¶1Concurring.
¶2¶ 1 I join the opinion of the majority. I write separately only to emphasize my view that a defendant may have standing to challenge the authority of his arresting officer when qualification-based requirements such as training requirements have not been met.
¶3¶ 2 The majority applies the de facto doctrine discussed in Commonwealth v. Pontious, 396 Pa.Super. 15, 578 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1990) (en banc). The majority states:
In the instant case, Officer Musial had de facto authority to conduct a lawful arrest of Appellee. See id.He had completed all the necessary training for police officers in this jurisdiction. We reject the notion that the “hiring” issue in Pontius is distinguishable from the “certification” issue under review, for purposes of a challenge to Appellee’s arrest. The hiring provision in Pontius and the certification provision in the present case are both in the nature of civil service requirements. Whether Officer Musial was “certified” under 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2167 does not substantially, directly, and immediately affect Appel-lee’s individual constitutional rights.
¶4Slip Opinion at 10-11.
¶5¶ 3 I fully agree with that statement, so far as it goes. I would add that, in my view, Pontius should not be interpreted to deny standing in all cases where an arresting officer has defacto authority to enforce the law. I believe that a defendant might have standing when his challenge to the officer’s authority is more than a “technical defect in title to office.” In my view, therefore, if training rather than certification were the issue in this case, Pontiouswould not apply to deny a defendant standing to challenge an officer’s actions as invading the defendant’s individual rights. See, Commonwealth v. J.H., 563 Pa. 248, 759 A.2d 1269, 1271 (2000); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 789 A.2d 266, 269-70 (Pa.Super.2001). See also, Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 643 A.2d 61, 68 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995).
¶6114 In Appellee’s case, the officer’s technical defect (ie., lack of certification) was not qualification-based, as the officer had received the requisite training. On the other hand, had the officer failed to complete the requisite training requirements, the defect would have been qualification-based. Then, I suggest, Pontius would not necessarily preclude Appellant from having standing.
¶7¶ 5 For these reasons, I join the majority and write to amplify my understanding of the majority opinion.