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2008 ND 152

State v. Gill

North Dakota Supreme Court

Decided August 28, 2008

North Dakota Supreme Court · decided 2008-08-28

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Acting in a community caretaking capacity is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Bridgeford v. Sorel

Relies on Cady v. Dombrowski · United States v. McGough · United States v. Stafford

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2008-08-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently May 2021

13 state decisions

90200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

SANDSTROM, Justice,

¶1dissenting.

¶2[¶ 25] The majority says, at ¶ 18, ‘We now hold that a law enforcement officer’s entry into a dwelling place cannot be justified alone on the basis that the officer is acting in a community caretaking capacity.” The majority’s application of this asserted principle reflects its belief that the community caretaking exception cannot be applied to a dwelling place. In doing so, it misinterprets the federal constitutional law. I therefore respectfully dissent.

¶3[¶ 26] Acting in a community caretak-ing capacity is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). The United States Supreme Court has not excluded the community caretaking exception’s application to dwellings; other federal courts have repeatedly recognized the application of the community caretaking exception to dwellings. E.g., United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.2006) (“A police officer may enter a residence without a warrant as a community caretaker where the officer has a reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring his or her attention.”); United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.2005) (applying the community care-taking principles to entry of residence). No court has said that the exception is inapplicable to dwellings, although courts have on occasion said the exception did not apply under the facts of a particular case. See, e.g., United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2005).

¶4[¶ 27] Separated from the detection of crime is the police officers’ duty of promoting public safety and rendering needed assistance. See, e.g., City of Troy v. Ohlinger, 438 Mich. 477, 475 N.W.2d 54 (1991) (a police officer was justified as part of community caretaker function to enter defendant’s home after receiving information about defendant’s driving away after a car accident, holding his head as if injured, and, after shining his flashlight into defendant’s bedroom, seeing defendant bleeding and not moving); People v. Davis, 442 Mich. 1, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920 (1993) (opining “that rendering aid to persons in dis*462tress is one of the community caretaking functions of the police” and “that entries made to render aid to a person in a private dwelling were part of the community care-taking function”); State v. Mason, 2008 WL 2512811, ¶ 8 (Wis.App.2008) (“We have held that police may, in certain circumstances, conduct an entry and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, provided that the seizure based on community caretaker function is reasonable.”); United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1080 (5th Cir.1990) (concluding officers’ role as community caretakers allowed them to enter a residence in order to keep the peace).

[¶ 28] DALE V. SANDSTROM
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