Reaser v. Reaser’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Here, under Judge Delaney’s findings, the actions of these parties and the attorney are egregious conduct involving corruption of the judicial process itself. Considering those findings, this fraudulent conduct may have violated a criminal statute, and it certainly violated the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys. * * * Moreover, under the trial court’s findings, Ortner’s preparation of, and participation in, the concealment of the private agreement violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. “Because the courts of this state must rely upon the assistance of attorneys to ascertain the truth of matters before them, attorneys must be fair and forthright with the courts.” Matter of Discipline of Mines, 523 N.W.2d 424, 426 (S.D.1994) (citing Matter of Discipline of Schmidt, 491 N.W.2d 754, 755 (S.D.1992)). Moreover, “the requirement of candor towards the tribunal goes beyond simply telling a portion of the truth. It requires every attorney to be fully honest and forthright.” In re Discipline of Wilka, 2001 SD 148, ¶ 15 , 638 N.W.2d 245, 249 . It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Mines, 523 N.W.2d at 426 . Ortner’s conduct appears to violate that duty of candor toward the court. Rule 3.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part that: (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: [[Image here]] (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re the Discipline of Ortner

2. “This type of fraud is different than that associated with fraud upon the parties. ‘Fraud upon the court’ should, we believe, embrace only that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication ... In addition, it has been said that ‘[i]n order to set aside a judgment or order because of fraud upon the court under Rule 60(b), ... it is necessary to show an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.’ Courts have found fraud upon the court only where there has been the most egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself. Examples are bribery of judges, employment of counsel to ‘influence’ the court, bribery of the jury, and the involvement of an attorney (an officer of the court) in the perpetration of fraud.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re the Discipline of Ortner

3. “trial court is restrained from entering any order that would change or modify the judgment on appeal or have the effect of interfering with review of the judgment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tosh v. Schwab