¶1DISSENTING STATEMENT BY
¶2¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent. Under certain circumstances it may be appropri*279ate for the trial court to hold a PCRA hearing in the petitioner’s absence, if counsel is present and can speak on his or her client’s behalf. The difference in this case, however, is that before the hearing, counsel had filed a Tumer/Finley letter and request to withdraw from representation, stating that he believed that Watson’s claims were meritless. In such a situation, I believe that the trial court violated Watson’s due process rights by not only holding a hearing without him, but failing to even notify Watson that the hearing would be held. This is particularly egregious considering that this hearing ultimately led to the denial of Watson’s petition.
¶3¶ 2 It is true that a defendant is not automatically entitled to a hearing on his PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. However, if the trial court elects to hold a hearing on a PCRA petition, and counsel has already filed a motion to withdraw, then I believe that the defendant should be notified of such hearing and have the opportunity to appear and be heard. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(C) (trial judge shall permit defendant to appear in person at hearing on PCRA petition and shall provide defendant opportunity to have counsel).
¶4¶ 8 Obviously if counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, he or she is in no position to properly represent the client’s interests at a hearing in the Ghent’s absence. Indeed, at the conclusion of the PCRA hearing in this case, Watson’s appointed counsel reiterated on the record that his client’s petition should be denied. Thus, I cannot agree with the trial court’s statement that Watson “was ably represented by counsel” at the hearing. (Trial Court Op., 8/11/05, at 12.)
¶5¶ 4 Watson asserts that had he been present at the hearing, he would have pointed out to the court or his counsel that the testimony pertained only to one of the three victims and, thus, failed to address all of his charges. Watson further argues that he was precluded from presenting evidence regarding the Commonwealth’s bad faith in destroying the evidence in 1996, in light of this Court’s approval of DNA testing as early as 1992. In my view, these are not obviously meritless issues and Watson should be given an opportunity to be heard in the PCRA court.
¶6¶ 5 Because I believe that Watson’s due process rights were violated, I would vacate and remand for a proper hearing on Watson’s PCRA petition. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.