Brakeall v. Weber’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is well settled that in reviewing trial counsel’s performance, it is not this Court’s function to second guess the decisions of experienced trial attorneys regarding matters of trial tactics unless the record shows that counsel failed to investigate and consider possible defenses and to exercise their good faith judgment thereon. The determination does not rest on whether this Court finds the tactics or strategy employed to be the most advantageous but, instead, whether counsel satisfied the Strickland standard of competence. In reviewing whether counsel acted reasonably we analyze counsel’s performance in light of the circumstances then existing. Neither the result reached nor second guessing with the benefit of hindsight determine the reasonableness of counsel’s performance. While this court will not compare counsel’s performance to that of some idealized “super-lawyer” and will respect the integrity of counsel’s decision in choos ing a particular strategy, these considerations must be balanced with the need to insure that counsel’s performance was within the realm of competence required of members of the profession. An attorney must make a reasonable investigation and must make reasonable decisions to forego particular investigations. A difference in trial tactics does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hirning v. Dooley

2. “Furthermore, even if habeas review were appropriate in order to collaterally attack his plea Brakeall is required to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 11. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 , 99 S.Ct. 2085 , 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979) (holding collateral relief not available to defendant who shows only violation of formal requirements of Rule 11 and no prejudice). Here, not one but two habeas courts have found that Brakeall did not suffer prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure to advise of the mandatory minimums. The findings demonstrate that Brakeall was aware he faced a sentence in the double digits; Brakeall intended to plead guilty from the beginning of the case; and, based upon Brakeall’s statements at sentencing and counsel’s comments, the trial court’s advisement of the mandatory minimum would not have made a difference in the decision to plead guilty. Those findings are not clearly erroneous on this record. As a result, Brakeall has not met his burden and the writ of habeas corpus relating to this issue was properly denied.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wright

3. “Before imposing sentence a court shall disclose the report of the presentence investigation to the defendant, the defendant’s counsel, if represented by counsel, and the prosecuting attorney, but the court may exclude any recommendation as to sentence, and other material that, in the opinion of the court, contains a diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. The court shall afford the defendant, the defendant’s counsel, or the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to comment thereon and, in the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the pre-sentence report.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Schmidt