Croft v . Coplan 04-CV-328-SM 06/14/06
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Sean Croft,
Plaintiff
v. Civil N o . 04-cv-328-SM
Opinion N o . 2006 DNH 067
Jane Coplan,
Defendant
O R D E R
Plaintiff, Sean Croft, is a state inmate, currently being
housed in a correctional facility in Colorado. Pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, he brings this action against Jane Coplan, the
former warden of the New Hampshire State Prison in Concord, New
Hampshire (“NHSP”). Croft claims Coplan orchestrated his
transfer to an out-of-state correctional facility in a deliberate
effort to hinder his ability to pursue a then-pending state court
petition to reduce his sentence. In other words, he says
defendant intentionally interfered with his constitutionally
protected right to access New Hampshire’s state courts. He seeks
a judicial order directing his transfer back to New Hampshire, as
well as $1,009,500.00 in damages, representing $100 for each day
of the three years he claims to have suffered injury. Defendant
denies and wrongdoing and moves for summary judgment. Croft
objects.
For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that
there are no genuinely disputed issues of material fact and
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
When ruling on a party’s motion for summary judgment, the
court must “view the entire record in the light most hospitable
to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan v . Smith, 904
F.2d 1 1 2 , 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the record reveals “no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In this context, “a fact is
‘material’ if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and
a dispute over it is ‘genuine’ if the parties’ positions on the
issue are supported by conflicting evidence.” Intern’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v . Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,
103
F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, if the non-moving party’s “evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative,” no genuine dispute
as to a material fact has been proved, and “summary judgment may
be granted.” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 249-
2
50 (1986) (citations omitted). As the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit has observed, “the evidence illustrating the
factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must
have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of
the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.
Conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation will not suffice.” Cadle C o . v . Hayes, 116 F.3d 9 5 7 ,
960 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Coyne v . City of Somerville,
972 F.2d 4 4 0 ,
444-45 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[T]hough for pleading purposes the line
between sufficient facts and insufficient conclusions is often
blurred, we nonetheless require that it be plotted.”) (citation
and internal punctuation omitted).
The key, then, to defeating a properly supported motion for
summary judgment is the non-movant’s ability to support his or
her claims concerning disputed material facts with evidence that
conflicts with that proffered by the moving party. See generally
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). It naturally follows that while a
reviewing court must take into account all properly documented
facts, it may ignore bald assertions, unsupported conclusions,
and mere speculation. See Serapion v . Martinez, 119 F.3d 9 8 2 ,
987 (1st Cir. 1997).
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Background
In May of 1995, Croft was sentenced to seven and one-half to
fifteen years in prison for conspiracy to commit burglary, and a
consecutive ten to twenty years for first degree assault. During
his period of incarceration in the state prison system, Croft has
accumulated an extensive disciplinary record. He acknowledges
that he has received more than 100 disciplinary citations, though
he says most were for “minor infractions, mainly tattooing.”
Plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 14-2) at 3 . He does,
however, admit that several involved more serious charges such as
weapons possession and drug use. Id.
In light of Croft’s disciplinary record, on June 6, 2000, he
was transferred to a correctional facility in Massachusetts under
the Interstate Compact System. In 2001, Croft requested a
transfer back to New Hampshire on grounds that his behavior had
improved and because he wished to be closer to friends and
family. That request was granted and he was transferred to the
New Hampshire correctional facility in Berlin. Shortly
thereafter, however, Croft’s behavioral problems re-emerged.
Among other things, he received major disciplinary citations for
assaulting a staff member, interfering with a cell search, and
possession of drugs. Soon after that, he tested positive for the
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presence of opiates. He was then transferred from the Berlin
facility back to the NHSP in Concord and his status was upgraded
to C-4 (close custody). While at the NHSP, Croft’s behavioral
problems continued and he was periodically transferred back and
forth between C-4 and C-5 custody (also known as the Special
Housing Unit, the most secure unit at the NHSP).
On October 2 8 , 2002, a classification review team was again
convened to review Croft’s status. After considering the
findings and recommendations of that group, Kimberly Lacasse, the
Director of Classifications for the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections, concluded that Croft should again be transferred to
an out-of-state correctional facility. See Lacasse affidavit,
Exhibit A to defendant’s memorandum (document n o . 13-3) at para.
