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2003 T.C. Memo. 60

Flathers v. Comm'r

United States Tax Court

Decided March 4, 2003

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United States Tax Court · decided 2003-03-04

Relies on Goza v. Commissioner · Sego v. Commissioner · Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner

Respondent's motion for summary judgment and to impose… · Decided 2003-03-04

CHERYL D. FLATHERS, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Flathers v. Comm'r
13037-02L
T.C. Memo 2003-60; 2003 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61; 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 969; T.C.M. (RIA) 55067;
March 4, 2003, Filed

¶1*61 Respondent's motion for summary judgment and to impose penalty granted.

Cheryl D. Flathers, pro se.
Rollin G. Thorley, for respondent.
Chiechi, Carolyn P.

CHIECHI

¶2MEMORANDUM OPINION

¶3CHIECHI, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment and to impose a penalty under section 6673 (respondent's motion). 1 We shall grant respondent's motion.

¶4             Background

¶5The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the following.

¶6Petitioner resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time she filed the petition in this case.

¶7On or about March 17, 1999, petitioner filed a Federal income tax (tax) return for her taxable year 1998 (1998 return). In her 1998 return, petitioner reported total income of $ 0, total tax of $ 0, and claimed a refund*62 of $ 4,704.60 of tax withheld. Petitioner attached to her 1998 return Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, reporting wages, tips, and other compensation of $ 47,554.71. Petitioner also attached a two-page document to that return (petitioner's attachment to her 1998 return). That document stated in pertinent part:

¶8   I, Cheryl Dawn Flathers, am submitting this as part of my 1998

¶9   Income Tax Return, even though I know that no section of the

¶10   Internal Revenue Code:

¶11     1) Establishes an income tax "liability [sic]: as, for

¶12     example, Code Sections 4401, 5005, and 5703 do with respect

¶13     to wagering, alcohol, and tobacco taxes;

¶14     2) Provides that income taxes "have to be paid on the basis

¶15     of a return" -- as, for example, Code Sections 4374,

¶16     4401(c), 5061(a) and 5703(b) do with respect to other

¶17     taxes; I am filing anyway because I know the government has

¶18     prosecuted others for failing to file income tax forms by

¶19     (erroneously) invoking Code Sections 7201 and 7203.

¶20     Therefore, this return is not being filed voluntarily*63 but

¶21     is being filed out of fear that if I did not file this

¶22     return I could also be (illegally) prosecuted for failing

¶23     to file an income tax return for the year 1998.

¶24     3) In addition to the above, I am filing even though the

¶25     "Privacy Act Notice" as contained in a 1040 booklet clearly

¶26     informs me that I am not required to file. It does so in at

¶27     least two places.

¶28        a) In one place, it states that I need only file a

¶29        return for "any tax" I may be "liable" for. Since no

¶30        Code Section makes me "liable" for income taxes, this

¶31        provision notifies me that I do not have to file an

¶32        income tax return.

¶33       b) In another place, it directs me to Code Section

        6001. This section provides, in relevant part that



        "Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary it is



        necessary, he may require any person by notice



        served on such person; or by regulations, to

*64     make such returns, render such statements, or keep

        such records, as the Secretary deems sufficient to



        show whether or not such person is liable far [sic]



        the tax under this title." Since the Secretary of the



        Treasury did not "serve" me with any such "notice" and



        since no legislative regulation exists requiring



        anyone to file an income tax return, I am again



        informed by the "Privacy Act Notice" that I am not



        required to file an income tax return.



           *   *   *   *   *   *   *



   7) It should also be noted that I had "zero" income according to

   the Supreme Court's definition of income … since in



  Merchant's Loan & Trust C.V. Smlietanka [sic], 255 U.S. 509, 65 L. Ed. 751, 41 S. Ct. 386, (at pages 518 & 519) that court held that "The

   word (income) must be given the same meaning in all of the



   Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the



   Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909." Therefore, since I had no

*65   earnings in 1998, that would have been taxable as "income" under

   the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, I can only swear to

   having "zero" income in 1998. Obviously, since I know the legal

¶34   definition of "income"; if I were to swear to having received

¶35   any other amount of "income" I would be committing perjury

¶36   …. Therefore, not wishing to commit perjury …, I can

¶37   only swear to having "zero" income for 1998.

