2003 Pa. Super. 10 - Nippes v. Lucas’s Empirical Analysis
2003
Citation profile
6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 2021
6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc. · 451 Pa. Super. 119 - Commonwealth v. Heberling · Commonwealth v. Kelley · Ludmer v. Nernberg · Fairmount Insurance v. Commonwealth, Insurance Department
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[W]hen determining the meaning of a statute, a court must construe the words of that statute according to their plain meaning. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a); Ludmer v. Nemberg, 699 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa.Super.1997). When the words of a statute are [clear and free from all ambiguity], they are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Heberling, 451 Pa.Super. 119 , 678 A.2d 794, 795 (1996). It is only when the statute is unclear that the court may embark upon the task of ascertaining the intent of the legislature. Id. Absent a definition, statutes are presumed to employ words in their popular and plain everyday sense, and popular meanings of such words must prevail. Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dames, Inc., 540 Pa. 398, 406 , 658 A.2d 336, 340 (1995); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 569 Pa. 179 , 801 A.2d 551, 555 (2002).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“(a) Penalty for failure to comply with act. — If arbitration or litigation is commenced to recover payment under this act and it is determined that an owner, contractor or subcontractor has failed to comply with the payment terms of this act, the arbitrator or court shall award, in addition to other damages due, a penalty equal to 1% per month of the amount that was wrongfully withheld. An amount shall not be deemed to be wrongfully withheld to the extent it bears a reasonable relation to the value of any claim held in good faith by the owner, contractor or subcontractor against whom the contractor or subcontractor is seeking to recover payment, (b) Award of Attorney Fee and Expenses. — Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the substantially prevailing party in any proceeding to recover payment under this act shall be awarded a reasonable attorney fee in an amount to be determined by the court or arbitrator, together with expenses.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.