2005 Pa. Super. 405 - Commonwealth v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Appellant’s entire argument depends upon an assumptión for which there is no evidence in the record, i.e. that the victim scratched her assailant, thereby acquiring fragments of skin or droplets of blood from the assailant on her fingernails. Based on this assumption, appellant contends that the DNA profile obtained by testing the victim’s fingernails will identify her assailant. In the absence of supporting evidence, we cannot accept appellant’s premise. We have no evidentiary basis on which to infer that any DNA detected on the victim’s fingernails was deposited there by her assailant during the fatal attack. Merely detecting DNA from another individual on the victim’s fingernails, in the absence of any evidence as to how and when that DNA was deposited, would not exculpate appellant by pointing to a different assailant. To support his speculation that the assailant’s DNA was deposited onto the victim’s fingernails, appellant relies on the fact that the victim sustained defensive wounds on her hands and fingers during the fatal attack by the knife-wielding assailant. From the defensive wounds, appellant infers that the victim tried to fight off her assailant by scratching him, thereby resulting in a deposition of the assailant’s skin cells or blood on her fingernails. However, appellant’s inference from the defensive wounds goes far beyond any testimony presented at trial. The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy of the victim’s body testified that her defensive w”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2011 Pa. Super. 7 - Commonwealth v. Conway

2. ““(a) Motion. “(1) An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a court of this Commonwealth and serving a term of imprisonment or awaiting execution because of a sentence of death may apply by making a written motion to the sentencing court for the performance of forensic DNA testing on specific evidence that is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction. “(2) The evidence may have been discovered either prior to or after the applicant’s conviction. The evidence shall be available for testing as of the date of the motion. If the evidence was discovered prior to the applicant’s conviction, the evidence shall not have been subject to the DNA testing requested because the technology for testing was not in existence at the time of the trial or the applicant’s counsel did not seek testing at the time of the trial in a case where a verdict was rendered on or before January 1, 1995, or the applicant’s counsel sought funds from the court to pay for the testing because his client was indigent and the court refused the request despite the client’s indigency. “(c) Requirements. In any motion under subsection (a), under penalty of perjury, the applicant shall: “(l)(i) specify the evidence to be tested; “(ii) state that the applicant consents to provide samples of bodily fluid for use in the DNA testing; and “(iii) acknowledge that the applicant understands that, if the motion is granted, any data obtained from any DNA samples or test resul”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Hadjar

3. “[T]he legislature delineated a clear standard — and in fact delineated certain portions of the standard twice. Under section 9543.1(c)(3), the petitioner is required to present a prima facie case that the requested DNA testing, assuming it gives exculpatory results, would establish the petitioner’s actual innocence of the crime. Under section 9543.1(d)(2), the court is directed not to order the testing if it determines, after review of the trial record, that there is no reasonable possibility that the testing would produce exculpatory evidence to establish petitioner’s actual innocence. From the clear words and plain meaning of these provisions, there can be no mistake that the burden lies with the petitioner to make a prima facie case that favorable results from the requested DNA testing would establish his innocence. We note that the statute does not require petitioner to show that the DNA testing results would be favorable. However, the court is required to review not only the motion [for DNA testing], but also the trial record, and then make a determination as to whether there is a reasonable possibility that DNA testing would produce exculpatory evidence that would establish petitioner’s actual innocence. We find no ambiguity in the standard established by the legislature with the words of this statute.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2011 Pa. Super. 275 - Commonwealth v. Williams