers and
was limited to performing simple, one-step
instructions.
7. Prior to November 1 , 1998, the claimant had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work
activity.
8. The claimant is 48 years old, which is defined as
a “younger individual” (20 CFR 404.1563 and
416.963).
9. The claimant has a high school education (20 CFR
404.1564 and 416.964).
10. Section 404.1569 of Regulations N o . 4 and Rule
202.21, Table N o . 2 , of Appendix 2 , Subpart P,
Regulations N o . 4 , directs a conclusion that, the
claimant, considering her residual functional
capacity, age, education and prior work
experience, was not disabled prior to November 1 ,
1998.
(Tr. at 22-23.) Based upon the foregoing findings, the ALJ ruled
as follows:
Therefore, using Rule 202.21 as a framework for
decisionmaking, and relying upon the vocational
expert’s testimony, the undersigned finds that, during
the period from March 3 1 , 1996 through October 3 1 ,
1998, the claimant was capable of making a vocational
adjustment to jobs existing in significant numbers in
the national economy. Accordingly, the claimant was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act and was not entitled to a period of disability or
8
disability insurance benefits and not eligible to
receive supplemental security income benefits, based on
the applications she filed on November 4 , 1997 and
October 2 1 , 1998.
(Tr. at 22.)
Discussion
According to Slovak, the ALJ’s decision should be reversed,
and the case remanded, because the ALJ: (1) failed to ask the VE
whether his testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and also gave the VE a hypothetical
question based on a different residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) than the RFC stated in his written findings; (2) based
his decision on Rule 202.21 of the medical-vocational guidelines
without giving her proper notice; (3) failed to base his step-
five determination on substantial evidence; (4) made a
credibility determination that was not supported by substantial
evidence; and (5) failed to complete the required psychiatric
review technique form.
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a person
must: (1) be insured for such benefits; (2) not have reached
9
retirement age; (3) have filed an application; and (4) be under a
disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A)-(D). To be eligible for
supplemental security income, a person must be aged, blind, or
disabled, and must meet certain requirements pertaining to income
and assets.
42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The only question in this case
is whether Slovak was disabled between March 3 1 , 1996 and October
3 1 , 1998.
For the purpose of determining eligibility for disability
insurance benefits,
[t]he term “disability” means . . . inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)
(setting out a similar definition of disability for determining
eligibility for SSI benefits). Moreover,
[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if [her] physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not
only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot,
considering [her] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
10
which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
[she] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists
for [her], or whether [she] would be hired if [she]
applied for work. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (pertaining to DIB benefits); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (setting out a similar standard
determining eligibility for SSI benefits).
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled for the
purpose of determining eligibility for either DIB or SSI
benefits, an ALJ is required to employ a five-step process. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 404.1520 (DIB) and 416.920 (SSI).
The steps are: 1 ) if the [claimant] is engaged in
substantial gainful work activity, the application is
denied; 2 ) if the [claimant] does not have, or has not
had within the relevant time period, a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the
application is denied; 3 ) if the impairment meets the
conditions for one of the “listed” impairments in the
Social Security regulations, then the application is
granted; 4 ) if the [claimant’s] “residual functional
capacity” is such that he or she can still perform past
relevant work, then the application is denied; 5 ) if
the [claimant], given his or her residual functional
capacity, education, work experience, and age, is
unable to do any other work, the application is
granted.
11
Seavey v . Barnhard, 276 F.3d 1 , 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing
20
C.F.R. § 416.920).
The claimant bears the burden of proving that she is
disabled. See Bowen v . Yuckert, 482 U.S. 1 3 7 , 146 (1987). She
must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mandziej v .
Chater,
944 F. Supp. 1 2 1 , 129 (D.N.H. 1996) (citing Paone v .
Schweiker,
530 F. Supp. 8 0 8 , 810-11) (D. Mass. 1982)). However,
[o]nce the [claimant] has met his or her burden at Step
4 to show that he or she is unable to do past work due
to the significant limitation, the Commissioner then
has the burden at Step 5 of coming forward with
evidence of specific jobs in the national economy that
the [claimant] can still perform. Arocho v . Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 3 7 4 , 375 (1st Cir.