¶38On June 14, 1999, respondent paid petitioner the $ 4,704.60 refund that she claimed in her 1998 return plus interest thereon.

¶39On February 4, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a notice of deficiency (notice) with respect to her taxable year 1998, which she received. In that notice, respondent determined a deficiency in, and an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) on, petitioner's tax for her taxable year 1998 in the respective amounts of $ 5,969 and $ 1,177.

¶40Petitioner did not file a petition in the Court with respect to the notice relating to her taxable year 1998. Instead, on April 15, 2000, in response to the notice, petitioner sent a letter (petitioner's April 15, 2000 letter) to the Internal Revenue Service. *66 That letter stated in pertinent part:

¶41     Your Deficiency Notice dated February 4, 2000.

¶42     First and foremost, be advised that this alleged deficiency

¶43   has been created out of thin air by the IRS from a return which

¶44   I submitted in a timely manner, a return which was reviewed by

¶45   the IRS and a refund issued, including interest paid for the

¶46   delay in refunding the amount to me. The IRS now attempts to

¶47   extort penalties and interest on top of the amount duly refunded

¶48   to me.

¶49     According to your "Deficiency Notice" of the above

¶50   date (cover sheet [page 1 of notice with respect to petitioner's

¶51   taxable year 1998] attached), there is an alleged deficiency

¶52   with respect to my 1998 income tax return of $ 7546.09, and if I

¶53   wanted to "contest this deficiency before making

¶54   payment," I must "file a petition with the United States

¶55   Tax Court." Before I file, pay, or do anything with respect

¶56   to your "Notice" I must first establish whether or not

¶57   it was sent pursuant to law, whether or not it has the

¶58   "force and effect of law," and whether*67 you had any

¶59   authority to send me the Notice in the first place.

¶60           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶61   Let me further point out that IRS Code Sections 6001 and 6011

¶62   (as identified in the 1040 Privacy Act) notifies me that I need

¶63   only "comply with regulations." Nothing in the

¶64   Privacy Act Notice or in the above statutes informs me that I

¶65   have to "comply" with, or pay attention to, letters

¶66   and/or alleged "determinations" sent to me by various

¶67   and sundry employees of the IRS .

¶68     Please note that Section 6212 states that "If the

¶69   Secretary determines that there is a deficiency in

¶70   respect of any tax . . . he is authorized to send notice of such

¶71   deficiency etc., etc., etc." However, the "Notice" I

¶72   received was not sent by the Secretary but by Deborah S. Decker

¶73   who is identified as being the Director of the IRS Service

¶74   Center in Ogden, Utah, and I have no way of knowing whether

¶75   he/she has been delegated by the Secretary to send out such

¶76   notices on the Secretary's behalf. So before I do anything at

¶77   all with*68 respect to your "Notice", I would have to see a

¶78   Delegation Order from the Secretary of the Treasury delegating

¶79   Deborah S. Decker the authority to send out Deficiency Notices.

¶80     In addition, I would also like you to send me (or identify

¶81   for me) the legislative regulations that you claim

¶82   implement Code Sections 6212 and 6213. I have also attached an

¶83   excerpt from the IRS Procedures Manual (MT 1218-196, at page P-

¶84   6-40) which points out that the IRS is required to "make

¶85   available to all taxpayers comprehensive, accurate, and timely

¶86   information on the requirements of tax law and regulations."

¶87   So, pursuant to this provision from your Procedures Manual, I am

¶88   asking that you identify (" make available") for me the

¶89   legislative regulations that you claim implement both Code

¶90   Section 6212 and 6213 -- since I haven't been able to locate

¶91   them.

¶92On July 17, 2000, respondent assessed a frivolous return penalty under section 6702 regarding petitioner's 1998 return.

¶93On July 24, 2000, respondent assessed petitioner's tax, as well as a penalty under section 6662(a) and interest as*69 provided by law, for her taxable year 1998. (We shall refer to those assessed amounts, as well as interest as provided by law accrued after July 24, 2000, as petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998.)

¶94On July 24, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a notice of balance due with respect to petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998.

¶95On October 12, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final notice of intent to levy and notice of your right to a hearing (notice of intent to levy) with respect to the frivolous return penalty under section 6702 regarding her 1998 return.

