Roesch v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This case is very different from the circumstances where we ruled that the sentences were void because the district court violated the defendants' rights to a speedy sentencing. In Yates, the district court had attempted to use a Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 7-13-302 (Michie 1987) sentence deferral on one of several counts and, accordingly, had delayed the imposition of sentence on the deferred count for more than a decade. Applying the newly adopted rule, this Court concluded that the district court's decision to suspend imposition of sentence for more than ten years was unreasonable. In Daugherty [v. State, 2002 WY 52 ] ¶ 35, 44 P.3d [28,] 89, the district court deferred sentencing on one of two counts for an undetermined amount of time, without stating its reasons for doing so. After revoking Daugherty's probation on the first count, the district court proceeded to sentence him on the second count. The sentencing took place three years after guilt had been established. We ruled that the delay was unreasonable. Because the sentences in Yates and Daugherty were imposed after the defendants engaged in subsequent bad conduct, this Court was concerned that their due process rights had been violated because they were subjected to greater punishment than if they had been sentenced in a timely fashion. As we stated earlier, the purpose of the rule requiring timely sentencing. is to prevent the possibility that a greater punishment than is deserved will be imposed based upon conduct occurring”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Brown v. State

2. “We elect to hold that a delay in sentencing in excess of one calendar year from the date guilt is established, either by trial, whether to a jury or to the court, or upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, is presumptively unreasonable. A court may not pronounce sentence on a defendant after the expiration of such time, unless the record clearly establishes those facts and cireumstances that excuse the delay, thus making later imposition of the sentence reasonable. The State must bear the burden of establishing those facts and cireum-stances.... While we hold that the delay in excess of one year is presumptively unreasonable, we do not hold that the delay serves to deprive the district court of jurisdiction. Rather, we hold that the delay exceeds the bounds of reason if it occurs beyond that date and, in the interest of fairness, due process of law, and expeditious handling of court matters, a court should be foreclosed from imposing sentence after the one year period of time. [[Image here]] The rule that we espouse protects important rights of the convicted defendant. It serves to prevent the possibility that a greater punishment than is deserved will be imposed because of subsequent conduct that results in a violation of the probation. It also serves to ensure that any vagaries of memory will not interfere with the imposition of a sentence appropriate to the individual and the crime.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Brown v. State

3. “This Court will not disturb a sentence on the ground of sentencing procedures absent a showing by the defendant of an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, cireumstances that manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct that offends the public sense of fair play.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Brown v. State