Easum v. Miller’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]e do not believe that a medical expert must always cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness. To so hold would doom from the outset all cases in which the state of research on the specific ailment or on the alleged causal agent was in its early stages, and would effectively resurrect a Frye-like bright-line standard, not by requiring that a methodology be 'generally accepted,' but by excluding expert testimony not backed by published (and presumably peer-reviewed) studies. In the actual practice of medicine, physicians do not wait for conclusive, or even published and peer-reviewed, studies to make diagnoses to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Such studies of course help them to make various diagnoses or to rule out prior diagnoses that the studies call into question. However, experience with hundreds of patients, discussions with peers, attendance at conferences and seminars, detailed review of a patient's family, personal, and medical histories, and thorough physical examinations are the tools of the trade, and should suffice for the making of a differential diagnosis even in those cases in which peer-reviewed studies do not exist to confirm the diagnosis of the physician.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. McMullen

2. “In general terms, the reliability of differential diagnos[i]s is easily resolved. "Most circuits have held that a reliable differential diagnosis satisfies Daubert and provides a valid foundation for admitting an expert opinion. The cireuits reason that a differential diagnosis is a tested methodology, has been subjected to peer review/publication, does not frequently lead to incorrect results, and is generally accepted in the medical community." Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir.2000); see Westberry [v. Gislaved Gummi AB], 178 F.3d [257,] 262-63 [ (4th Cir.1999)]. Physicians routinely determine medical causation by this technique, and we have previously determined that the technique of differential diagnosis for establishing causation can be reliable under Daubert. See Reichert v. Phipps, 2004 WY 7, ¶ 18 , 84 P.3d 353, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2004).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Steven F. Ludlow

3. “A qualified expert witness may testify about scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge if such testimony will help the jury understand the case. W.R.E. 702. When determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the district court's gatek-eeping function requires it to determine whether the methodology or technique used by the expert to reach his conclusions is reliable and, if so, the court must then determine whether the proposed testimony "fits" the facts of the particular case. Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Wyo.1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-93 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Steven F. Ludlow