¶96On May 30, 2001, respondent issued to petitioner a notice of Federal tax lien and your right to a hearing (notice of tax lien) with respect to both petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998 and the frivolous return penalty under section 6702 regarding her 1998 return.

¶97On or about June 25, 2001, in response to the notice of intent to levy and the notice of tax lien, petitioner filed Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (Form 12153), and requested a hearing with respondent's Appeals Office (Appeals Office). Petitioner attached, inter alia, a seven-page document to her Form 12153 (petitioner's attachment*70 to her Form 12153). That document stated in pertinent part:

¶98     1. VERIFICATION FROM THE SECRETARY. First of

¶99   all, I expect you to have at the CDP hearing "verification

¶100   from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law

¶101   or administrative procedure have been met". That is the

¶102   specific statement from the Secretary (or his delegate) that THE

¶103   LAW requires you to have. Don't tell me at the CDP

¶104   hearing that in lieu of your having that specific statement from

¶105   the Secretary, you have some IRS transcript or printout that

¶106   "I may not understand". …

¶107     2. PROOF OF ASSESSMENT AND COPY OF RETURN SHOWING

¶108   OWED TAXES

¶109   Pursuant to Code Section 6201(1), before I can owe any income

¶110   taxes there has to be an assessment based on a "return or

¶111   list". I filed a return showing no taxes due, in fact a

¶112   return that showed a refund for which a refund check was

¶113   issued by the Internal Revenue Service, PLUS INTEREST!

¶114   Therefore, I do not see how the IRS could have made a lawful

¶115   assessment from a return showing no income taxes due and owing

¶116*71    unless the IRS prepared another 1040 showing a different

¶117   amount due. …

¶118           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶119     3. A COPY OF FORM 17, STATUTORY NOTICE OF

¶120   DEFICIENCY

¶121   I have never received a Statutory Notice of Deficiency, Form 17,

¶122   for payment of any 1998 income taxes.

¶123           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶124     4. I CLAIM THERE IS NO UNDERLYING, STATUTORY

¶125   LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCOME TAXES AT ISSUE.

¶126   I am challenging the "existence" of the underlying tax

¶127   liability as the law (Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B)) and regulation

¶128   (301.6330-1T-(3)) specifically permit me to do. …

¶129           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶130     5. I CLAIM THERE IS NO STATUTE REQUIRING ME "TO

¶131   PAY" THE INCOME TAXES AT ISSUE.

¶132   … it is my belief that there is no law requiring me "to

¶133   pay" income taxes …

¶134     6. NO LAW AUTHORIZES THE IRS TO CLAIM THAT I OWE MORE

¶135   IN INCOME TAXES THAN THE "ZERO" I REPORTED ON MY 1998

¶136   INCOME TAX RETURN.

¶137*72    … it is my contention that no law authorizes the Secretary

¶138   (let alone any IRS agent) to determine that I owe more in income

¶139   taxes that the "zero" I reported on my 1998 income tax

¶140   return. … [Reproduced literally.]

¶141On April 12, 2002, a settlement officer with respondent's Appeals Office (settlement officer) sent petitioner a letter. That letter stated in pertinent part:

¶142   I have scheduled the Collection Due Process hearing you

¶143   requested on this case for the time and date shown above [May

¶144   16, 2002]. …

¶145   Your request for a due process hearing was timely for the Letter

¶146   3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing, issue for the Form 1040

¶147   taxes for 1998 and for the civil penalty assessment for 1998.

¶148   Your request for a due process hearing for the Letter 1058,

¶149   Notice of Intent to Levy, on the civil penalty assessment for

¶150   1998 was not timely and therefore, you are entitled to an

¶151   equivalency hearing on this matter.

