State v. Dimmitt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Rule 11(d)(1), N.D.R.Crim.P. [now N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)], provides, “the court shall not participate” in plea agreement discussions. On this point, the federal rule is substantively identical to our rule and prohibits the court from participating in any plea discussions. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 556-58 [(9th Cir. 1992)] (citations omitted), explains the purpose of the rule prohibiting a judge from participating in plea discussions: Rule 11(e)(1) [later renumbered 11(c)(1)] simply commands that the judge not participate in, and remove him or herself from, any discussion of a plea agreement that has not yet been agreed to by the parties in open court. The “bright-line rule” created by Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1) bars a judge from participating in plea bargaining for three main reasons. First, such participation is prohibited because judicial involvement in plea negotiations inevitably carries with it the high and unacceptable risk of coercing a defendant to accept the proposed agreement and plead guilty. [[Image here]] Second, Rule 11 protects the integrity of the judicial process. “The Rule is based on the sound principle that the interests of justice are best served if the judge remains aloof from all discussions preliminary to the determination of guilt or innocence so that his impartiality and objectivity shall not be open to any questions or suspicion when it becomes his duty to impose sentence.” [[Imag”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Vandehoven

2. “The purpose of Rule 11 is not only to protect judicial neutrality but also to eliminate the coercive effect of judicial participation on plea bargaining. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 196 (6th Cir.1992) (citation omitted), explains: “Regardless of the judge’s objectivity, it is the defendant’s perception of the judge that will determine whether the defendant will feel coerced to enter a plea.” Even if the District Judge can put aside knowledge about the defendant and provide a fair hearing, the judge cannot remove the doubt from the defendant’s mind caused by his statements in this case. To cure this improper judicial participation in the plea bargaining process, then, the case must be assigned to another judge. Even if the sentencing judge could remain impartial and act with objectivity in this case, the larger issue is whether the defendant’s perception of the judge is such that he will feel coerced to enter a particular plea. Under these circumstances, to cure an improper judicial participation in the plea bargaining process, it is appropriate to assign the case to another judge.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Vandehoven

3. “A manifest injustice may result from procedural errors by the sentencing court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Yost