1982). If the [claimant’s] limitations are exclusively
exertional, then the Commissioner can meet her burden
through the use of a chart contained in the Social
Security regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.969; Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. p t . 4 0 4 , subpt. P,
App. 2 , tables 1-3 (2001), cited in 20 C.F.R. §
416.969; Heckler v . Campbell,
461 U.S. 458 (1983). “The
Grid,” as it is known, consists of a matrix of the
[claimant’s] exertional capacity, age, education, and
work experience. If the facts of the [claimant’s]
situation fit within the Grid’s categories, the Grid
“directs a conclusion as to whether the individual is
or is not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. p t . 4 0 4 , subpt. P, App.
2 , § 200.00(a), cited in 20 C.F.R. § 416.969. However,
f the claimant has nonexertional limitations (such as
mental, sensory, or skin impairments, or environmental
restrictions such as an inability to tolerate dust, id.
§ 200(e)) that restrict his [or her] ability to perform
12
jobs he [or she] would otherwise be capable of
performing, then the Grid is only a “framework to guide
[the] decision,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.969a(d) (2001). See
also Pratts v . Chater, 94 F.3d 3 4 , 39 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing use of Grid when applicant has
nonexertional limitations
Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5 (parallel citations omitted). Finally,
In assessing a disability claim, the [Commissioner]
considers objective and subjective factors, including:
(1) objective medical facts; (2) plaintiff’s subjective
claims of pain and disability as supported by the
testimony of the plaintiff or other witness; and (3)
the plaintiff’s educational background, age, and work
experience.
Mandziej, 944 F. Supp. at 129 (citing Avery v . Sec’y of HHS,
797
F.2d 1 9 , 23 (1st Cir. 1986); Goodermote v . Sec’y of HHS,
690 F.2d
5 , 6 (1st Cir. 1982)).
Here, the Commissioner agrees that Slovak met her step-four
burden of proving that her disabilities prevent her from
performing her past relevant work. Thus, the only question
before the court is whether the Commissioner met her burden of
producing evidence of other jobs in the national economy that
Slovak is capable of performing. The court considers in turn
13
each of the five grounds for reversal and remand that claimant
has raised.
I. Reliance on VE Testimony that is Inconsistent with the DOT
and Use of a Hypothetical Question that is Inconsistent with
the ALJ’s Findings of Fact
According to Slovak, the ALJ erred, at step five of the
sequential evaluation, in two ways, by: (1) failing to ask the VE
whether his testimony was consistent with the DOT; and (2)
presenting the VE with a hypothetical question that contained
limitations that were materially less restrictive than those
listed in his findings of fact.
A. Consistency of the VE’s Testimony with the DOT
Slovak argues that the VE testified that the security guard
and storage-facility rental clerk jobs require only occasional
use of the upper extremities while the DOT states that both
positions require frequent reaching and frequent handling, and
that, contrary to the requirement of Social Security Ruling
(“SSR”) 00-9p, 2000 WL 1898704 (S.S.A.), the ALJ failed to
identify that discrepancy and to elicit an explanation of it from
the V E . The discrepancy between the VE’s testimony and the DOT
14
is significant because the ALJ specified, in his hypothetical
question to the V E , that Slovak had a bilateral limitation on
upper extremity use which reduced her abilities in reaching,
handling, gross manipulation, fingering, and fine manipulation.
The Commissioner contends, without mentioning SSR 00-4p, that:
(1) the DOT job definitions are simply generic descriptions that
are not binding on an ALJ; (2) the ALJ was entitled to credit the
VE’s testimony that some security guard and storage facility
rental clerk jobs do not require frequent handling; and (3) even
if the security guard job requires frequent reaching and
handling, the surveillance systems monitor job, which roughly
corresponds to the job of a security guard who only watches
monitors, requires no reaching, handling, or fingering.