11. Gregory Crompton, acting as defendant’s designee, approved
that decision. Id. Accordingly, Denise Heath, the Interstate
Compact Coordinator, contacted several states to determine if
they would be willing to accept Croft. All but Colorado refused.
Seeking to prevent his impending transfer, Croft filed a petition
for habeas corpus in state court. After conducting a hearing on
the matter, the court denied Croft’s petition on December 2 0 ,
2002. Exhibit A to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 3 ) .
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On that same day - December 2 0 , 2002 - Croft filed a motion
in state court seeking a reduction in his sentence. The State
received notice of that motion in mid-January and objected to any
change in Croft’s sentence, citing, among other things, his
lengthy and serious disciplinary record while in prison. Exhibit
C to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 5 ) . In March of
2003, while that motion was still pending, Croft was transferred
to a correctional facility in Colorado, where he is presently
incarcerated.
Approximately two months later, on May 7 , 2003, the state
court issued an order scheduling a 15 minute hearing for May 1 3 ,
2003, on Croft’s pending motion for sentence reduction. The
court also directed the State to arrange for his presence at that
hearing. Exhibit D to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 14-
6). It appears the court was operating under the mistaken
impression that Croft was still being housed in Concord, at the
NHSP. See id. at 2 . And, perhaps due to the limited amount of
time to make travel arrangements, the State failed to produce
Croft for the hearing. Nevertheless, the State acknowledges that
it was responsible for insuring Croft’s presence at the hearing
and does not attempt to offer any excuse for its failure to meet
that obligation.
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Defendant, however, says she was completely unaware of the
court’s order directing the State to produce Croft for the
hearing or that the State failed to comply with that order.
Moreover, she says that if she had been aware of the court’s
transportation order, she would have made arrangements to get
Croft to that hearing and/or sought additional time from the
court to comply with it’s directive. Coplan affidavit, Exhibit B
to defendant’s memorandum (document n o . 13-4) at para. 1 1 .
Given Croft’s absence, the court issued an order continuing
the hearing on his motion for sentence reduction for
approximately 60 days, unless the court ruled on the merits of
the motion prior to then. Exhibit E to plaintiff’s memorandum
(document n o . 1 4 - 7 ) . Subsequently, the Clerk of the Court
scheduled the hearing on Croft’s motion for the latter part of
July. Accordingly, on May 1 9 , 2003, M s . Heath contacted the
Colorado Department of Corrections to inquire about the
possibility of arranging a video-conference link for the July
hearing, so Croft might be heard without the need to transport
him back to New Hampshire. Those efforts were, however, soon
rendered moot.
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On May 2 2 , 2003, the state court issued an order denying
Croft’s motion on the merits, based upon the written submissions.
Among other things, the court concluded that Croft’s record while
an inmate “includes a lengthy disciplinary record and does not
support any change in the sentence. Under these facts any
modification or reduction [in his sentence] is not appropriate.”
Exhibit F to plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 1 4 - 8 ) . In
light of that decision, the court cancelled the previously
scheduled hearing for July 2 3 .
Reduced to its essence, Croft’s complaint asserts that,
while the decision to transfer him to an out-of-state
correctional facility may have been made in October of 2002, by
January of 2003, defendant knew that he had filed a motion with
the state court seeking a reduction in his sentence.
Accordingly, says Croft, at that point defendant should have
recognized that transferring him to another state might interfere
with his efforts to secure a reduced sentence and, therefore, she
should have cancelled the plans to transfer him. He also
complains that once his transfer to Colorado was complete, the
State failed to arrange for his transportation back to New
Hampshire for the original court hearing on his motion - a
failure he attributes to defendant. He claims that if he had
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been present for that hearing, he would have been able to testify
on his own behalf, as well as obtain the favorable testimony of
friends and family, in support of his efforts to secure a
reduction of his sentence. He says he was directly and
demonstrably injured by defendant’s conduct insofar a s , once the
court denied his motion, state law prevented him from filing
another motion for sentence reduction for three years. See N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 651:20.
Discussion
While Croft’s disappointment and frustration over the
State’s failure to produce him for the original hearing on his
motion for sentence reduction are understandable, his claim
against defendant is without merit. It i s , of course, well-
established that the Constitution guarantees inmates the right to
a “reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations
of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Bounds v .
