Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1. Oral and written directions must be given to all staff members that the attorney will not participate in any matter in which the attorney participated as a public defender or criminal defense attorney. A written ' screening policy must be put in place to ensure this requirement is met. 2. A letter should be directed to every former client of the attorney announcing the new employment relationship. This letter may be sent to ■ the client, care of the client’s current attorney. Ideally, this letter should appear in the court record of an affected criminal case. 3. -The prosecuting attorney’s screening policy should be sent to every •judge in the district, circuit, and/or county affected. 4. A: copy of the screening policy should be placed in every active case file in ¡which the .attorney participated. * 5. Alb office employees should be advised both orally and in writing that . any violation of the screening process must be reported immediately and that inattention to the screening policy will result in discipline. 6. In a prominent location near case files, post a list of all cases from which the attorney is to be screened. 13”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. David Calhoun v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · Hart v. State

2. “(Emphasis added.) The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bear Cloud v. State · David Michael Norgaard

3. “In assaying the Batchelder reasoning, it is useful to think about three types of situations in which a defendant’s conduct may fall within two statutes. They are: ' (1) where one statute defines a lesser included offense of the other and they carry different penalties (e.g., whoever carries a concealed weapon is guilty of a misdemeanor; a convicted felon who carries a concealed weapon is guilty of a felony); (2) where the statutes overlap and carry different penalties (e.g., possession of a gun by a convicted felon, illegal alien or dishonorably discharged serviceman is a misdemeanor; possession of a gun by a convicted felon, fugitive from justice, or unlawful user of narcotics is a felony); (3) where the statutes are identical (e.g., possession of a gun by a convicted felon is a misdemeanor; possession of a gun by a convicted felon is a felony). The Court in Batchelder had before it a situation falling into the second category, but [it] seems to have concluded that the three statutory schemes [were] indistinguishable for purposes of constitutional analysis. But in terms of either the difficulties which are confronted at the legislative level in drafting statutes or in the guidance which is given to a prosecutor by the legislation, the three schemes are markedly different. The first of the three is certainly unobjectionable. Such provisions are quite common (robbery-armed robbery; bat tery-aggravated battery; joyriding-theft; housebreaking-burglary), and usually are a consequ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Williams