SSR 00-4p, on which Slovak relies, provides, in pertinent
part:
Occupational evidence provided by a VE or VS generally
should be consistent with the occupational information
supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent
unresolved conflict between VE or VS evidence and the
DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable
explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE
or VS evidence to support a determination or decision
about whether the claimant is disabled. At the
hearings level, as part of the adjudicator’s duty to
15
fully develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire,
on the record, as to whether or not there is such
consistency
Neither the DOT nor the VE or VS evidence automatically
“trumps” when there is a conflict. The adjudicator
must resolve the conflict by determining if the
explanation given by the VE or VS is reasonable and
provides a basis for relying on the VE or VS testimony
rather than the DOT information.
When a VE or VS provides evidence about the
requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator
has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any
possible conflict between that VE or VS evidence and
information provided in the DOT. In these situations,
the adjudicator will:
• Ask the VE or VS if the evidence he or she has
provided conflicts with information provided in
the DOT; and
• If the VE’s or VS’s evidence appears to conflict
with the DOT, the adjudicator will obtain a
reasonable explanation for the apparent
conflict.
When vocational evidence provided by a VE or VS is not
consistent with information in the DOT, the adjudicator
must resolve this conflict before relying on the VE or
VS evidence to support a determination or decision that
the individual is not disabled. The adjudicator will
explain in the determination or decision how he or she
resolved the conflict. The adjudicator must explain
the resolution of the conflict irrespective of how the
conflict was identified.
SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at * 2 , * 4 .
16
According to the DOT, the security guard job requires
frequent reaching and frequent handling, as does the storage-
facility rental clerk position. Frequent, in this context, means
from one-third to two-thirds of the time. The V E , however,
testified that neither job required significant use of the upper
extremities, stating that “use of the upper extremities for gross
and fine manipulation would be occasional,” which he further
specified to mean less than one-third of the time. Plainly, the
VE’s testimony conflicts with the DOT. Because the ALJ did not
inquire as to the existence of any such conflicts, he did not
identify, and did not resolve, the conflict identified above. On
that basis, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed and the case
remanded. On remand, the ALJ should resolve the conflict between
the VE’s testimony and the DOT, following the guidance of SSR 00-
4p.
B. Validity of the ALJ’s Hypothetical Question
Slovak also points out that while the ALJ found she “was
unable to perform tasks that require handling or fingering,” his
hypothetical question to the VE posited that she was able to
perform “limited reaching, handling, gross manipulation,
17
fingering, fine manipulation, and feeling.” That discrepancy is
significant because the only jobs identified by the V E , security
guard and storage facility rental clerk, both require frequent
handling. The Commissioner counters that there is no discrepancy
between the ALJ’s findings and the residual functional capacity
he posited in his hypothetical.
Slovak raises a valid point; the ALJ’s hypothetical question
contained a less-restrictive limitation on handling than the
limitation stated in the his findings of fact. Accordingly, on
remand, the ALJ should make sure that his findings and
hypothetical questions include the same non-exertional
limitations.
II. Use of Rule 202.21 without Proper Notice
Slovak next argues that the ALJ denied her due process to
the extent that he based his decision on Rule 202.21 (20 C.F.R. §
404, subpt. P, App. 2 ) of the medical-vocational guidelines.
According to Slovak, the holding in Sykes v . Apfel,
228 F.3d 259
(3d Cir. 2000), combined with the existence of non-exertional
impairments, required the ALJ to provide her with notice of his
18
intention to base his decision upon a medical-vocational “grid
rule,” because reliance upon a grid rule necessarily implies a
finding that a claimant’s non-exertional impairments do not
significantly erode the base of available jobs. The Commissioner
does not respond to Slovak’s Rule 202.21 argument.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the First Circuit
would adopt the rule described in Sykes, this case is not on all
fours with Sykes. Sykes was a case in which “the ALJ did not
consider any evidence in addition to the grids [of which Rule
202.21 is a part] in making his determination that there were
jobs in the national economy that [the claimant] could perform.”
