Quillen v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First-degree felony murder is now limited to a handful of enumerated felonies. Thus, the English common law policy decisions to escape the onerous penalties imposed on felony convictions are no longer viable. In addition, a plain reading and literal application of § 701.8(2) also will not subsume other forms of homicide. In addition to second-degree felony murder, a homicide is second-degree murder when committed by an act which is imminently dangerous to another person and evincing a depraved mind, but without any premeditated design to affect the death of any individual. Homicide is first-degree manslaughter when a killing is committed: 1) during the commission of a misdemeanor; 2) in the heat of passion; or 3) in an unnecessary attempt to prevent the person killed from committing a crime. Construing the see-ond-degree murder statute together with the first-degree manslaughter statute, it is clear the Legislature intended for any felony, as defined by statute, to serve as the basis for a second-degree felony murder conviction unless the defendant was acting while in the heat of passion or in an unnee-essary attempt to resist a crime. Further, second degree manslaughter is committed by a person who acts negligently, but does not commit a felony. Therefore, applying § 7018 to any felony, not listed in § 701.7(B), does not subsume second-degree manslaughter.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Barnett v. State

2. “Despite the narrow purpose to which the merger rule is directed, the Court's decisions in this area now poise it to void a felony murder conviction whenever there is either too much criminal nexus or not enough: too little relationship between the felony and the killing and liability will not attach; too direct a relationship and the lesser and greater offenses "merge" to the same effect. To these judicial complications of a seemingly straightforward legislative policy, today's opinion adds a non-sequitur: the lesser predicate crime first merges with the more serious act of killing and then (astonishingly) re-emerges to serve as the offense of conviction. The criminal homicide into which this lesser crime merged is then set at naught; its prosecution is abated forever. Previous findings of a merger violation resulted in reversal and remand for a new trial on a proper homicide charge. The remedy imposed, here is unprecedented.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Barnett v. State

3. “The Oklahoma Legislature has clearly enunciated its intent and set out the criteria for both first and second-degree felony murder ... Section 701.8(2) is recognition by the Legislature that a homicide can occur during the commission of felonies other. than those specifically enumerated under the first-degree felony murder statute and under cireumstances not warranting a first-degree murder charge Appellant's failure to seek medical attention for her son, which was inherently and potentially dangerous to her son's life in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding both the predicate felony and the homicide, brings this case within the historical definition of second degree felony murder [CJriminal liability for the baby's murder based upon Appellant's willful failure to seek medical attention (commission of the felony of child neglect) is an appropriate application of the second-degree felony murder statute.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Barnett v. State