¶152   Appeals' jurisdiction to hear your case is specified in the

¶153Internal Revenue code, Sections 6320 and 6330, and the related

¶154*73 federal regulations. Appeals will consider the appropriateness

¶155   of the proposed collection action, spousal defenses, and

¶156   collection alternatives. If you received a statutory notice of

¶157   deficiency … you may not raise as an issue the amount or

¶158   existence of the underlying assessment. …

¶159   I am also enclosing Forms 2866, Certificate of Official Record,

¶160   and Forms 4340, Certificate of Assessment for the Form 1040

¶161   taxes for 1998 and for the civil penalty assessment under IRC

¶162   section 6702 for 1998. These documents meet the verification

¶163   requirements under IRC section 6330(c)(1). Your request for

¶164   additional information should be made under the

¶165   Freedom of Information Act through the Disclosure Officer located at the

¶166   Internal Revenue Service, 210 E. Earll, Phoenix, Arizona 85012.

¶167   I have reviewed the correspondence you attached to your request

¶168   for the collection due process hearing and would like to point

¶169   out that the courts have previously ruled against your

¶170   arguments, and in some instances, have imposed sanctions. I have

¶171   verified*74 the validity of the assessments through the review of

¶172   the complete computer transcripts, the tax return file and

¶173   related workpapers. I have no further legal obligation to

¶174   consider any challenge to the validity of the assessment in the

¶175   absence of independent proof that the assessment was defective

¶176   in some manner. I am hopeful that you wish to discuss legitimate

¶177   issues and alternatives for resolving your case at the upcoming

¶178   hearing. I will have the original tax return for 1998 available

¶179   for your review at the hearing, as well as the civil penalty

¶180   documentation.

¶181On May 3, 2002, respondent's settlement officer sent petitioner another letter (settlement officer's May 3, 2002 letter). That letter stated in pertinent part:

¶182   I am writing to you regarding the upcoming collection due

¶183   process hearing set for May 16, 2002 at 3:00 p.m. at the Las

¶184   Vegas Appeals Office.

¶185   You previously indicated in your correspondence that you

¶186   intended to audio record the hearing and have a court reporter

¶187   present. There has been a recent change in this practice for

¶188   hearings before*75 Appeals. Effective immediately audio and

¶189   stenographic recordings will no longer be allowed on Appeals

¶190   cases.

¶191   The recording of hearings has always been discretionary for

¶192   Appeals under IRC section 7521. Pursuant to a recent decision all

¶193   audio and stenographic recordings will be eliminated. You may

¶194   still have a witness present at the hearing; however, this

¶195   witness may not represent you or negotiate for you.

¶196On May 7, 2002, in response to the settlement officer's May 3, 2002 letter, petitioner sent the settlement officer a letter (petitioner's May 7, 2002 letter). That letter stated in pertinent part:

¶197   I am in receipt of your letter of May 3, 2002, in which you

¶198   attempt to deny me the right to record my hearing under IRC

¶199section 7521.

¶200           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶201   Who made this "recent decision", where is the

¶202   documentation? Where is the proof of legislative mandate

¶203   providing authority to make this change? Furthermore, under

¶204   whose authority is my Constitutional right to preserve testimony

¶205   for myself*76 being truncated? After all, I require an accurate

¶206   record of who said what and when.

¶207   The code quoted [section 7521] deals with "Procedures

¶208   involving taxpayer interviews". Are you then stating, by

¶209   quoting this code section, that you are only conducting an

¶210   "interview" and not a "hearing" as is my right

¶211   under the law? You are labeled as a "settlement

¶212   officer", not an "appeals officer". If you are

¶213   unable to show authority as an appeals officer, then I require

¶214   that you provide an appeals officer at the hearing who has the

¶215   authority to impartially decide the issues at hand. If this is

¶216   an "interview" which is conducted by exam and audit and

¶217   for which the code you quote would be correct, then I am not

¶218   receiving a hearing. If you claim this is a hearing, then an

¶219   appeals officer, with appropriate identification will need to be

¶220   present to conduct a true hearing, and the code you quote does

¶221   not apply.

¶222On May 13, 2002, in response to petitioner's May 7, 2002 letter, respondent's settlement officer sent petitioner a letter (settlement officer's May 13, 2002 letter). *77 That letter stated in pertinent part:

¶223   I am in receipt of your letter dated May 7, 2002 regarding the

¶224   change in procedures for the audio recording or stenographic

¶225   recording of Appeals hearings. I am enclosing a copy of the

¶226   memorandum dated May 2, 2002 per your request for documentation

¶227   of this change.

¶228   This will be a "hearing" and as a settlement officer I

¶229   have the same authority as an appeals officer to impartially

¶230   decide the issues at hand, as you stated in your letter.

