Martin v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[flour requirements must be satisfied before a prior consistent statement will be properly admissible: (1) The declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (8) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tombroek v. State · Marquess v. State

2. “Generally, decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court. Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 14 , 98 P.3d 181, 187 (Wyo.2004). We afford considerable deference to the district court’s decision and, as long as a legitimate basis exists for the district court’s ruling, it will not be reversed on appeal. Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court’s decision. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 20 , 157 P.3d 923, 928 (Wyo.2007); Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 13 , 74 P.3d 699, 707 (Wyo.2003). The burden of establishing an abuse of discretion rests with the appellant. Martin, ¶ 20, 157 P.3d at 928 . If we find that the district court erred in admitting the evidence, we must then determine whether or not the error affected [the appellant’s] substantial rights, providing grounds for reversal, or whether the error was harmless. See Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25 , 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo.2001); W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52. The error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to [the appellant] if the error had never occurred. Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d at 767 . To demonstrate harmful error, [the appellant] must prove prejudice under “circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.199”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Proffit v. State

3. “The error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, [the defendant] must prove prejudice under "cireumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Majors v. State