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2005 Pa. Super. 116

874 A.2d 49

Commonwealth v. Gallagher

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Decided March 30, 2005

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Superior Court of Pennsylvania · decided 2005-03-30

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently October 2015

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“As the trial court noted, the statute sub judice does not specifically provide a mistake of age defense. However, that omission does not absolve the Commonwealth of its burden to prove that Appellant possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the crime. Applying § 302, we hold that the Commonwealth was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant either intentionally sought out the complainant because he was under the age of 18, knew the complainant was under the age of 18, or, at the very least, was reckless as to the complainant’s age. Although the trial court states in its Opinion that “the evidence, in no uncertain terms, clearly establishes that [Appellant] was fully aware of the fact that his young companion was a minor,” (Trial Ct. Op. at 7), this finding is contradicted by the Appellant’s acquittal on the charge of corruption of minors based on his testimony that he reasonably believed [the minor child/victim] to be over the age of 18. Indeed, a photograph of the victim at the time of the incident included among the trial exhibits makes evident why the trial judge would credit Appellant’s mistake of age defense. This credibility determination makes ludicrous the court’s subsequent finding that Appellant “knew he was dealing with a minor.” (Id.). Moreover, the fact that Appellant may have learned later in the evening that [the minor child/victim] was only 17 years old is irrelevant. By that time, [the minor child/victim] had already entered Appellant’s ”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 2006 Pa. Super. 273 - Commonwealth v. Strouse

Relies on 436 Pa. Super. 569 - Commonwealth v. Figueroa

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2005-03-30

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

STEVENS, J.,

¶1Dissenting.:

¶2¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s judgment of sentence on Appellant’s conviction for luring a child into a motor vehicle.

¶3¶ 2 The offense of luring a child into a motor vehicle is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2910, which provides that: “A person who lures a child into a motor vehicle without the consent, express or implied, of the child’s parent or guardian, unless the circumstances reasonably indicate the child is in need of assistance, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2910. In Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 436 Pa.Super. 569, 648 A.2d 555 (1994), this Court, in analyzing § 2910, stated that:

*66[CJriminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a criminal offense, though the legislature may define a crime so that proof of criminal intent or guilty knowledge is unnecessary. In such case, the culpability or mens rea is established by proof that the person acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
The gravamen of the present crime is luring a child into a motor vehicle. We have stated above that inviting the children into [an individual’s] car with a promise of a ride to school or the bus stop ... is sufficient to meet the prohibition of the statute. This knowing conduct we believe meets the requirement of culpability. That there may have been no intent to harm is not relevant since this is not a requirement of the act.

¶4Id. at 557-558.

¶5¶ 3 As noted by the majority, in interpreting § 2910, the FigueroaCourt imputed strict liability -with respect to the intent to harm. I would also impute strict liability to the age element in that the statute at issue does not specifically provide a mistake of age defense. In order to give full effect to the intention of the Legislature, I would find that luring a child into a motor vehicle is a strict liability offense, which may be committed regardless of a defendant’s motive, and that the Act does not require a showing of intent to harm. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

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