¶231The copy of the memorandum referred to in the settlement officer's May 13, 2002 letter, which the settlement officer enclosed with that letter, stated in pertinent part:

¶232   Effective immediately, audio and stenographic recordings will no

¶233   longer be allowed on Appeals cases. Taxpayers and/or

¶234   representatives who have already requested such recordings will

¶235   be informed of the change in practice immediately, and advised

¶236   that their request cannot be allowed.

¶237   BACKGROUND

¶238   Prior to enactment of IRC 7521, Service Compliance functions

¶239   voluntarily allowed audio recordings.*78 Appeals decided to follow

¶240   this practice at that time. IRC 7521, enacted in 1988, provided

¶241   for the allowance of audio recordings of conferences relative to

¶242   the determination or collection of a tax, between the taxpayer

¶243   and the Internal Revenue Service, provided that the Service was

¶244   given at least ten (10) days advance notice of the taxpayer's

¶245   intent to record the conference.

¶246   Although Appeals makes liability and collectibility

¶247   determinations, Appeals' procedures differ from Examination and

¶248   Collection function contacts that are not discretionary for the

¶249   taxpayer. Contact with Appeals is discretionary for the

¶250   taxpayer, and as such, recording has always been discretionary

¶251   for Appeals. …

¶252On May 16, 2002, respondent's settlement officer held an Appeals Office hearing with petitioner with respect to the notice of tax lien. 2 Although petitioner knew that the Appeals Office no longer allowed audio recordings of Appeals Office hearings, petitioner secretly made an audio recording of her Appeals Office hearing. At the Appeals Office hearing, the settlement officer*79 gave petitioner Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters (Form 4340), with respect to her taxable year 1998.

¶253On July 11, 2002, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner a notice of determination concerning collection action(s) under section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) with respect to petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998 (notice of determination with respect to petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998). 3 An attachment to that notice stated in pertinent part:

¶254*80    Verification of Legal and Procedural Requirements

¶255   The Secretary has provided sufficient verification that the

¶256   requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure

¶257   have been met.

¶258   Certified account transcripts, Forms 4340, were requested and

¶259   reviewed along with the administrative return file for 1998,

¶260   which included the civil penalty work papers. …

¶261           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶262     The collection due process and equivalency hearings were

¶263   held on May 16, 2002 …. The taxpayer was advised prior to

¶264   the hearing by letter that no audio recording or stenographic

¶265   recording of the hearing would be permitted per a directive

¶266   issued by the Acting Chief of Appeals dated May 2, 2002.

¶267   Settlement Officer Rene Swall has had no prior involvement with

¶268   respect to these liabilities.

¶269   Issues Raised by the Taxpayer

¶270   The taxpayer checked both blocks on the Form 12153 and states,

¶271   "see attached letter". Attached is a copy of the Notice

¶272   of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL), the Letter 3172, and*81 several pages

¶273   of non-filer arguments. As part of the taxpayer's argument, she

¶274   asks for verification from the secretary, proof of the

¶275   assessments, [and] a copy of the statutory notice of deficiency.

¶276   The taxpayer further claims that there is no underlying

¶277   statutory liability in connection with the income taxes at

¶278   issue, that there is no statute requiring her to pay the taxes

¶279   at issue, and that no law authorizes the Service to claim that

¶280   she owes more income tax than the "zero" reported on her

¶281   return. In addition the taxpayer states that she did not receive

¶282   a notice and demand for payment per IRC section 6331.

¶283   Certified transcripts, Forms 4340, for both periods were

¶284   provided to the taxpayer prior to the hearing. The taxpayer was

¶285   advised by letter that these transcripts meet the verification

¶286   requirements under IRC section 6330(c)(1). …

¶287   At the hearing the taxpayer raised the issue of audio recording

¶288   and was advised again that the audio recording would not be

¶289   allowed. …

¶290*82       *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶291   I attempted to review the Form 4340 transcripts and the