228 F.3d at 265. The rule announced in Sykes is that
the Commissioner cannot determine that a claimant’s
nonexertional impairments do not significantly erode
his occupational base under the medical-vocational
guidelines without either taking additional vocational
evidence establishing as much or providing notice to
the claimant of his intention to take official notice
of this fact (and providing the claimant with an
opportunity to counter the conclusion).
Id. at 261. Here, as Slovak herself acknowledges, the ALJ did
consider evidence provided by a vocational expert. Thus, the key
condition set out in Sykes, exclusive reliance on the medical-
19
vocational guidelines, is absent. Accordingly, the rule of Sykes
does not require reversal and remand, and the court declines to
extend that rule to cover the circumstances of this case, in
which the ALJ referred to the medical-vocational guidelines but
also relied upon the testimony of a vocational expert.
While it was not improper for the ALJ to rely, in part, on a
grid rule, given the holding in Sykes, use of the grid may still
prove problematic in this case. “The Grid is based on a
claimant’s exertional capacity and can only be applied when
claimant’s non-exertional limitations do not significantly impair
claimant’s ability to perform at a given exertional level.” Rose
v . Shalala 34 F.3d 1 3 , 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Sherwin v .
Sec’y of HHS,
685 F.2d 1 , 2-3 (1st Cir. 1982)); see also Seavey,
276 F.3d at 6 (discussing use of the grid as a “framework to
guide [the] decision”). Accordingly, before relying upon the
grid, the ALJ will need to establish that Slovak’s various non-
exertional limitations do not significantly impair her ability to
perform at the relevant exertional levels.
20
III. Lack of Substantial Evidence to Support RFC Determination
Slovak also contends that the ALJ’s decision should be
reversed because ALJ lacked substantial evidence for his decision
and misapplied the step-five burden by basing his decision on his
negative finding as to her credibility rather than on positive
medical and vocational evidence. The Commissioner does not
respond to claimant’s argument. Because this case is being
remanded on other grounds, and because further proceedings
consistent with the instructions outlined above will very likely
solve the problems identified in this section, there is no need
for further discussion.
IV. Lack of Substantial Evidence to Support Credibility
Determination
Slovak argues that the ALJ’s negative assessment of her
credibility (Tr. at 22) is not supported by any findings or
explanation, making it impermissibly conclusory. In response,
the Commissioner points to several statements about Slovak’s
treatment, in the body of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. at 21.) The
ALJ’s consideration of Slovak’s credibility is sketchy at best,
and would appear to fall short of the standard set out in SSR 96-
7p. On remand, the ALJ should provide “specific reasons for
21
[any] finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the
case record, and [those findings] must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the [ALJ] gave to the individual’s statements and the
reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 (S.S.R.) at
*4.
V. Failure to Complete the Required Psychiatric Review
Technique Form
Finally, Slovak contends that the ALJ committed reversible
error by failing to fill out a psychiatric review technique
(“PRT”) form after determining that she suffered from a
significant mental problem, namely bipolar disorder. The
Commissioner counters that the applicable regulations no longer
require completion of the PRT form, and points to several of the
ALJ’s findings related to claimant’s bipolar disorder. Slovak,
in turn, concedes that the PRT is no longer required, but
maintains that the ALJ failed to perform the evaluation of mental
impairments required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. Without
belaboring the point, the court agrees that the ALJ’s decision
does not conform to the analytical framework set out in §
22
404.1520a. On remand, the ALJ should follow that framework in
assessing Slovak’s mental impairment.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, claimant’s motion to reverse
and remand (document n o . 10) is granted in part and denied in
part. To the extent it seeks reversal of the Commissioner’s
decision denying her application for benefits, that motion is
denied. To the extent it seeks remand to the ALJ for further
consideration, it is granted. The Commissioner’s motion for an
order affirming the ALJ’s decision (document n o . 11) is denied.
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this matter
is remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings. The Clerk of the
Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and
close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
May 2 9 , 2003
cc: Francis M . Jackson, Esq.
David L . Broderick, Esq.
23
