2007 Pa. Super. 16 - Commonwealth v. Scott’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In reviewing the grant of a motion to suppress, we are guided by the following standard of review: When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of facts bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Commonwealth v. Scott, 916 A.2d 695, 696 (Pa.Super.2007) (quotation omitted). Further, the construction of a statute raises a question of law. On questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 574 Pa. 620 , 832 A.2d 1042, 1052 (2003).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2015 Pa. Super. 143 - Commonwealth v. Diego · 2008 Pa. Super. 150 - Commonwealth v. Deck

2. “[U]nless there are exigent circumstances, none of which existed here, a search of McDowelfs residence must have been supported by reasonable suspicion that ‘the real or other property in the possession of or under control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.’ That is to say, if there had been evidence McDowell was under supervision for a drug offense, then perhaps the officers would have had reasonable suspicion for the search, but they still would have needed a supervisor’s approval absent exigent circumstances. Here, no such suspicion existed; in fact, Officer Yasenchak testified his sole purpose for being at McDowell’s residence was to conduct a routine home visit, and Officer Kerstetter testified he went along on the ‘spur of the moment.’ Even if one were to concede the officers had the ‘right’ to conduct a Terry stop, which this Court specifically denies, the ■ officers had no reasonable basis (suspicion) upon which to detain [Scott]. Once the bag was removed from the premises by [Scott], the officers had no authority to detain [Scott], search the bag that he removed from McDowell’s residence, or do anything other than perhaps call the police on McDowell’s behalf, -if they believed the bag was being stolen. No evidence was presented to suggest the officers believed [Scott] to be armed and dangerous, warranting a search for their protection.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2015 Pa. Super. 201 - Commonwealth v. Mathis