¶292   administrative file with the taxpayer, which included the tax

¶293   return filed and the statutory notice of deficiency that was

¶294   sent and received. The taxpayer stated that what I provided her

¶295   as evidence of the statutory notice of deficiency was only a

¶296   "letter". The taxpayer was advised that she could not

¶297   raise the issue of the underlying liability as she had received

¶298   the statutory notice of deficiency, and had in fact responded to

¶299   it with additional frivolous arguments. The taxpayer is now

¶300   precluded from raising this issue at the collection due process

¶301   hearing. Collection alternatives could not be discussed with the

¶302   taxpayer, as the taxpayer is not in filing compliance, nor did

¶303   the taxpayer attempt to complete the financial statement that

¶304   was mailed to her prior to the hearing. The taxpayer asked for

¶305   the cite that makes her liable to pay the taxes and continued to

¶306   raise only frivolous arguments. The hearing was concluded.

¶307   The taxpayer does not*83 believe that wages are income or that the

¶308   tax laws apply to her. I advised the taxpayer of recent court

¶309   case decisions where sanctions were imposed for bringing the

¶310   same type of arguments and attempted to provide the taxpayer

¶311   with copies of recent cases on T. Pierson and R.

¶312   Davis as well as Publication 2105, Why Do I Have to Pay

¶313   Taxes, and a handout, The Truth About Frivolous Tax Arguments.

¶314   The taxpayer refused to accept these from me.

¶315           *   *   *   *   *   *   *

¶316   The taxpayer raised no other non-frivolous issues.

¶317   Balancing the Need for Efficient Collection with Taxpayer

¶318   Concerns

¶319   The requirements of all applicable laws and administrative

¶320   procedures have been met. The courts have previously addressed

¶321   the taxpayers' arguments, and Appeals does not have the

¶322   authority for reconsideration of the matters. The assessments

¶323   are valid and the Service followed proper procedures in making

¶324   these assessments. For the civil penalty to apply the

¶325   individual's conduct must be due in part to a position, which is

¶326*84    frivolous, or a desire (which appears on the return) to delay or

¶327   impede the administration of Federal income tax laws. Income

¶328   reported to the Service verifies that the taxpayer had

¶329   sufficient income that would require her to file a return. The

¶330   taxpayer was provided an opportunity to file a correct return,

¶331   but instead responded with frivolous arguments. The taxpayer

¶332   received her required notices. The filing of the NFTL was

¶333   appropriate to protect the Government's interest. In addition,

¶334   the issuance of the notice of intent to levy was appropriate on

¶335   the civil penalty assessment. No collection alternatives could

¶336   be discussed as the taxpayer is not in filing compliance and the

¶337   taxpayer only continued to raise frivolous arguments.

¶338   Given the taxpayer's history of non-compliance, I believe that

¶339   collection action in the form of levy should be allowed to

¶340   proceed. Lacking the taxpayer's cooperation, the proposed

¶341   collection action balances the need for efficient collection of

¶342   taxes with the taxpayer's legitimate concern that any collection

¶343   action be*85 no more intrusive than necessary.

¶344             Discussion

¶345The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. 4Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the questions raised in respondent's motion.

¶346*86With respect to petitioner's taxable year 1998, petitioner received a notice of deficiency, but she did not file a petition with respect to that notice. On the instant record, we find that petitioner may not challenge the existence or the amount of petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998. See sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610-611 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182-183 (2000).

¶347Where, as is the case here, the validity of the underlying tax liability is not properly placed at issue, the Court will review the determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 181-182.

¶348As was true of petitioner's attachment to her 1998 return, petitioner's April 15, 2000 letter, petitioner's attachment to her Form 12153, and petitioner's May 7, 2002 letter, petitioner's response contains contentions, arguments, statements, and requests that the Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless. To illustrate, petitioner appears to argue that she did not receive proper notice and demand under section 6303(a) because, according*87 to petitioner, respondent must use Form 17 in issuing such notice and demand.

¶349We reject petitioner's argument that respondent did not issue the notice and demand required by section 6303(a). Form 4340 with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1998 shows that respondent sent petitioner a notice of balance due on July 24, 2000, the same day on which respondent assessed petitioner's tax, as well as any penalties and interest as provided by law, for her taxable year 1998. A notice of balance due constitutes the notice and demand for payment under section 6303(a). Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262-263 (2002). Respondent is not required to use Form 17 as the notice and demand for payment. E.g., Keene v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-277; Tapio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-141.

