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← 2004 ND 48 - State v. Bergstrom

State v. Bergstrom’s Empirical Analysis

2004

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
1
states following
March 2024
most recently cited

14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently March 2024

14 state decisions

60200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Barker v. Wingo · State v. Erickson · State v. Murchison · State v. Backlund · State v. Matthews

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 859 (N.D. 1976), this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which is used to evaluate the validity of a speedy trial claim under the United States Constitution, and now, the North Dakota Constitution, and the North Dakota statute. N.D.C.C. § 29-01-06(5). The test requires balancing four factors: length of the delay, reason for the delay, proper assertion of the right, and actual prejudice to the accused. State v. Murchison, 541 N.W.2d 435, 438 (N.D. 1995) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-33 [, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ]). In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court of the United States held: We regard none of the four factors identified above as either -a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused’s interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted); see also State v. Johnson, 1999 ND 33, ¶ 21 , 590 N.W.2d 192 .”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[W]e defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We affirm the district court’s decision unless, after ‘ resolving conflicting evidence in favor of affirmance, we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.