2007 Pa. Super. 172 - Leber v. Stretton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A collateral order is an order [1] separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where [2] the right involved is too important to be denied review and [3] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 61 - Shearer, D. and J. v. Hafer, S. · 2011 Pa. Super. 3 - Pilchesky v. Gatelli

2. “[e]ven if [the judges] were the sole source of the information, we ... determine that [the plaintiffs] desire to question [the judges] regarding events which occurred in the course of their judicial duty not only will take time away from their role as district judges but also necessitates delving into the thought processes they utilized in those positions. As a matter of public policy, we find this type of questioning unacceptable and hold that judicial officers are immune from testifying as to information surrounding their conduct during an official proceeding.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ciarlone v. City of Reading · Commonwealth v. McClure

3. “A century ago, the United States Supreme Court declared it “wholly improper” to subject decision makers to the rigors of an “elaborate cross-examination with regard to the operation of their minds.” Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 , 27 S.Ct. 326 , 51 L.Ed. 636 (1907). Therein, the Court declared: Jurymen cannot be! called, even on a motion for a new trial in the same case, to testify to the motives and influences that led to their verdict. .., Similar reasoning was applied to a judge. ... All the often-repeated reasons for the rule as to jurymen apply with redoubled force to the attempt, by exhibiting on cross-examination the confusion of the members’ minds, to attack in another proceeding the judgment of a lay tribunal, which is intended, so far as may be, to be final, notwithstanding mistakes of fact or law. Id. (citations omitted).[ 22 ] A few decades -later, the United States Supreme Court created a concept known as “the deliberative process privilege.” See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 , 61 S.Ct. 999 , 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941).... Since Morgan, a number .of jurisdictions, including the Third Circuit,.have-utilized the rationale of that case to prohibit judges from testifying under oath.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. McClure