2003 Pa. Super. 100 - Commonwealth v. Hetzel’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] defendant is not entitled to a change of venue unless he or she can show that pre-trial publicity resulted in actual prejudice that prevented the impaneling of an impartial jury.... Pretrial publicity will be presumed to have been prejudicial if the defendant is able to prove that the publicity was sensational, inflammatory, and slanted toward conviction, rather than factual and objective; that such publicity revealed the defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, or referred to confessions, admissions, or reenactments of the crime by the defendant; or that it was derived from official police and prosecutorial reports. Even if the defendant proves the existence of one or more of these circumstances, a change of venue or venire is not warranted unless he or she also shows that the pre-trial publicity was so extensive, sustained, and pervasive that the community must be deemed to have been saturated with it, and that there was insufficient time between the publicity and the trial for any prejudice to have dissipated.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 630 F. Supp. 2d 563 - Hetzel v. Lamas · 372 F. App'x 280 - Hetzel v. Lamas

2. “As a result of counsel’s request for a change of venue, the trial judge reviewed the media accounts of the case and considered Hetzel’s claim of prejudice. The court denied the motion because it concluded that the published reports, though voluminous, were not “sensational, inflammatory nor slanted toward conviction, but [were] factual and objectively reported.” Nonetheless, the court indicated that it would revisit the issue if it became “evident during jury voir dire that the ability ... to empanel a fair and impartial jury has been compromised by the pretrial publicity.” Thereafter, jury selection in the case was thorough and careful. The court dismissed for cause all jurors who hinted at having a fixed opinion in the case or who believed they were unable to be fair or impartial. While the majority of the jurors chosen to serve had some knowledge of the case through the media, none reported that the exposure prompted a fixed opinion and all stated that they would decide the matter consistent with the court’s instructions and based on the evidence presented at trial. In light of the conscientious and methodical manner in which the court presided over jury selection in this case, as well as our limited scope of review, we cannot find that there was an abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the change of venue. The record simply does not reveal an extensive, sustained, or pervasive effect from the media coverage in this case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 372 F. App'x 280 - Hetzel v. Lamas

3. “[T]he work-product doctrine provides broader protections than the attorney-client privilege and shields from disclosure an attorney’s (or his representative’s, [investigator’s or other agent’s]) opinions, theories, or conclusions. Pa. R.Crim.P. 573(G). 11 The underlying purpose of the work product doctrine is to guard the mental processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case. [This Court has] described the work product doctrine as one that promotes the adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases without fear that their work product will be used against their clients ... [and further] protects materials prepared by agents for the attorney.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2013 Pa. Super. 182 - Commonwealth v. Sandusky