¶1files a dissenting opinion, in which HILL, J., joins.
¶2[¶32] While I agree with most everything said in the majority opinion, I simply would come to a different conclusion. If W.R.Cr.P. 16(d)(2) truly does give the district court broad discretion in improvising a remedy for discovery violations by the State “as it deems just under the circumstances,” then the circumstances of this ease, coupled with the matters described in paragraph six of the district court’s order, should suffice. The district court deemed a particular remedy to be just under the circumstances. Even though the district court’s order did not directly identify and discuss the Dennison factors, I would find that it sufficiently recited a reasoned decision, and sufficiently met the spirit of Dennison. Repeated violations by a prosecutor’s office constitute the type of extreme behavior for which nothing short of dismissal with prejudice may have any effect.