2005 Pa. Super. 156 - Commonwealth v. Hill’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “' A primary purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 is to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Not-every encounter between citizens and the police is.so intrusive as to amount to a “seizure” triggering constitutional concerns. See Commonwealth v. Boswell, 554 Pa. 275 , 721 A.2d 336, 340 (1998) (opinion in support of affirmance) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). This Court has noted that there are three basic categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first category, a mere encounter or request for information, does not need to be supported by any level of suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second category, an investigative detention, derives from Terry and its progeny: such a detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion because, although it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, it does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. The final category, the arrest or custodial detention, must be supported by probable cause.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2005 Pa. Super. 372 - Commonwealth v. Sands · 2010 Pa. Super. 217 - Commonwealth v. Cauley

2. “The Commonwealth’s reliance on Joho-noson is misplaced. Unlike the driver in that case, who was traveling well below the speed limit on a rural road at 3:00 a.m. with his hazard lights activated, Appellee did nothing more than pull his truck to the side -of the road in an effort to allow another motorist to pass. Appellee had no reason to expect that a police officer would stop to render aid. Indeed, Appellee testified that when the oncoming vehicle pulled in behind him, he considered leaving until Trooper Koebley activated his overhead flashing lights. More importantly, however, Officer Nuhfer conceded on cross-examination that Appellee was not free to terminate the encounter once Trooper Koebley activated his overhead lights, stating, “Once the emergency lights were activated ... [Appellee] would have been required to stay stopped.” ... Hence, the record fully supports the suppression court’s determination that the initial interaction amounted to a seizure rather than a mere encounter.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2007 Pa. Super. 407 - Commonwealth v. Fuller

3. “Where a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings. Where, as here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradict-ed. Moreover, if the evidence when so viewed supports the factual findings of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2009 Pa. Super. 67 - Commonwealth v. Basking