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2006 DNH 70

Parker v. MVM, Inc.

New Hampshire District Court

Decided June 20, 2006

New Hampshire District Court · decided 2006-06-20

Relies on Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. · Smith v. Fw Morse & Co Inc · Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

Decided 2006-06-20

Parker v . MVM, Inc.                  05-CV-380-SM 06/20/06
                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                   DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


Richard Parker,
     Plaintiff

    v.                                 Civil N o . 05-cv-380-SM
                                       Opinion N o . 
2006 DNH 070
MVM, Inc.,
     Defendant


                           O R D E R


    Plaintiff, Richard Parker, brings this action against his

former employer, MVM, Inc., claiming it unlawfully terminated his

employment. In his complaint, Parker advances common law claims

for wrongful termination and breach of contract, as well as state

and federal statutory claims for age discrimination.   MVM moves

to dismiss the common law wrongful termination claim, asserting

that because it is founded on Parker’s assertion that he was

discharged because of his age, it is preempted by the state and

federal statutes prohibiting age discrimination.   Parker objects.



                       Standard of Review

    When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true the well-pleaded factual

allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences

therefrom in the plaintiff’s favor and determine whether the
complaint, so read, sets forth facts sufficient to justify

recovery on any cognizable theory.”    Martin v . Applied Cellular

Tech., Inc., 
284 F.3d 1
 , 6 (1st Cir. 2002).   Dismissal is

appropriate only if “it clearly appears, according to the facts

alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.”

Langadinos v . American Airlines, Inc., 
199 F.3d 6
 8 , 69 (1st Cir.

2000).   See also Gorski v . N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 
290 F.3d 466, 472

(1st Cir. 2002) (“The issue presently before u s , however, is not

what the plaintiff is required ultimately to prove in order to

prevail on her claim, but rather what she is required to plead in

order to be permitted to develop her case for eventual

adjudication on the merits.”) (emphasis in original).



     Notwithstanding this deferential standard of review,

however, the court need not accept as true a plaintiff’s “bald

assertions” or conclusions of law.    See Resolution Trust Corp. v .

Driscoll, 
985 F.2d 4
 4 , 48 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Factual allegations

in a complaint are assumed to be true when a court is passing

upon a motion to dismiss, but this tolerance does not extend to

legal conclusions or to bald assertions.”) (citations omitted).

See also Chongris v . Board of Appeals, 
811 F.2d 3
 6 , 37 (1st Cir.

1987).




                                 2
                             Background

     After reaching age 6 2 , Parker spoke with representatives of

MVM about reducing his employment from full-time to part-time, so

he might begin receiving Social Security benefits without

incurring tax penalties. Eventually that request was honored

and, although he retained the title “Quality Assurance Manager”

and received the same hourly rate of pay, his work schedule was

reduced to only 11 hours per week.    Soon thereafter, however, he

was told that his position was erroneously converted to part-

time.   But, rather than simply reinstating him to his prior full-

time position (an option Parker says he both welcomed and

communicated to M V M ) , MVM transferred Parker to another job and

filled his former position with a younger employee.      Parker

understandably viewed the transfer as a demotion.



     In count one of his amended complaint (document n o . 9 ) ,

Parker asserts that he was constructively discharged when MVM

demoted “him to a position for which he was grossly

overqualified, ill-suited and in which he would be supervised by

younger, less experienced personnel, including one who had been

his subordinate.”   
Id.
 at para. 3 1 . He goes on to say:


     MVM’s employment action against Parker was not
     motivated by business necessity but rather by malice

                                  3
     and personal animus, predicated on the view that he
     would ultimately feel he had no choice but to resign
     rather than continue working under circumstances that
     MVM knew would be demeaning and intolerable.

     Parker was punished for seeking to continue to perform
     a job he was deeply committed to while obtaining
     reasonable accommodation from his employer for agerelated limitations.

     Considering the advancing average age of the American
     worker and economic pressures extending the age at
     which workers like Parker can reasonably expect to be
     able to retire, there is a sound public policy basis to
     hold MVM legally accountable for its wrongful actions
     against Parker.


