Smith v. Desautels

¶1¶ 26. concurring. Today’s ruling is supported by the plain language of 21 V.S.A. § 618. The majority’s foray into legislative history is therefore entirely unnecessary, and potentially confusing in some future dispute over the meaning of a statute otherwise clear on its face. When interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain language of the text, In re D’Antonio, 2007 VT 100, ¶ 7, 182 Vt. 599, 939 A.2d 493 (mem.), and presume that the Legislature intended the ordinary meaning of the words. Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999). Legislative history is to be referenced only when the words of the statute are ambiguous, and thus “do not provide sufficient guidance to ascertain legislative intent.” State v. Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 635, 928 A.2d 489 (mem.); LeClair v. Reed ex rel. Reed, 2007 VT 89, ¶ 5, 182 Vt. 594, 939 A.2d 466 (mem.) (“Where the language of a statute is clear, our inquiry is at an *269end and we apply the statute in accordance with its plain meaning.”) (quotations omitted); In re Carroll, 2007 VT 19, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 383, 925 A.2d 990. Nevertheless, despite the clarity of § 618(b) and (d), the majority looks to, and cites in support of our reading of this statute, legislative committee commentary concerning amendments to the Act. In my view, such gratuitous exploration should be avoided, lest it be suggested, erroneously, that language as plain as that in § 618 may still be open to interpretation based on legislative comments arguably inconsistent with the actual words enacted.