Proffit v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “For proper appellate review of the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the record must reflect that the trial court .required the State not only to identify the proper purpose for which uncharged misconduct evidence is being offered, but also to explain how or why it is probative, and why it is more probative than prejudicial.... In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court should consider the following factors: " ■' 1. How clear is it that the defendant com.mitted the prior bad act? 2. Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad acts evidence? 3. Is other evidence available? 4. Is the evidence unnecessarily, cumulative? 5. How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad act? Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the. case on an improper basis. In balancing against its probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the central question whether the defendant committed the charged crime. The trial court should weigh these additional factors against the probative value of the evidence: 1. The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act. The more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act. 2. The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act. Again, the jury will be tem”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garrison v. State

2. “Hicks’ statements to Martinez would only be hearsay if they were being offered to prove the assertions being made by Hicks. Thus, the statements would be hearsay if they were being offered to prove, for instance, that Hicks had arranged a 500-pound marijuana deal, or that the deal had “gone bad,” or that he and Martinez were being threatened with death. The statements were not, however, offered for that purpose. Rather, they were offered for the purpose of showing the effect the statements had upon Martinez and [Proffit] See Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 853-54 (Wyo.1999) (credibility of the declarant not the issue). The fact that Hicks’ statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted also defeats [Proffit’s] contention that admission of the statements violated his constitutional confrontation rights. Crawford, itself, notes that the confrontation clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford [v. Washington], 541 U.S. [36], 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. [1354], 1369 n. 9[, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ]; Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 11 , 169 P.3d 81, 85 (Wyo.2007); Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶¶ 20-26 , 166 P.3d 879, 884-86 (Wyo.2007). [Proffit] has failed to show plain error.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Proffit v. State

3. “We have said that, when this Court reviews a trial court’s determination to admit evidence against a W.R.E. 403 challenge, we “will not overturn a trial court’s determination' ... as long as a legitimate basis exists supporting the determination.” Law [v. State ], 2004 WY 111, ¶ 15 , 98 P.3d [181,] 187 [ (Wyo. 2004) ]. Further, the appellant “must demonstrate that the evidence had little or no probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury.” Id. (quoting Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1981)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garrison v. State