Id.
 at paras. 32-34 (emphasis supplied).



                              Discussion

     To state a viable claim for wrongful discharge under New

Hampshire’s common law, a plaintiff must allege two things:


     one, that the employer terminated the employment out of
     bad faith, malice, or retaliation; and two, that the
     employer terminated the employment because the employee
     performed acts which public policy would encourage or
     because he refused to perform acts which public policy
     would condemn.


Short v . Sch. Admin. Unit N o . 1 6 , 
136 N.H. 7
 6 , 84 (1992) (citing

Cloutier v . A & P Tea Co., 
121 N.H. 915, 921-22
 (1981)) (emphasis

supplied).   See also Monge v . Beebe Rubber Co., 
114 N.H. 130
                                  4
(1974).   Count one of Parker’s complaint fails to state a viable

cause of action for wrongful discharge for at least two reasons.



     First, and most notably, while he certainly alleges that his

former employer acted out of bad faith and/or malice, Parker

fails to allege that he was discharged because he engaged in

conduct which public policy would encourage or because he refused

to engage in conduct which public policy would condemn.   Instead,

he says MVM terminated his employment because of his age.   The

New Hampshire Supreme Court has expressly held that the common

law cause of action for wrongful termination is not the proper

vehicle by which to seek redress for alleged age discrimination.


     We construe Monge to apply only to a situation where an
     employee is discharged because he performed an act that
     public policy would encourage, or refused to do that
     which public policy would condemn. A discharge due to
     sickness does not fall within this category, and is
     generally remedied by medical insurance or disability
     provisions in an employment contract. Nor does
     discharge because of age fall within this narrow
     category. The proper remedy for an action for unlawful
     age discrimination is provided for by statute.


Howard v . Dorr Woolen Co., 
120 N.H. 295, 298
 (1980) (citations

omitted) (emphasis supplied).




                                 5
       Nowhere in his complaint does Parker allege that his

constructive termination was the result of his having engaged (or

having refused to engage) in any particular conduct with public

policy implications. He claims he was demoted because of his

age.   Under those circumstances, he cannot pursue a common law

claim for wrongful discharge. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court

has made clear, the common law cause of action for wrongful

discharge is not the proper means by which to remedy a discharge

that was motivated by someone’s status or physical condition.

Instead, that cause of action is properly invoked only when an

employee is discharged in response to his or her having engaged

in a “narrow category” of conduct. Howard, 
120 N.H. at 297
.



       Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has

interpreted New Hampshire common law to preclude a cause of

action for wrongful termination when the aggrieved employee has a

statutory cause of action arising out of the same conduct.


       Title VII not only codifies the public policy against
       gender-based discrimination (including, but not limited
       t o , pregnancy discrimination) but also creates a
       private right of action to remedy violations of that
       policy and limns a mature procedure for pursuing such
       an action. Under Wenners [v. Great State Beverages,
       Inc., 
140 N.H. 100
 (1995)], the existence of such a
       remedy precludes the appellant, in the circumstances of
       this case, from asserting a common law claim for
       wrongful discharge.


                                  6
Smith v . F.W. Morse & Co., 
76 F.3d 413, 429
 (1996) (emphasis

supplied).



      The Smith decision remains binding precedent in this

circuit.     So, since Parker asserts that his employment was

terminated because of his age and since both state and federal

statutes specifically provide a remedy for age discrimination, he

cannot, as a matter of law, pursue a common law claim for

wrongful discharge arising out of alleged age discrimination.



                               Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, Parker’s amended complaint fails

to state a viable claim for wrongful termination under the common

law of New Hampshire.    Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss

count one of plaintiff’s amended complaint (document no. 12) is

granted.


      SO ORDERED.



                                 Steven J . McAuliffe
                                 Chief Judge
June 20, 2006

cc:   Glen A. Perlow, Esq.
      David W. McGrath, Esq.
      Christopher Cole, Esq.

                                   7

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