Smith, 430 U.S. 8 1 7 , 825 (1977). That right of access, however,
is not unbounded. The constitution obligates prisons and prison
administrators to afford inmates “adequate, effective, and
meaningful” access to the courts. Id. at 822. But, as the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed, “[t]he
constitutionally relevant benchmark is meaningful, not total or
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unlimited access.” Campbell v . Miller, 787 F.2d 2 1 7 , 226 (7th
Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). See also Lewis v . Casey,
518
U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (“Bounds does not guarantee inmates the
wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines
capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions
to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided
are those that the inmates need in order to attack their
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge
the conditions of their confinement.”).
To prevail on his claim that defendant violated his
constitutionally protected right of adequate and meaningful
access to the courts, Croft must demonstrate that he suffered an
actual injury as a result of his transfer to Colorado, such as
the inability to provide adequate legal support for his motion
due to insufficient legal resources at the correctional facility
in Colorado or the dismissal of his motion for failure to
prosecute. See, e.g., Casey, 518 U.S. at 349-51 (holding that
inmates must do more than simply demonstrate that their
constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts was
impaired in some theoretical sense). Croft has not done s o .
And, his opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
insufficient to demonstrate the existence of any genuinely
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disputed material facts or prevent the entry in defendant’s favor
of judgment as a matter of law.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has made clear that an
inmate who files a motion seeking a reduction in his or her
sentence is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on that motion
as a matter of right. Instead, the court in which the motion is
pending has the discretion to grant or deny an inmate’s request
for oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. See State v . Roy,
138 N.H. 9 7 , 98 (1993). In this case, although the state
superior court originally scheduled a hearing on Croft’s motion
(and then rescheduled that hearing when Croft missed the original
hearing), it ultimately ruled on the merits of Croft’s motion,
without the benefit of oral argument. While Croft was not
afforded the opportunity to present oral argument in support of
his motion, he was able to fully and fairly present his claims to
the court, which considered them on the merits. It necessarily
follows that, as a matter of law, he was not denied “adequate,
effective, and meaningful” access to the courts. See, e.g.,
Demoran v . Witt,
781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A plaintiff
in a civil suit who is confined in state prison at the time of a
hearing has no absolute right to appear personally.”).
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If Croft objected to the lower state court’s decision to
rule on the merits of his motion based solely on the written
submissions and without the benefit of oral argument, he should
have either moved for reconsideration or appealed that decision
to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. He did neither. As a
result, his claim that the he likely would have prevailed on the
motion, had he only be able to attend the originally scheduled
hearing, is pure speculation. See generally Cadle, 116 F.3d at
960. It is certainly not the type of “injury” that is sufficient
to vest him with standing to pursue a section 1983 claim for
interference with his constitutionally protected right to
meaningful access to the courts.
Conclusion
I f , when Croft was unable to attend the original state court
hearing on his motion seeking a reduced sentence, the court had
dismissed his motion for failure to prosecute, this might be an
entirely different case. But it did not. Instead, the state
court addressed and rejected Croft’s motion on the merits. While
it is possible to speculate (as does Croft) that he might have
been able to more forcefully and/or persuasively present his case
had he been afforded the opportunity to argue his motion orally,
the state court obviously determined that it could rule on
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Croft’s motion based solely on the written record. That decision
i s , under New Hampshire law, committed to the court’s discretion.
If Croft disagreed with either the court’s decision on the merits
or its decision to proceed without oral argument, he should have
moved for reconsideration or filed an appeal with the New
Hampshire Supreme Court.
Because Croft cannot demonstrate that he suffered any actual
injury as a result of defendant’s alleged conduct, he cannot, as
a matter of law, prevail on his claim that defendant interfered
with his constitutionally protected right to adequate, effective,
and meaningful access to the courts. For the foregoing reasons,
as well as those set forth in defendant’s memorandum of law,
defendant’s motion for summary judgment (document n o . 13) is
granted. Plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum (document n o . 15) is denied as moot.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with
this order and close the case.
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SO ORDERED.
£.
S/teven J. McAuliffe
Chief Judge
June 1 4 , 2006
cc: Sean Croft, pro se
Andrew B . Livernois, Esq.
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