¶350As a further illustration of the frivolous and/or groundless nature of petitioner's position in this case, petitioner contends in petitioner's response that the settlement officer failed to obtain verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met, as required by section 6330(c)(1). In this regard, petitioner contends*88 that the settlement officer improperly relied on Form 4340 to meet the verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1).

¶351The record establishes that the settlement officer obtained verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure were met, and we reject petitioner's contention to the contrary. As for the settlement officer's reliance on Form 4340, at the Appeals Office hearing, the settlement officer relied on, and gave petitioner, Form 4340 with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1998. Section 6330(c)(1) does not require the settlement officer to rely on a particular document to satisfy the verification requirement imposed by that section. Craig v. Commissioner, supra at 261-262. Nor does section 6330(c)(1) require the settlement officer to provide petitioner with a copy of the verification upon which the settlement officer relied. 119 T.C. at 262. Form 4340 is a valid verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. Id. Petitioner has not shown any irregularity in respondent's assessment procedure that would raise a question about the validity of the assessment*89 or the information contained in Form 4340 with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1998. We hold that the assessment with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1998 was valid and that the settlement officer satisfied the verification requirement of section 6330(c)(1). See id.5

¶352Based upon our examination of the entire record before us, we find that respondent did not abuse respondent's discretion in determining to proceed with the collection action*90 as determined in the notice of determination with respect to petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998.

¶353In respondent's motion, respondent requests that the Court require petitioner to pay a penalty to the United States pursuant to section 6673(a)(1). Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty in an amount not to exceed $ 25,000 whenever it appears to the Court, inter alia, that a proceeding before it was instituted or maintained primarily for delay, sec. 6673(a)(1)(A), or that the taxpayer's position in such a proceeding is frivolous or groundless, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B).

¶354In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000), we issued an unequivocal warning to taxpayers concerning the imposition of a penalty under section 6673(a) on those taxpayers who abuse the protections afforded by sections 6320 and 6330 by instituting or maintaining actions under those sections primarily for delay or by taking frivolous or groundless positions in such actions. 6

¶355*91 In the instant case, petitioner advances, we believe primarily for delay, frivolous and/or groundless contentions, arguments, statements, and requests, thereby causing the Court to waste its limited resources. We shall impose a penalty on petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) in the amount of $ 1,500.

¶356We have considered all of petitioner's contentions, arguments, statements, and requests that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit and/or irrelevant.

¶357To reflect the foregoing,

¶358An appropriate order granting respondent's motion and decision will be entered for respondent.


Footnotes

  • ¶3591. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩

  • ¶3602. On May 16, 2002, respondent's settlement officer also held an equivalent hearing with petitioner with respect to the notice of intent to levy.↩

  • ¶3613. On July 11, 2002, the Appeals Office also issued to petitioner (1) a notice of determination with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner's 1998 return and (2) a decision letter concerning equivalent hearing under sec. 6320 and/or 6330↩ (decision letter) with respect to the notice of intent to levy issued to petitioner with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner's 1998 return (decision letter with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner's 1998 return).

  • ¶3624. The only questions raised in respondent's motion relate to petitioner's unpaid liability for 1998 over which we have jurisdiction and do not relate to the frivolous return penalty regarding her 1998 return over which we do not have jurisdiction. In this connection, on Feb. 6, 2003, the Court issued an Order granting respondent's motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction insofar as petitioner sought review of either the notice of determination with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner's 1998 return or the decision letter with respect to the frivolous return penalty regarding petitioner's 1998 return.↩

  • ¶3635. In petitioner's response, petitioner also argues that "Appeals personnel denied Petitioner the right to protect her rights in total disregard for the Taxpayer Bill of Rights↩, Publication 1 and Petitioner's constitutional right to protect oneself." That is because, according to petitioner, the Appeals Office denied her request to record her Appeals Office hearing. However, petitioner admits that she "did in fact tape the CDP hearing", and we shall not address petitioner's argument about the Appeals Office's refusal to permit her to record her Appeals Office hearing.

  • ¶3646. The record in this case reflects that the settlement officer attempted to give petitioner, inter alia, a copy of the Court's opinion in Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576↩ (2000), which she refused to accept.

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